Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-39G5-2Q66-34FM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:31

Details

A vulnerability in rustdesk-client RustDesk Client rustdesk-client on Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, Android, WebClient (Strategy sync, HTTP API client, config options engine modules) allows Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle. This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hbbs_http/sync.Rs, hbb_common/src/config.Rs and program routines Strategy merge loop in sync.Rs, Config::set_options().

This issue affects RustDesk Client: through 1.4.5.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-657"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T16:16:19Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in rustdesk-client RustDesk Client rustdesk-client on Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, Android, WebClient (Strategy sync, HTTP API client, config options engine modules) allows Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle. This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hbbs_http/sync.Rs, hbb_common/src/config.Rs and program routines Strategy merge loop in sync.Rs, Config::set_options().\n\nThis issue affects RustDesk Client: through 1.4.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-39g5-2q66-34fm",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:31:36Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T18:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSds6jjpd38oO_yIAyd1HYtKNUuea-I-ozAPpGhYI7QgAU-QGJ7D8a4rOZVj1vmiUXV1EcdRHf9aZAW/pub"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustdesk.com/docs/en/self-host/client-configuration/advanced-settings"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulsec.org"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-39PV-4J6C-2G6V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:24 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:03

Summary

@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning

Details

Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in TransferState using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).

The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.

An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., q=aaCAZMMM for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., /api/user/profile). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState cache.

Impact

When the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user's profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:

State Poisoning: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely.
Information Leakage: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker's search results and rendered on the page, the victim's sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.

Patched Versions

22.0.1
21.2.17
20.3.25

Framework-Level Fix

The logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure SHA-256 hash algorithm for generating TransferState cache keys in HttpTransferCache. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your HttpClient requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:

this.http.get('/api/user/profile', {
  transferCache: false
});

Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:


import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser';

export const appConfig = {
  providers: [
    provideClientHydration(
      withNoHttpTransferCache()
    )
  ]
};

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by CodeMender from Google DeepMind.

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "22.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "19.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-328",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T16:16:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Angular\u0027s `HttpTransferCache` caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in `TransferState` using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).\n\nThe cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.\n\nAn attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., `q=aaCAZMMM` for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., `/api/user/profile`). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the `TransferState` cache.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user\u0027s profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:\n\n* **State Poisoning**: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely.  \n* **Information Leakage**: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker\u0027s search results and rendered on the page, the victim\u0027s sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.\n\n### Patched Versions\n* 22.0.1  \n* 21.2.17  \n* 20.3.25\n\n### Framework-Level Fix\n\nThe logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure **SHA-256** hash algorithm for generating `TransferState` cache keys in `HttpTransferCache`. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your `HttpClient` requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:\n\n```ts\nthis.http.get(\u0027/api/user/profile\u0027, {\n  transferCache: false\n});\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:\n\n```ts\n\nimport { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from \u0027@angular/platform-browser\u0027;\n\nexport const appConfig = {\n  providers: [\n    provideClientHydration(\n      withNoHttpTransferCache()\n    )\n  ]\n};\n\n```\n\n### Credits\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [CodeMender from Google DeepMind](https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/).",
  "id": "GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T22:03:56Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/5f36274da3f961430ae72865159afa02a1dd9133"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning"
}

GHSA-39VM-H38V-J867

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:25 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:25

Details

IP address spoofing when proxying using mod_remoteip and mod_rewrite For configurations using proxying with mod_remoteip and certain mod_rewrite rules, an attacker could spoof their IP address for logging and PHP scripts. Note this issue was fixed in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.24 but was retrospectively allocated a low severity CVE in 2020.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11985"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-08-07T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IP address spoofing when proxying using mod_remoteip and mod_rewrite For configurations using proxying with mod_remoteip and certain mod_rewrite rules, an attacker could spoof their IP address for logging and PHP scripts. Note this issue was fixed in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.24 but was retrospectively allocated a low severity CVE in 2020.",
  "id": "GHSA-39vm-h38v-j867",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:25:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:25:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11985"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2021.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200827-0002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202008-04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HYVYE2ZERFXDV6RMKK3I5SDSDQLPSEIQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A2RN46PRBJE7E7OPD4YZX5SVWV5QKGV5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf6449464fd8b7437704c55f88361b66f12d5b5f90bcce66af4be4ba9@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd336919f655b7ff309385e34a143e41c503e133da80414485b3abcc9@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rcc44594d4d6579b90deccd4536b5d31f099ef563df39b094be286b9e@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rc998b18880df98bafaade071346690c2bc1444adaa1a1ea464b93f0a@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9f93cf6dde308d42a9c807784e8102600d0397f5f834890708bf6920@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r76142b8c5119df2178be7c2dba88fde552eedeec37ea993dfce68d1d@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r476d175be0aaf4a17680ef98c5153b4d336eaef76fb2224cc94c463a@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c5c3104813c1c5508b55564b66546933079250a46ce50eee90b2e36@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r09bb998baee74a2c316446bd1a41ae7f8d7049d09d9ff991471e8775@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r03ee478b3dda3e381fd6189366fa7af97c980d2f602846eef935277d@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3CJ6-X6GM-3HC5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-25 09:30 – Updated: 2024-11-25 09:30

Details

IPP software versions prior to v1.71 do not sufficiently verify the authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

Severity

5.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-33861"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-25T09:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IPP software versions prior to v1.71 do not sufficiently verify the authenticity of data, in a\nway that causes it to accept invalid data.",
  "id": "GHSA-3cj6-x6gm-3hc5",
  "modified": "2024-11-25T09:30:59Z",
  "published": "2024-11-25T09:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33861"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.eaton.com/content/dam/eaton/company/news-insights/cybersecurity/ETN-VA-2022-1011.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3F32-JC9W-78M7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-26 18:31 – Updated: 2024-09-26 21:31

Details

The goTenna Pro series use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message.

Severity

0.0 (None)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N

6.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47123"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-353"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-26T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The goTenna Pro series use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message.",
  "id": "GHSA-3f32-jc9w-78m7",
  "modified": "2024-09-26T21:31:11Z",
  "published": "2024-09-26T18:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47123"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-270-04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3FXJ-6JH8-HVHX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:21 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:21

Summary

chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`

Details

Summary

The RealIP middleware in go-chi/chi is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.

Details

In middleware/realip.go, the realIP function parses the X-Forwarded-For header and extracts the first comma-separated value:

func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
    // ...
    } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
        ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")
    }
    // ...
}

Standard practice for X-Forwarded-For is that each proxy appends the client's IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed_ip>, <actual_proxy_ip>, and go-chi/chi will treat <spoofed_ip> as the source of the request.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.

package main

import (
        "fmt"
        "net/http"
        "net/http/httptest"

        "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
        "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)

func main() {
        r := chi.NewRouter()

        // Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware
        r.Use(middleware.RealIP)

        // An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)
        r.Get("/admin/secret", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
                clientIP := r.RemoteAddr
                fmt.Printf("[Server] Request received from IP: %s\n", clientIP)

                // Simulate IP-based access control
                if clientIP == "1.2.3.4" {
                        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
                        w.Write([]byte("CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\n"))
                } else {
                        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
                        w.Write([]byte("Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\n"))
                }
        })

        // --- Attack Simulation ---
        fmt.Println("--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---")

        // 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)
        req1, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
        rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
        r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)
        fmt.Printf("[Client] Normal Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())

        // 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)
        // Attacker claims to be '1.2.3.4'
        req2, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
        req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP
        rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
        r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
        fmt.Printf("[Client] Spoofed Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())
}

Impact

An attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to: - Bypass of Authentication/Authorization: Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP. - Rate Limiting Evasion: Circumbeting rate limiters that use RemoteAddr as a key. - Log Forgery: Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.

CWE

CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

CVSS Score

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.9 Moderate)

Affected Versions

github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 <= v5.2.1 (and all previous versions)

Recommendation

Stop using middleware.RealIP if you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy.
Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.
Use the X-Forwarded-For header by traversing it from right to left and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.

Suggested Fix

A secure implementation of RealIP should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the X-Forwarded-For header from right to left:

func GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {
        xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
        if xff == "" {
                return r.RemoteAddr
        }

        ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
        // Traverse from right to left
        for i := len(ips) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
                ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])
                ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
                if ip == nil {
                        continue
                }

                if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {
                        return ipStr
                }
        }

        return r.RemoteAddr
}

func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {
        for _, network := range trustedProxies {
                if network.Contains(ip) {
                        return true
                }
        }
        return false
}

By providing a configuration like middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}) , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.2.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.\n\n## Details\nIn `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value:\n\n```go\nfunc realIP(r *http.Request) string {\n    // ...\n    } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != \"\" {\n        ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, \",\")\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nStandard practice for `X-Forwarded-For` is that each proxy appends the client\u0027s IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like `X-Forwarded-For: \u003cspoofed_ip\u003e, \u003cactual_proxy_ip\u003e`, and `go-chi/chi` will treat `\u003cspoofed_ip\u003e` as the source of the request.\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n        \"fmt\"\n        \"net/http\"\n        \"net/http/httptest\"\n\n        \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n        \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n        r := chi.NewRouter()\n\n        // Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware\n        r.Use(middleware.RealIP)\n\n        // An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)\n        r.Get(\"/admin/secret\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n                clientIP := r.RemoteAddr\n                fmt.Printf(\"[Server] Request received from IP: %s\\n\", clientIP)\n\n                // Simulate IP-based access control\n                if clientIP == \"1.2.3.4\" {\n                        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n                        w.Write([]byte(\"CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\\n\"))\n                } else {\n                        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n                        w.Write([]byte(\"Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\\n\"))\n                }\n        })\n\n        // --- Attack Simulation ---\n        fmt.Println(\"--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---\")\n\n        // 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)\n        req1, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n        rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n        r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)\n        fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Normal Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())\n\n        // 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)\n        // Attacker claims to be \u00271.2.3.4\u0027\n        req2, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n        req2.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", \"1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8\") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP\n        rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n        r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)\n        fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Spoofed Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:\n- **Bypass of Authentication/Authorization:** Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.\n- **Rate Limiting Evasion:** Circumbeting rate limiters that use `RemoteAddr` as a key.\n- **Log Forgery:** Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-290:** Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n- **CWE-345:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## CVSS Score\n- **CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N** (6.9 Moderate)\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` \u003c= `v5.2.1` (and all previous versions)\n\n## Recommendation\n1.  **Stop using `middleware.RealIP`** if you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy.\n2.  Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.\n3.  Use the `X-Forwarded-For` header by traversing it from **right to left** and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nA secure implementation of `RealIP` should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the `X-Forwarded-For` header from right to left:\n\n```go\nfunc GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {\n        xff := r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")\n        if xff == \"\" {\n                return r.RemoteAddr\n        }\n\n        ips := strings.Split(xff, \",\")\n        // Traverse from right to left\n        for i := len(ips) - 1; i \u003e= 0; i-- {\n                ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])\n                ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n                if ip == nil {\n                        continue\n                }\n\n                if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {\n                        return ipStr\n                }\n        }\n\n        return r.RemoteAddr\n}\n\nfunc isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {\n        for _, network := range trustedProxies {\n                if network.Contains(ip) {\n                        return true\n                }\n        }\n        return false\n}\n```\n\nBy providing a configuration like `middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{\"10.0.0.0/8\"}})` , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:21:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`"
}

GHSA-3GF7-PFQC-82V4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-02-16 18:31

Details

A GRE dataset file within Systems Manager can be tampered with and distributed to PCUs.

Severity

6.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30562"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-13T20:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A GRE dataset file within Systems Manager can be tampered with and distributed to PCUs. \n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-3gf7-pfqc-82v4",
  "modified": "2024-02-16T18:31:04Z",
  "published": "2023-07-13T21:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30562"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bd.com/en-us/about-bd/cybersecurity/bulletin/bd-alaris-system-with-guardrails-suite-mx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3GX8-Q682-38MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 20:51 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:38

Summary

OpenID Connect nonce generated but never validated — ID token replay attack

Details

Summary

The roadiz/openid package generates an OIDC nonce in OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate() and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but never stores it and never validates it on the callback. The OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate() never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value.

Details

In src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP:

'nonce' => $this->tokenGenerator->generateToken(),

However, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store.

In src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php, the JWT validation constraints are: - LooseValidAt (expiry) - PermittedFor (audience) - IssuedBy (issuer) - HostedDomain (optional) - UserInfoEndpoint (optional)

No nonce constraint is present.

In src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php, the authenticate() method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the nonce claim in the ID token.

PoC

Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect).
Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired.
Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token's validity window.

Additionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently.

Impact

ID token replay attacks: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period.
Token injection attacks: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection.
Affects any Roadiz application using the roadiz/openid package with OpenID Connect SSO.

The OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the nonce claim if it was present in the authorization request.

Severity

5.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "roadiz/openid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "roadiz/openid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.31"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "roadiz/openid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "roadiz/openid"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.43"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T20:51:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T22:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `roadiz/openid` package generates an OIDC nonce in `OAuth2LinkGenerator::generate()` and includes it in the authorization request sent to the identity provider, but **never stores it** and **never validates it** on the callback. The `OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory` validation chain does not include a nonce constraint, and `OpenIdAuthenticator::authenticate()` never checks the nonce claim in the returned ID token against a stored value.\n\n### Details\nIn `src/OAuth2LinkGenerator.php`, a nonce is created and sent to the IdP:\n```php\n\u0027nonce\u0027 =\u003e $this-\u003etokenGenerator-\u003egenerateToken(),\n```\nHowever, this value is neither stored in session, cache, nor any other persistent store.\n\nIn `src/OpenIdJwtConfigurationFactory.php`, the JWT validation constraints are:\n- `LooseValidAt` (expiry)\n- `PermittedFor` (audience)\n- `IssuedBy` (issuer)\n- `HostedDomain` (optional)\n- `UserInfoEndpoint` (optional)\n\n**No nonce constraint is present.**\n\nIn `src/Authentication/OpenIdAuthenticator.php`, the `authenticate()` method validates the state CSRF token correctly (fixed in v2.7.10), but never retrieves a stored nonce or compares it against the `nonce` claim in the ID token.\n\n### PoC\n1. Obtain a valid ID token from a legitimate OIDC flow for a target user (e.g. via network interception, browser history leak, or referrer header exposure on a non-HTTPS redirect).\n2. Replay the ID token: Since the nonce in the token is never cross-checked against a client-stored value, the token passes all validation constraints as long as it has not expired.\n3. Result: An attacker can authenticate as the victim within the ID token\u0027s validity window.\n\nAdditionally, in an authorization code flow with multiple concurrent sessions, a malicious IdP or a compromised token endpoint could inject a token with a mismatched nonce, and the application would accept it silently.\n\n### Impact\n- **ID token replay attacks**: Valid but intercepted tokens can be reused for authentication within their validity period.\n- **Token injection attacks**: A malicious or compromised identity provider can inject tokens across sessions without detection.\n- Affects any Roadiz application using the `roadiz/openid` package with OpenID Connect SSO.\n\nThe OIDC Core 1.0 specification (Section 3.1.3.7) explicitly requires clients to verify the `nonce` claim if it was present in the authorization request.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gx8-q682-38mx",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:38:01Z",
  "published": "2026-04-29T20:51:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/roadiz/core-bundle-dev-app/security/advisories/GHSA-3gx8-q682-38mx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42206"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/roadiz/core-bundle-dev-app"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenID Connect nonce generated but never validated \u2014 ID token replay attack"
}

GHSA-3HFQ-CX9J-923W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-14 22:20 – Updated: 2023-11-14 22:20

Summary

Attacker can cause Kyverno user to unintentionally consume insecure image

Details

An issue was found in Kyverno that allowed an attacker to control the digest of images used by Kyverno users. The issue would require the attacker to compromise the registry that the Kyverno fetch their images from. The attacker could then return a vulnerable image to the the user and leverage that to further escalate their position. As such, the attacker would need to know which images the Kyverno user consumes and know of one of multiple exploitable vulnerabilities in previous digests of the images. Alternatively, if the attacker has compromised the registry, they could craft a malicious image with a different digest with intentionally placed vulnerabilities and deliver the image to the user.

An attacker was not be able to control other parameters of the image than the digest by exploiting this vulnerability.

Users pulling their images from trusted registries are not impacted by this vulnerability. There is no evidence of this being exploited in the wild.

The issue has been patched in 1.11.0.

The vulnerability was found during an ongoing security audit of Kyverno conducted by Ada Logics, facilitated by OSTIF and funded by the CNCF.

Members of the community have raised concerns over the similarity between this vulnerability and the one identified with CVE-2023-46737; They are two different issues with two different root causes and different levels of impact. Some differences are:

The current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) has its root cause in Kyverno whereas the root cause of CVE-2023-46737 is in Cosigns code base.
The impact of the current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) is that an attacker can trick Kyverno into consuming a different image than the one the user requested; The impact of CVE-2023-46737 is an endless data attack resulting in a denial-of-service.
The fix of the current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) does not result in users being secure from CVE-2023-46737 and vice versa.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47630"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-14T22:20:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T21:15:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was found in Kyverno that allowed an attacker to control the digest of images used by Kyverno users. The issue would require the attacker to compromise the registry that the Kyverno fetch their images from. The attacker could then return a vulnerable image to the the user and leverage that to further escalate their position. As such, the attacker would need to know which images the Kyverno user consumes and know of one of multiple exploitable vulnerabilities in previous digests of the images. Alternatively, if the attacker has compromised the registry, they could craft a malicious image with a different digest with intentionally placed vulnerabilities and deliver the image to the user. \n\nAn attacker was not be able to control other parameters of the image than the digest by exploiting this vulnerability.\n\nUsers pulling their images from trusted registries are not impacted by this vulnerability. There is no evidence of this being exploited in the wild.\n\nThe issue has been patched in 1.11.0. \n\nThe vulnerability was found during an ongoing security audit of Kyverno conducted by Ada Logics, facilitated by OSTIF and funded by the CNCF.\n\nMembers of the community have raised concerns over the similarity between this vulnerability and the one identified with CVE-2023-46737; They are two different issues with two different root causes and different levels of impact. Some differences are:\n\n- The current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) has its root cause in Kyverno whereas the root cause of CVE-2023-46737 is in Cosigns code base. \n- The impact of the current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) is that an attacker can trick Kyverno into consuming a different image than the one the user requested; The impact of CVE-2023-46737 is an endless data attack resulting in a denial-of-service.\n- The fix of the current advisory (GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w) does not result in users being secure from CVE-2023-46737 and vice versa.",
  "id": "GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w",
  "modified": "2023-11-14T22:20:09Z",
  "published": "2023-11-14T22:20:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-3hfq-cx9j-923w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47630"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/releases/tag/v1.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Attacker can cause Kyverno user to unintentionally consume insecure image"
}

GHSA-3M3Q-X3GJ-F79X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:01

Summary

OpenClaw optional voice-call plugin: webhook verification may be bypassed behind certain proxy configurations

Details

Affected Packages / Versions

This issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled.

Package: @openclaw/voice-call
Vulnerable versions: < 2026.2.3
Patched versions: >= 2026.2.3

Legacy package name (if you are still using it):

Package: @clawdbot/voice-call
Vulnerable versions: <= 2026.1.24
Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to @openclaw/voice-call

Summary

In certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted.

Impact

An external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed.

Root Cause

Some deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example Forwarded / X-Forwarded-*) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification.

Resolution

Ignore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip Forwarded and X-Forwarded-* headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly.

Fix Commit(s)

a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f

Credits

Thanks @0x5t for reporting.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@openclaw/voice-call"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@clawdbot/voice-call"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2026.1.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28465"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:31:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n\nThis issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled.\n\n- Package: `@openclaw/voice-call`\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c 2026.2.3`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.3`\n\nLegacy package name (if you are still using it):\n\n- Package: `@clawdbot/voice-call`\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.1.24`\n- Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to `@openclaw/voice-call`\n\n## Summary\n\nIn certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nSome deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-*`) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification.\n\n## Resolution\n\nIgnore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, strip `Forwarded` and `X-Forwarded-*` headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f`\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks `@0x5t` for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-3m3q-x3gj-f79x",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T01:01:21Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3m3q-x3gj-f79x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28465"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-voice-call-webhook-verification-bypass-via-forwarded-headers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw optional voice-call plugin: webhook verification may be bypassed behind certain proxy configurations"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.

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