CVE-2026-97037 (GCVE-0-2026-97037)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 03:13 – Updated: 2026-11-11 03:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Linker script injection via split -Wl, flags and Darwin or symbol linker flags in cgo in cmd/go
Summary
Building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause arbitrary code execution at link time by passing linker script files to the host linker via "#cgo LDFLAGS". Split "-Wl," flags that consume a following argument (such as "-Wl,-rpath", "-Wl,--just-symbols", and "-Wl,-undefined") previously accepted a bare second argument without a "-Wl," prefix, which the compiler driver passes directly to the linker as a positional input file. Additionally, when using GNU ld.bfd, flags such as "-framework", "-Wl,-framework", "-Wl,-undefined", "-Wl,--just-symbols", "-Wl,-R", "-Wl,-subsystem", and (on non-Darwin platforms) "-Wl,-sectcreate" could cause ld.bfd to interpret their arguments as linker scripts if they named a regular file on disk. The go command now requires a "-Wl," prefix on the second token of split "-Wl," flags (except "-Wl,-R"), verifies that these flags do not reference linker script files, and disallows bare "-Wl,--warn-backrefs-exclude".
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Go toolchain | cmd/go |
Affected:
0 , < 1.26.11
(semver)
Affected: 1.27.0-0 , < 1.27.4 (semver) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/go",
"product": "cmd/go",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.26.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause arbitrary code execution at link time by passing linker script files to the host linker via \"#cgo LDFLAGS\". Split \"-Wl,\" flags that consume a following argument (such as \"-Wl,-rpath\", \"-Wl,--just-symbols\", and \"-Wl,-undefined\") previously accepted a bare second argument without a \"-Wl,\" prefix, which the compiler driver passes directly to the linker as a positional input file. Additionally, when using GNU ld.bfd, flags such as \"-framework\", \"-Wl,-framework\", \"-Wl,-undefined\", \"-Wl,--just-symbols\", \"-Wl,-R\", \"-Wl,-subsystem\", and (on non-Darwin platforms) \"-Wl,-sectcreate\" could cause ld.bfd to interpret their arguments as linker scripts if they named a regular file on disk. The go command now requires a \"-Wl,\" prefix on the second token of split \"-Wl,\" flags (except \"-Wl,-R\"), verifies that these flags do not reference linker script files, and disallows bare \"-Wl,--warn-backrefs-exclude\"."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"description": "CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)",
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T03:13:16.142Z",
"orgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"shortName": "Go"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/862150"
},
{
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/82573"
},
{
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iY8TY0wWgbM"
},
{
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6854"
}
],
"title": "Linker script injection via split -Wl, flags and Darwin or symbol linker flags in cgo in cmd/go"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "1bb62c36-49e3-4200-9d77-64a1400537cc",
"assignerShortName": "Go",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-97037",
"datePublished": "2026-11-11T03:13:16.142Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-23T23:05:04.987Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T03:13:16.142Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pkg.go.dev",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "cmd/go",
"product": "cmd/go",
"vendor": "Go toolchain",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1.26.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "1.27.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1.27.0-0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@golang.org"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause arbitrary code execution at link time by passing linker script files to the host linker via \"#cgo LDFLAGS\". Split \"-Wl,\" flags that consume a following argument (such as \"-Wl,-rpath\", \"-Wl,--just-symbols\", and \"-Wl,-undefined\") previously accepted a bare second argument without a \"-Wl,\" prefix, which the compiler driver passes directly to the linker as a positional input file. Additionally, when using GNU ld.bfd, flags such as \"-framework\", \"-Wl,-framework\", \"-Wl,-undefined\", \"-Wl,--just-symbols\", \"-Wl,-R\", \"-Wl,-subsystem\", and (on non-Darwin platforms) \"-Wl,-sectcreate\" could cause ld.bfd to interpret their arguments as linker scripts if they named a regular file on disk. The go command now requires a \"-Wl,\" prefix on the second token of split \"-Wl,\" flags (except \"-Wl,-R\"), verifies that these flags do not reference linker script files, and disallows bare \"-Wl,--warn-backrefs-exclude\"."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-97037",
"lastModified": "2026-11-11T05:19:57.860",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-11T05:19:57.860",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://go.dev/cl/862150"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://go.dev/issue/82573"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/iY8TY0wWgbM"
},
{
"source": "security@golang.org",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6854"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@golang.org",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
}
}
}
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