OESA-2026-4100 (CVE-2026-0799)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-25 01:28 – Updated: 2026-09-25 01:28 – Source websiteThis is the official web site of tcpdump, a powerful command-line packet analyzer; and libpcap, a portable C/C++ library for network traffic capture.
Security Fix(es):
In BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.(CVE-2026-0799)
The rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet.(CVE-2026-18238)
rpcapd can allocate up to 65536 bytes per each RPCAP_MSG_UPDATEFILTER_REQ or RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REQ message received from the client, but it never frees the memory, so it leaks memory even under normal use. A malicious client can cause the server to leak memory substantially faster.(CVE-2026-18313)
libpcap BPF interpreter calls abort() if it encounters a BPF instruction that has an invalid opcode. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can terminate the OS process.(CVE-2026-31911)
libpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.(CVE-2026-31912)
libpcap BPF interpreter for the 'div #k' and 'mod #k' ALU instructions does not check whether the immediate value is zero. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause a division by zero.(CVE-2026-6244)
libpcap BPF interpreter treats the offset in the 'ja L' BPF instruction as a signed integer to implement looping via backward jumps, but it does not limit the number of loop iterations. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to loop infinitely.(CVE-2026-6554)
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"libpcap-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libpcap-debuginfo-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libpcap-debugsource-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"libpcap-devel-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"libpcap-help-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"libpcap-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"libpcap-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libpcap-debuginfo-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libpcap-debugsource-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"libpcap-devel-1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "libpcap",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/libpcap\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.10.4-6.oe2403sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "This is the official web site of tcpdump, a powerful command-line packet analyzer; and libpcap, a portable C/C++ library for network traffic capture.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIn BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.(CVE-2026-0799)\n\nThe rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet.(CVE-2026-18238)\n\nrpcapd can allocate up to 65536 bytes per each RPCAP_MSG_UPDATEFILTER_REQ or RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REQ message received from the client, but it never frees the memory, so it leaks memory even under normal use. A malicious client can cause the server to leak memory substantially faster.(CVE-2026-18313)\n\nlibpcap BPF interpreter calls abort() if it encounters a BPF instruction that has an invalid opcode. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can terminate the OS process.(CVE-2026-31911)\n\nlibpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.(CVE-2026-31912)\n\nlibpcap BPF interpreter for the \u0026apos;div #k\u0026apos; and \u0026apos;mod #k\u0026apos; ALU instructions does not check whether the immediate value is zero. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause a division by zero.(CVE-2026-6244)\n\nlibpcap BPF interpreter treats the offset in the \u0026apos;ja L\u0026apos; BPF instruction as a signed integer to implement looping via backward jumps, but it does not limit the number of loop iterations. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to loop infinitely.(CVE-2026-6554)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4100",
"modified": "2026-09-25T01:28:24Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T01:28:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4100"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0799"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18238"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18313"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31911"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31912"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6244"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6554"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "libpcap security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-0799",
"CVE-2026-18238",
"CVE-2026-18313",
"CVE-2026-31911",
"CVE-2026-31912",
"CVE-2026-6244",
"CVE-2026-6554"
]
}
Sightings
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|---|
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