GHSA-MVX4-532P-XFM9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:55 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:55
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation
Details

Title: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation

Summary

Open WebUI documents pending as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with get_verified_user() (which rejects pending), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the features.automations permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (pending) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:

  1. Scheduler did not re-gate the owner. When a stored automation became due, execute_automation() rehydrated the owner with Users.get_user_by_id(...) and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still user/admin or still held features.automations. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.
  2. Model ACL only enforced for exact role user. check_model_access() applied private-model grants only when user.role == "user", so a pending principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner user.

Net effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.

Impact

A pending/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to pending (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.

Patched

In 0.10.0:

  • execute_automation() aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still user or admin and (for non-admins) still holds features.automations, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs.
  • check_model_access() enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role user, so a pending or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.

Credits

@rexpository

Severity
3.1 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59226"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T17:17:04Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "**Title:** Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation\n\n### Summary\n\nOpen WebUI documents `pending` as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with `get_verified_user()` (which rejects `pending`), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the `features.automations` permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (`pending`) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:\n\n1. **Scheduler did not re-gate the owner.** When a stored automation became due, `execute_automation()` rehydrated the owner with `Users.get_user_by_id(...)` and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still `user`/`admin` or still held `features.automations`. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.\n2. **Model ACL only enforced for exact role `user`.** `check_model_access()` applied private-model grants only when `user.role == \"user\"`, so a `pending` principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner `user`.\n\nNet effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator\u0027s configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.\n\n### Impact\n\nA `pending`/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator\u0027s provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation\u0027s stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to `pending` (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.\n\n### Patched\n\nIn 0.10.0:\n\n- `execute_automation()` aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still `user` or `admin` and (for non-admins) still holds `features.automations`, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner\u0027s due automation no longer runs.\n- `check_model_access()` enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role `user`, so a `pending` or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.\n\n### Credits\n\n@rexpository",
  "id": "GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/920b655f4689e2118de928fbc936f6ebd4fed396"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation"
}



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