GHSA-39PV-4J6C-2G6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:24 – Updated: 2026-06-15 17:24Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in TransferState using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).
The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.
An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., q=aaCAZMMM for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., /api/user/profile). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState cache.
Impact
When the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user's profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:
- State Poisoning: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely.
- Information Leakage: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker's search results and rendered on the page, the victim's sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.
Patched Versions
- 22.0.1
- 21.2.17
- 20.3.25
Framework-Level Fix
The logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure SHA-256 hash algorithm for generating TransferState cache keys in HttpTransferCache. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your HttpClient requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:
this.http.get('/api/user/profile', {
transferCache: false
});
Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:
import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser';
export const appConfig = {
providers: [
provideClientHydration(
withNoHttpTransferCache()
)
]
};
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by CodeMender from Google DeepMind.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.2.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.3.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "19.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Angular\u0027s `HttpTransferCache` caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in `TransferState` using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).\n\nThe cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.\n\nAn attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., `q=aaCAZMMM` for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., `/api/user/profile`). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the `TransferState` cache.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user\u0027s profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:\n\n* **State Poisoning**: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely. \n* **Information Leakage**: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker\u0027s search results and rendered on the page, the victim\u0027s sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.\n\n### Patched Versions\n* 22.0.1 \n* 21.2.17 \n* 20.3.25\n\n### Framework-Level Fix\n\nThe logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure **SHA-256** hash algorithm for generating `TransferState` cache keys in `HttpTransferCache`. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your `HttpClient` requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:\n\n```ts\nthis.http.get(\u0027/api/user/profile\u0027, {\n transferCache: false\n});\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:\n\n```ts\n\nimport { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from \u0027@angular/platform-browser\u0027;\n\nexport const appConfig = {\n providers: [\n provideClientHydration(\n withNoHttpTransferCache()\n )\n ]\n};\n\n```\n\n### Credits\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [CodeMender from Google DeepMind](https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/).",
"id": "GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v",
"modified": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/5f36274da3f961430ae72865159afa02a1dd9133"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.