CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-33FG-V3G6-559Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-13 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-17 00:00Due to insufficient input validation, SAP Business Objects - version 420, allows an authenticated attacker to submit a malicious request through an allowed operation. On successful exploitation, an attacker can view or modify information causing a limited impact on confidentiality and integrity of the application.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31598"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-12T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Due to insufficient input validation, SAP Business Objects - version 420, allows an authenticated attacker to submit a malicious request through an allowed operation. On successful exploitation, an attacker can view or modify information causing a limited impact on confidentiality and integrity of the application.",
"id": "GHSA-33fg-v3g6-559q",
"modified": "2022-07-17T00:00:46Z",
"published": "2022-07-13T00:00:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31598"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3213279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-33QG-7WPP-89CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:15 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:21Rack::Session::Cookie incorrectly handles decryption failures when configured with secrets:. If cookie decryption fails, the implementation falls back to a default decoder instead of rejecting the cookie. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to supply a crafted session cookie that is accepted as valid session data without knowledge of any configured secret.
Because this mechanism is used to load session state, an attacker can manipulate session contents and potentially gain unauthorized access.
Details
When secrets: is configured, Rack::Session::Cookie attempts to decrypt incoming session cookies using one of the configured encryptors. If all decrypt attempts fail, the implementation does not reject the cookie. Instead, it falls back to decoding the cookie using a default coder.
This fallback path processes attacker-controlled cookie data as trusted session state. The behavior is implicit and occurs even when encrypted cookies are expected.
The fallback decoder is applied automatically and does not require the application to opt into a non-encrypted session format. As a result, a client can send a specially crafted cookie value that bypasses the intended integrity protections provided by secrets:.
This issue affects both default configurations and those using alternative serializers for encrypted payloads.
Impact
Any Rack application using Rack::Session::Cookie with secrets: may be affected.
[!NOTE] Rails applications are typically not affected — Rails uses
ActionDispatch::Session::CookieStore, which is a separate implementation backed byActiveSupport::MessageEncryptorand does not share the vulnerable code path.
An unauthenticated attacker can supply a crafted session cookie that is accepted as valid session data. This can lead to authentication bypass or privilege escalation in applications that rely on session values for identity or authorization decisions.
Depending on application behavior and available runtime components, processing of untrusted session data may also expose additional risks.
Mitigation
- Update to a patched version of
rack-sessionthat rejects cookies when decryption fails under thesecrets:configuration. - After updating, rotate session secrets to invalidate existing session cookies, since attacker-supplied session data may have been accepted and re-issued prior to the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack-session"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39324"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-502",
"CWE-565"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:15:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T18:16:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "`Rack::Session::Cookie` incorrectly handles decryption failures when configured with `secrets:`. If cookie decryption fails, the implementation falls back to a default decoder instead of rejecting the cookie. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to supply a crafted session cookie that is accepted as valid session data without knowledge of any configured secret.\n\nBecause this mechanism is used to load session state, an attacker can manipulate session contents and potentially gain unauthorized access.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen `secrets:` is configured, `Rack::Session::Cookie` attempts to decrypt incoming session cookies using one of the configured encryptors. If all decrypt attempts fail, the implementation does not reject the cookie. Instead, it falls back to decoding the cookie using a default coder.\n\nThis fallback path processes attacker-controlled cookie data as trusted session state. The behavior is implicit and occurs even when encrypted cookies are expected.\n\nThe fallback decoder is applied automatically and does not require the application to opt into a non-encrypted session format. As a result, a client can send a specially crafted cookie value that bypasses the intended integrity protections provided by `secrets:`.\n\nThis issue affects both default configurations and those using alternative serializers for encrypted payloads.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny Rack application using `Rack::Session::Cookie` with `secrets:` may be affected.\n\n\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e Rails applications are typically not affected \u2014 Rails uses `ActionDispatch::Session::CookieStore`, which is a separate implementation backed by `ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor` and does not share the vulnerable code path.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can supply a crafted session cookie that is accepted as valid session data. This can lead to authentication bypass or privilege escalation in applications that rely on session values for identity or authorization decisions.\n\nDepending on application behavior and available runtime components, processing of untrusted session data may also expose additional risks.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of`rack-session` that rejects cookies when decryption fails under the `secrets:` configuration.\n * After updating, rotate session secrets to invalidate existing session cookies, since attacker-supplied session data may have been accepted and re-issued prior to the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-33qg-7wpp-89cq",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:21:11Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:15:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack-session/security/advisories/GHSA-33qg-7wpp-89cq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39324"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack-session"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack-session/CVE-2026-39324.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Rack::Session::Cookie secrets: decrypt failure fallback enables secretless session forgery and Marshal deserialization"
}
GHSA-3466-HWG6-RP7H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-21 21:30 – Updated: 2024-08-22 18:31Insufficient data validation in Installer in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 128.0.6613.84 allowed a local attacker to perform privilege escalation via a crafted symbolic link. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7979"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-21T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insufficient data validation in Installer in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 128.0.6613.84 allowed a local attacker to perform privilege escalation via a crafted symbolic link. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-3466-hwg6-rp7h",
"modified": "2024-08-22T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-08-21T21:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7979"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2024/08/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_21.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/356064205"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-34W5-C283-J9FG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:34 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:34Description
In symfony/ux-live-component, a component's server-side state is exposed to the browser as a set of props (#[LiveProp]-annotated properties). Props marked writable: true can be freely changed by the client. Read-only props are round-tripped to the browser and back, and their integrity is protected by an HMAC so the client cannot tamper with them. Child components additionally receive a propsFromParent blob, also HMAC-signed.
The HMAC computed by Symfony\UX\LiveComponent\LiveComponentHydrator covered only the sorted prop key/value pairs. It didn't include the component name, the slot identifier (props vs propsFromParent), or any request context, and a single application-wide secret is used for every component. A signed blob the server minted for component A is therefore a valid signature for component B if the key names happen to match, and a props blob can be replayed in the propsFromParent slot (or the reverse). An attacker can use this to set a read-only prop on a target component to a value they were only ever allowed to choose as a writable prop on another component.
Resolution
The HMAC is now bound to its context: the component name and a slot identifier are included in the pre-image before hashing. Two constants (CHECKSUM_SLOT_PROPS and CHECKSUM_SLOT_PROPS_FROM_PARENT) name the two slots, and calculateChecksum(), verifyChecksum(), addChecksumToData(), and ChildComponentPartialRenderer thread these values through. Cross-component and cross-slot replays no longer verify.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Anthropic (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-live-component"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.36.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-live-component"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49212"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:34:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Description\n\nIn `symfony/ux-live-component`, a component\u0027s server-side state is exposed to the browser as a set of props (`#[LiveProp]`-annotated properties). Props marked `writable: true` can be freely changed by the client. Read-only props are round-tripped to the browser and back, and their integrity is protected by an HMAC so the client cannot tamper with them. Child components additionally receive a `propsFromParent` blob, also HMAC-signed.\n\nThe HMAC computed by `Symfony\\UX\\LiveComponent\\LiveComponentHydrator` covered only the sorted prop key/value pairs. It didn\u0027t include the component name, the slot identifier (`props` vs `propsFromParent`), or any request context, and a single application-wide secret is used for every component. A signed blob the server minted for component A is therefore a valid signature for component B if the key names happen to match, and a `props` blob can be replayed in the `propsFromParent` slot (or the reverse). An attacker can use this to set a read-only prop on a target component to a value they were only ever allowed to choose as a writable prop on another component.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe HMAC is now bound to its context: the component name and a slot identifier are included in the pre-image before hashing. Two constants (`CHECKSUM_SLOT_PROPS` and `CHECKSUM_SLOT_PROPS_FROM_PARENT`) name the two slots, and `calculateChecksum()`, `verifyChecksum()`, `addChecksumToData()`, and `ChildComponentPartialRenderer` thread these values through. Cross-component and cross-slot replays no longer verify.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/a224b5af3e2e33ee14ac71356ae0e0877900a81c) for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Anthropic (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-34w5-c283-j9fg",
"modified": "2026-06-19T19:34:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T19:34:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/security/advisories/GHSA-34w5-c283-j9fg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/a224b5af3e2e33ee14ac71356ae0e0877900a81c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/ux-live-component/CVE-2026-49212.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "symfony/ux-live-component: LiveComponentHydrator HMAC checksum lacks component and slot binding"
}
GHSA-35GM-XGGQ-MJXQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:48 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:48show_default.php in the LocalFilesEditor extension before 11.4.0.1 for Piwigo allows Local File Inclusion because the file parameter is not validated with a proper regular-expression check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-31783"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-26T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "show_default.php in the LocalFilesEditor extension before 11.4.0.1 for Piwigo allows Local File Inclusion because the file parameter is not validated with a proper regular-expression check.",
"id": "GHSA-35gm-xggq-mjxq",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:48:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:48:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Piwigo/LocalFilesEditor/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Piwigo/LocalFilesEditor/commit/dda691d3e45bfd166ac175c70bd8b91cb4917b6b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://piwigo.org/ext/index.php?cid=null"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-37RH-J9CP-X58F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-28 00:00A CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability exists that could cause loading of unauthorized firmware images due to improper verification of the firmware signature. Affected Products: X80 advanced RTU Communication Module (BMENOR2200H) (V2.01 and later), OPC UA Modicon Communication Module (BMENUA0100) (V1.10 and prior)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34763"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-13T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability exists that could cause loading of unauthorized firmware images due to improper verification of the firmware signature. Affected Products: X80 advanced RTU Communication Module (BMENOR2200H) (V2.01 and later), OPC UA Modicon Communication Module (BMENUA0100) (V1.10 and prior)",
"id": "GHSA-37rh-j9cp-x58f",
"modified": "2022-07-28T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-07-14T00:00:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2022-193-01_OPC_UA_X80_Advanced_RTU_Modicon_Communication_Modules+_Security_Notification.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-37WC-H8XC-5HC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-10 17:46 – Updated: 2025-02-10 19:51Summary
The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.
Details
verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned.
Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.
PoC
The proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey and resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey.
Impact
This impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-proto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25188"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-10T18:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.\n\n### Details\n`verify_dnskey_rrset()` will return `Ok(true)` if any record\u0027s public key matches a trust anchor. This results in `verify_rrset()` returning a `Secure` proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. `verify_default_rrset()` looks up DNSKEY records by calling `handle.lookup()`, which takes the above code path. There\u0027s a comment following this that says \"DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup\", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in `verify_default_rrset()`, `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its `Proof` is returned.\n\nSimilarly, `verify_dnskey_rrset()` returns `Ok(false)` if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says \"If all the keys are valid, then we are secure\", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone\u0027s delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to `verify_rrset()`, it will call `verify_default_rrset()`. The special handling for DNSKEYs in `verify_default_rrset()` will then call `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its `Proof`. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside `verify_dnskey_rrset()` and cut `verify_default_rrset()` out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.\n\n### PoC\nThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey` and `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey`.\n\n### Impact\nThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.",
"id": "GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4",
"modified": "2025-02-10T19:51:23Z",
"published": "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/e118c6eec569f4340421f86ee0686714010c63e9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Hickory DNS\u0027s DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains"
}
GHSA-389R-GV7P-R3RP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 14:48 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:42Impact
go-git may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When commit or tag objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, go-git’s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object.
Additionally, go-git’s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from go-git’s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, go-git may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository.
This can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed.
Patches
Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.
Credit
Thanks to @bugbunny-research (https://bugbunny.ai/) for reporting this to sigstore/gitsign, and to @wlynch, @patzielinski and @adityasaky for coordinating the disclosure with the go-git project. :bow: :1st_place_medal:
Thanks to @wayphinder for reporting this to the go-git project. :bow:
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`go-git` may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When `commit` or `tag` objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, `go-git`\u2019s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object.\n\nAdditionally, `go-git`\u2019s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from `go-git`\u2019s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, `go-git` may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository.\n\nThis can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to @bugbunny-research (https://bugbunny.ai/) for reporting this to `sigstore/gitsign`, and to @wlynch, @patzielinski and @adityasaky for coordinating the disclosure with the `go-git` project. :bow: :1st_place_medal: \n\nThanks to @wayphinder for reporting this to the `go-git` project. :bow:",
"id": "GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:42:41Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45022"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "go-git\u0027s improper parsing of specially crafted objects may lead to inconsistent interpretation compared to upstream Git"
}
GHSA-38CG-GG9J-Q9J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-06-27 17:25 – Updated: 2021-08-17 15:33A vulnerability was found in keycloak before 6.0.2. The X.509 authenticator supports the verification of client certificates through the CRL, where the CRL list can be obtained from the URL provided in the certificate itself (CDP) or through the separately configured path. The CRL are often available over the network through unsecured protocols ('http' or 'ldap') and hence the caller should verify the signature and possibly the certification path. Keycloak currently doesn't validate signatures on CRL, which can result in a possibility of various attacks like man-in-the-middle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-06-27T15:43:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-12T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in keycloak before 6.0.2. The X.509 authenticator supports the verification of client certificates through the CRL, where the CRL list can be obtained from the URL provided in the certificate itself (CDP) or through the separately configured path. The CRL are often available over the network through unsecured protocols (\u0027http\u0027 or \u0027ldap\u0027) and hence the caller should verify the signature and possibly the certification path. Keycloak currently doesn\u0027t validate signatures on CRL, which can result in a possibility of various attacks like man-in-the-middle.",
"id": "GHSA-38cg-gg9j-q9j9",
"modified": "2021-08-17T15:33:33Z",
"published": "2019-06-27T17:25:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2019-3875"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Certificate Validation and Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in Keycloak"
}
GHSA-38X5-MX6X-V39W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-25 00:31 – Updated: 2024-12-03 18:31Affected devices beacon to eCharge cloud infrastructure asking if there are any command they should run. This communication is established over an insecure channel since peer verification is disabled everywhere. Therefore, remote unauthenticated users suitably positioned on the network between an EV charger controller and eCharge infrastructure can execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on affected devices.
This issue affects cph2_echarge_firmware: through 2.0.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-24T23:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Affected devices beacon to eCharge cloud infrastructure asking if there are any command they should run. This communication is established over an insecure channel since peer verification is disabled everywhere. Therefore, remote unauthenticated users\u00a0 suitably positioned on the network between an EV charger controller and eCharge infrastructure can execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on affected devices.\n\nThis issue affects cph2_echarge_firmware: through 2.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-38x5-mx6x-v39w",
"modified": "2024-12-03T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-11-25T00:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.onekey.com/resource/critical-vulnerabilities-in-ev-charging-stations-analysis-of-echarge-controllers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.