Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-43FP-RHV2-5GV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-07 23:05 – Updated: 2025-02-12 18:33
VLAI
Summary
Certifi removing TrustCor root certificate
Details

Certifi 2022.12.07 removes root certificates from "TrustCor" from the root store. These are in the process of being removed from Mozilla's trust store.

TrustCor's root certificates are being removed pursuant to an investigation prompted by media reporting that TrustCor's ownership also operated a business that produced spyware. Conclusions of Mozilla's investigation can be found here.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "certifi"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2017.11.05"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2022.12.07"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23491"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-07T23:05:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-07T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Certifi 2022.12.07 removes root certificates from \"TrustCor\" from the root store. These are in the process of being removed from Mozilla\u0027s trust store.\n\nTrustCor\u0027s root certificates are being removed pursuant to an investigation prompted by media reporting that TrustCor\u0027s ownership also operated a business that produced spyware. Conclusions of Mozilla\u0027s investigation can be found [here](https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/oxX69KFvsm4/m/yLohoVqtCgAJ).",
  "id": "GHSA-43fp-rhv2-5gv8",
  "modified": "2025-02-12T18:33:24Z",
  "published": "2022-12-07T23:05:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/security/advisories/GHSA-43fp-rhv2-5gv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23491"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/commit/9e9e840925d7b8e76c76fdac1fab7e6e88c1c3b8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/certifi/PYSEC-2022-42986.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/oxX69KFvsm4/m/yLohoVqtCgAJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230223-0010"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Certifi removing TrustCor root certificate"
}

GHSA-43RR-X62X-Q96W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-20 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-05 21:45
VLAI
Summary
MineAdmin improperly refreshes tokens
Details

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "mineadmin/mineadmin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T15:47:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-20T01:15:56Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-43rr-x62x-q96w",
  "modified": "2026-02-05T21:45:16Z",
  "published": "2026-01-20T03:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SourByte05/MineAdmin-Vulnerability/issues/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mineadmin/mineadmin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.341780"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.341780"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.734272"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MineAdmin improperly refreshes tokens"
}

GHSA-4588-CPVG-RGR5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:45 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:30
VLAI
Details

This vulnerability was caused by an incomplete fix to CVE-2017-0911. Twitter Kit for iOS versions 3.0 to 3.4.0 is vulnerable to a callback verification flaw in the "Login with Twitter" component allowing an attacker to provide alternate credentials. In the final step of "Login with Twitter" authentication information is passed back to the application using the registered custom URL scheme (typically twitterkit-) on iOS. Because the callback handler did not verify the authenticity of the response, this step is vulnerable to forgery, potentially allowing attacker to associate a Twitter account with a third-party service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-5431"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-05-06T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability was caused by an incomplete fix to CVE-2017-0911. Twitter Kit for iOS versions 3.0 to 3.4.0 is vulnerable to a callback verification flaw in the \"Login with Twitter\" component allowing an attacker to provide alternate credentials. In the final step of \"Login with Twitter\" authentication information is passed back to the application using the registered custom URL scheme (typically twitterkit-\u003cconsumer-key\u003e) on iOS. Because the callback handler did not verify the authenticity of the response, this step is vulnerable to forgery, potentially allowing attacker to associate a Twitter account with a third-party service.",
  "id": "GHSA-4588-cpvg-rgr5",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:30:40Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:45:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5431"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/topics/tips/2018/vulnerability-in-twitter-kit-for-ios.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-45FH-G845-PJ9W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:51 – Updated: 2023-07-14 21:25
VLAI
Summary
Auth0 Passport-SharePoint does not validate JWT signature
Details

Auth0 Passport-SharePoint before 0.4.0 does not validate the JWT signature of an Access Token before processing. This allows attackers to forge tokens and bypass authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "passport-sharepoint"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-13483"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-14T21:25:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-25T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Auth0 Passport-SharePoint before 0.4.0 does not validate the JWT signature of an Access Token before processing. This allows attackers to forge tokens and bypass authentication and authorization mechanisms.",
  "id": "GHSA-45fh-g845-pj9w",
  "modified": "2023-07-14T21:25:27Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:51:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13483"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://auth0.com/docs/security/bulletins/cve-2019-13483"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/auth0/passport-sharepoint"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Auth0 Passport-SharePoint does not validate JWT signature"
}

GHSA-45X7-PX36-X8W8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-18 19:22 – Updated: 2026-05-13 15:24
VLAI
Summary
Prefix Truncation Attack against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC aka Terrapin
Details

Summary

Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it.

Mitigations

To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes.

Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.

As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.

Details

The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.

The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.

In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.

For more details see https://terrapin-attack.com.

Impact

This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "russh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.40.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "golang.org/x/crypto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "paramiko"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "golang.org/x/crypto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20231218163308-9d2ee975ef9f"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48795"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-354"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-18T19:22:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-18T16:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nTerrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH\u0027s secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nTo mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called \"strict kex\" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes.\n\n**Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.** \n\nAs a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.\n\n### Details\n\nThe SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.\n\nThe attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.\n\nIn the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message\u0027s sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.\n\nFor more details see [https://terrapin-attack.com](https://terrapin-attack.com). \n\n### Impact\n\nThis attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.",
  "id": "GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T15:24:57Z",
  "published": "2023-12-18T19:22:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/warp-tech/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/issues/165"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hierynomus/sshj/issues/916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/janmojzis/tinyssh/issues/81"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cyd01/KiTTY/issues/520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/proftpd/proftpd/issues/456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/mina-sshd/issues/445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paramiko/paramiko/issues/2337#issuecomment-1887642773"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paramiko/paramiko/issues/2337"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PowerShell/Win32-OpenSSH/issues/2189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mwiede/jsch/issues/457"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/275249"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mwiede/jsch/pull/461"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TeraTermProject/teraterm/commit/7279fbd6ef4d0c8bdd6a90af4ada2899d786eec0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mscdex/ssh2/commit/97b223f8891b96d6fc054df5ab1d5a1a545da2a3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/connectbot/sshlib/commit/5c8b534f6e97db7ac0e0e579331213aa25c173ab"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/commit/8e972c5e94b460379fe0c7d20209c16df81538a5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/warp-tech/russh/commit/1aa340a7df1d5be1c0f4a9e247aade76dfdd2951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/golang/crypto/commit/9d2ee975ef9fe627bf0a6f01c1f69e8ef1d4f05d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oryx-embedded.com/download/#changelog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nova.app/releases/#v11.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38732005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2024-0002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://roumenpetrov.info/secsh/#news20231220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-48795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/source-package/libssh2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/KMZCVGUGJZZVDPCVDA7TEB22VUCNEXDD"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/L5Y6MNNVAPIJSXJERQ6PKZVCIUXSNJK7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LZQVUHWVWRH73YBXUQJOD6CKHDQBU3DM"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/MKQRBF3DWMWPH36LBCOBUTSIZRTPEZXB"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QI3EHAHABFQK7OABNCSF5GMYP6TONTI7"
    },
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/21"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/12/18/3"
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      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/12/19/5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/12/20/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/06/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/17/8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prefix Truncation Attack against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC aka Terrapin"
}

GHSA-46HC-3PVV-7XV3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-06 06:30 – Updated: 2026-06-06 06:30
VLAI
Details

The WPForms – Easy Form Builder for WordPress – Contact Forms, Payment Forms, Surveys, & More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in versions up to and including 1.10.0.1. This is due to the PayPal Commerce webhook endpoint processing unauthenticated JSON webhook payloads without verifying that the request originated from PayPal using the required HMAC-SHA256 webhook signature, and only checking whether the supplied event_type is whitelisted before dispatching the attacker-controlled resource data to handlers that update payment records. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who know a valid PayPal subscription_id to forge PayPal webhook events and modify subscription payment records, such as reactivating a cancelled or suspended subscription by setting its subscription_status to active.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-06T04:17:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WPForms \u2013 Easy Form Builder for WordPress \u2013 Contact Forms, Payment Forms, Surveys, \u0026 More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in versions up to and including 1.10.0.1. This is due to the PayPal Commerce webhook endpoint processing unauthenticated JSON webhook payloads without verifying that the request originated from PayPal using the required HMAC-SHA256 webhook signature, and only checking whether the supplied event_type is whitelisted before dispatching the attacker-controlled resource data to handlers that update payment records. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who know a valid PayPal subscription_id to forge PayPal webhook events and modify subscription payment records, such as reactivating a cancelled or suspended subscription by setting its subscription_status to active.",
  "id": "GHSA-46hc-3pvv-7xv3",
  "modified": "2026-06-06T06:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-06T06:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforms-lite/tags/1.10.0.1/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/WebhookRoute.php#L122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforms-lite/tags/1.10.0.1/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/WebhookRoute.php#L170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforms-lite/tags/1.10.0.1/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/Webhooks/BillingSubscriptionActivated.php#L38"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforms-lite/tags/1.10.0.1/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/Webhooks/BillingSubscriptionCancelled.php#L32"
    },
    {
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    },
    {
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    },
    {
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    },
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    },
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    },
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    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforms-lite/trunk/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/Webhooks/BillingSubscriptionCancelled.php#L32"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3532389/wpforms-lite/trunk/src/Integrations/PayPalCommerce/Api/WebhookRoute.php?old=3486451\u0026old_path=wpforms-lite%2Ftrunk%2Fsrc%2FIntegrations%2FPayPalCommerce%2FApi%2FWebhookRoute.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d5cf5fd2-58c7-42d0-948f-95764647630b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-46Q5-G3J9-WX5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 16:36 – Updated: 2026-03-13 13:35
VLAI
Summary
ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data
Details

Summary

The generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse.

Details

Relevant code paths:

  • src/channels/webhook.rs:121 sets runtime default auth_token: None.
  • src/config/types.rs:910 also defaults webhook config auth_token to None.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:224 (validate_auth) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:128 defines WebhookPayload with identity fields fully controlled by caller input:
  • sender: String
  • chat_id: String
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:421 performs allowlist authorization using payload.sender.
  • src/channels/webhook.rs:433 and src/channels/webhook.rs:434 create InboundMessage using untrusted payload.sender and payload.chat_id.

Why this is vulnerable:

  • The system treats user-provided JSON identity as authoritative identity.
  • Allowlist enforcement does not verify sender authenticity beyond that payload value.
  • chat_id is also attacker-controlled, so routing/session association can be steered to arbitrary chats/conversations.
  • If the webhook is exposed without strong upstream authn/authz controls, spoofing is straightforward.

PoC

  1. Configure the webhook channel in a vulnerable posture (common default behavior):
  2. enabled = true
  3. bind_address = "0.0.0.0" (or any reachable interface)
  4. port = 9876
  5. path = "/webhook"
  6. auth_token = null (or omitted)
  7. allow_from = ["trusted-user-1"]
  8. deny_by_default = true
  9. Start ZeptoClaw.
  10. Send a forged request with attacker-chosen sender and chat_id, without any Authorization header:
curl -i -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:9876/webhook" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{
    "message":"FORGED: run privileged workflow",
    "sender":"trusted-user-1",
    "chat_id":"victim-chat-42"
  }'
  1. Observe:
  2. Response is HTTP/1.1 200 OK.
  3. Message is accepted as if it originated from trusted-user-1.
  4. Message is routed under attacker-chosen chat_id (victim-chat-42).

Impact

  • Vulnerability type:
  • Authentication/authorization bypass (identity spoofing)
  • IDOR-style routing/control issue via attacker-chosen chat_id
  • Affected deployments:
  • Any deployment exposing the generic webhook endpoint without strict upstream authentication and identity binding.
  • Security consequences:
  • Forged inbound messages from spoofed trusted users.
  • Bypass of allowlist intent by injecting allowlisted sender IDs in payload.
  • Cross-chat/session contamination or hijacking by choosing arbitrary chat_id.
  • Potential unauthorized downstream agent/tool actions triggered by malicious input.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "zeptoclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32231"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:36:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (`sender`, `chat_id`) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (`auth_token: None`), an attacker who can reach `POST /webhook` can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary `chat_id` values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse.\n\n### Details\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `src/channels/webhook.rs:121` sets runtime default `auth_token: None`.\n- `src/config/types.rs:910` also defaults webhook config `auth_token` to `None`.\n- `src/channels/webhook.rs:224` (`validate_auth`) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured.\n- `src/channels/webhook.rs:128` defines `WebhookPayload` with identity fields fully controlled by caller input:\n  - `sender: String`\n  - `chat_id: String`\n- `src/channels/webhook.rs:421` performs allowlist authorization using `payload.sender`.\n- `src/channels/webhook.rs:433` and `src/channels/webhook.rs:434` create `InboundMessage` using untrusted `payload.sender` and `payload.chat_id`.\n\nWhy this is vulnerable:\n\n- The system treats user-provided JSON identity as authoritative identity.\n- Allowlist enforcement does not verify sender authenticity beyond that payload value.\n- `chat_id` is also attacker-controlled, so routing/session association can be steered to arbitrary chats/conversations.\n- If the webhook is exposed without strong upstream authn/authz controls, spoofing is straightforward.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure the webhook channel in a vulnerable posture (common default behavior):\n   - `enabled = true`\n   - `bind_address = \"0.0.0.0\"` (or any reachable interface)\n   - `port = 9876`\n   - `path = \"/webhook\"`\n   - `auth_token = null` (or omitted)\n   - `allow_from = [\"trusted-user-1\"]`\n   - `deny_by_default = true`\n2. Start ZeptoClaw.\n3. Send a forged request with attacker-chosen `sender` and `chat_id`, without any `Authorization` header:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:9876/webhook\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\n    \"message\":\"FORGED: run privileged workflow\",\n    \"sender\":\"trusted-user-1\",\n    \"chat_id\":\"victim-chat-42\"\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n4. Observe:\n   - Response is `HTTP/1.1 200 OK`.\n   - Message is accepted as if it originated from `trusted-user-1`.\n   - Message is routed under attacker-chosen `chat_id` (`victim-chat-42`).\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability type:\n  - Authentication/authorization bypass (identity spoofing)\n  - IDOR-style routing/control issue via attacker-chosen `chat_id`\n- Affected deployments:\n  - Any deployment exposing the generic webhook endpoint without strict upstream authentication and identity binding.\n- Security consequences:\n  - Forged inbound messages from spoofed trusted users.\n  - Bypass of allowlist intent by injecting allowlisted sender IDs in payload.\n  - Cross-chat/session contamination or hijacking by choosing arbitrary `chat_id`.\n  - Potential unauthorized downstream agent/tool actions triggered by malicious input.",
  "id": "GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T13:35:55Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T16:36:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32231"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/pull/324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/bf004a20d3687a0c1a9e052ec79536e30d6de134"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted payload data"
}

GHSA-48PQ-2XQ3-C2M4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:47 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:47
VLAI
Summary
CoreWCF: SAML SubjectConfirmation methods and holder-of-key proof keys are not enforced
Details

Impact

The relying application is given a ClaimsPrincipal for a subject whose authority over the assertion the sender never proved. There are two distinct exploit shapes: - Holder-of-key downgrade. An attacker who obtains a holder-of-key SAML assertion that was issued without KeyInfo (issuer bug, custom STS shape, or assertion captured from an interaction where KeyInfo was elided) can present it to the service and be authenticated as the assertion’s subject without producing the proof key the assertion’s confirmation method would normally require. The service’s reliance on holder-of-key for sensitive actions is bypassed. - Custom-method bypass. An attacker who can obtain or arrange the issuance of a SAML assertion bearing a non-standard confirmation method URI (a permissive STS that accepts arbitrary method strings, an experimental custom IDP, or an attacker-side construction that the issuer signs without validating the method field) can present the assertion and be authenticated. Per-method policies that an application or a binding-level policy expects the framework to enforce are silently bypassed.

Preconditions

The service is configured to accept SAML 1.1 tokens via federation. Typical bindings are WS2007FederationHttpBinding and WSFederationHttpBinding, or any custom binding using IssuedSecurityTokenParameters with a SAML 1.1 token type.
The attacker has obtained at least one signed SAML 1.1 assertion of a shape that triggers the bypass.

Patches

Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1

Workarounds

To exploit this issue, it's required that a trusted STS issues SAML assertions whose SubjectConfirmationMethod is not one of the SAML 1.1 trio, or is willing to issue holder-of-key assertions without KeyInfo. If no trusted STS is willing to issue SAML assertions meeting either of these criteria, then a service isn't vulnerable.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54781"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:47:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe relying application is given a ClaimsPrincipal for a subject whose authority over the assertion the sender never proved. There are two distinct exploit shapes:\n- Holder-of-key downgrade. An attacker who obtains a holder-of-key SAML assertion that was issued without KeyInfo (issuer bug, custom STS shape, or assertion captured from an interaction where KeyInfo was elided) can present it to the service and be authenticated as the assertion\u2019s subject without producing the proof key the assertion\u2019s confirmation method would normally require. The service\u2019s reliance on holder-of-key for sensitive actions is bypassed.\n- Custom-method bypass. An attacker who can obtain or arrange the issuance of a SAML assertion bearing a non-standard confirmation method URI (a permissive STS that accepts arbitrary method strings, an experimental custom IDP, or an attacker-side construction that the issuer signs without validating the method field) can present the assertion and be authenticated. Per-method policies that an application or a binding-level policy expects the framework to enforce are silently bypassed.\n\n#### Preconditions\nThe service is configured to accept SAML 1.1 tokens via federation. Typical bindings are WS2007FederationHttpBinding and WSFederationHttpBinding, or any custom binding using IssuedSecurityTokenParameters with a SAML 1.1 token type.  \nThe attacker has obtained at least one signed SAML 1.1 assertion of a shape that triggers the bypass.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1\n\n### Workarounds\nTo exploit this issue, it\u0027s required that a trusted STS issues SAML assertions whose SubjectConfirmationMethod is not one of the SAML 1.1 trio, or is willing to issue holder-of-key assertions without KeyInfo. If no trusted STS is willing to issue SAML assertions meeting either of these criteria, then a service isn\u0027t vulnerable.",
  "id": "GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:47:08Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:47:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreWCF: SAML SubjectConfirmation methods and holder-of-key proof keys are not enforced"
}

GHSA-4CM8-XPFV-JV6F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 16:38 – Updated: 2026-03-12 16:38
VLAI
Summary
ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation
Details

Summary

The email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed From header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input.

Details

Relevant code paths:

  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:311 extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:
  • let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...
  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:328 authorizes using that from value:
  • if !self.is_sender_allowed(&from) { ... }
  • src/channels/email_channel.rs:87 onward (is_sender_allowed) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.
  • There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.

Result: - Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.

PoC

  1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:
  2. channels.email.enabled = true
  3. channels.email.allowed_senders = ["ceo@example.com"]
  4. channels.email.deny_by_default = true
  5. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).
  6. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:
python - <<'PY'
import smtplib
from email.message import EmailMessage

msg = EmailMessage()
msg["From"] = "ceo@example.com"   # forged trusted sender
msg["To"] = "bot-inbox@example.net"
msg["Subject"] = "forged control message"
msg.set_content("FORGED EMAIL CONTENT")

# Example test SMTP endpoint
with smtplib.SMTP("127.0.0.1", 25) as s:
    s.send_message(msg)
PY
  1. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.
  2. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender ceo@example.com and published as inbound channel input.

Impact

  • Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.
  • Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.
  • Security effect:
  • Spoofed From headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.
  • Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.
  • Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.

Patch Recommendation

Add a sender-authentication gate in src/channels/email_channel.rs immediately after parsing from (src/channels/email_channel.rs:311) and before allowlist enforcement (src/channels/email_channel.rs:328). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, DMARC=pass, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before is_sender_allowed is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in EmailConfig (for example, sender_verification_mode), but recommend hardened settings in production: dmarc_aligned, exact-address allowlists, and deny_by_default=true.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "zeptoclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe email channel authorizes senders based on the parsed `From` header identity only. If upstream email authentication/enforcement is weak (for example, relaxed SPF/DKIM/DMARC handling), an attacker can spoof an allowlisted sender address and have the message treated as trusted input. \n\n### Details\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:311` extracts sender identity from parsed message headers:\n  - `let from = parsed.from() ... a.address() ...`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:328` authorizes using that `from` value:\n  - `if !self.is_sender_allowed(\u0026from) { ... }`\n- `src/channels/email_channel.rs:87` onward (`is_sender_allowed`) performs allowlist/domain matching against the same header-derived value.\n- There is no in-channel validation of sender authenticity indicators such as SPF/DKIM/DMARC results before allowlist trust decisions.\n\nResult:\n- Trust decision is based on a potentially spoofable header field unless mailbox/provider-side anti-spoofing controls are strong and enforced.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure email channel with strict sender allowlist:\n   - `channels.email.enabled = true`\n   - `channels.email.allowed_senders = [\"ceo@example.com\"]`\n   - `channels.email.deny_by_default = true`\n2. Ensure the monitored mailbox accepts or forwards a spoofed message (for testing, use a local SMTP path that does not enforce sender authentication strongly).\n3. Send an email to the monitored inbox with forged header identity:\n\n```bash\npython - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.message import EmailMessage\n\nmsg = EmailMessage()\nmsg[\"From\"] = \"ceo@example.com\"   # forged trusted sender\nmsg[\"To\"] = \"bot-inbox@example.net\"\nmsg[\"Subject\"] = \"forged control message\"\nmsg.set_content(\"FORGED EMAIL CONTENT\")\n\n# Example test SMTP endpoint\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\"127.0.0.1\", 25) as s:\n    s.send_message(msg)\nPY\n```\n\n4. Wait for IMAP fetch/IDLE processing.\n5. Observe the message is accepted as allowlisted sender `ceo@example.com` and published as inbound channel input.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability type: sender identity spoofing risk due to header-based authorization.\n- Affected deployments: those using email channel allowlists where upstream anti-spoof controls are weak, misconfigured, or bypassed.\n- Security effect:\n  - Spoofed `From` headers may bypass logical sender allowlist.\n  - Malicious content can enter trusted automation/agent flows as if sent by authorized identities.\n- Risk is reduced in environments with strict SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement and strong inbound mail hygiene, but not eliminated at application layer.\n\n### Patch Recommendation\nAdd a sender-authentication gate in `src/channels/email_channel.rs` immediately after parsing `from` (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:311`) and before allowlist enforcement (`src/channels/email_channel.rs:328`). The gate should require trusted SPF/DKIM/DMARC evidence with domain alignment (for example, `DMARC=pass`, or aligned SPF/DKIM pass) before `is_sender_allowed` is evaluated. For backward compatibility, add a configurable mode in `EmailConfig` (for example, `sender_verification_mode`), but recommend hardened settings in production: `dmarc_aligned`, exact-address allowlists, and `deny_by_default=true`.",
  "id": "GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T16:38:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4cm8-xpfv-jv6f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ZeptoClaw: Email Sender Spoofing to bypass Header-Only From Allowlist Validation"
}

GHSA-4CWC-669Q-R7HF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-12 15:31 – Updated: 2025-06-12 15:31
VLAI
Details

The backup ZIPs are not signed by the application, leading to the possibility that an attacker can download a backup ZIP, modify and re-upload it. This allows the attacker to disrupt the application by configuring the services in a way that they are unable to run, making the application unusable. They can redirect traffic that is meant to be internal to their own hosted services and gathering information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-49199"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-12T15:15:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The backup ZIPs are not signed by the application, leading to the possibility that an attacker can download a backup ZIP, modify and re-upload it. This allows the attacker to disrupt the application by configuring  the  services  in  a  way  that  they  are  unable  to  run,  making  the  application unusable. They can redirect traffic that is meant to be internal to their own hosted services and gathering information.",
  "id": "GHSA-4cwc-669q-r7hf",
  "modified": "2025-06-12T15:31:23Z",
  "published": "2025-06-12T15:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cdn.sick.com/media/docs/1/11/411/Special_information_CYBERSECURITY_BY_SICK_en_IM0084411.PDF"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/psirt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ics-recommended-practices"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2025/sca-2025-0007.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2025/sca-2025-0007.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.