GHSA-653Q-5476-X79G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 18:18 – Updated: 2026-09-03 18:18Summary
orval's zod client emits each query parameter name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({...}) request-validation schema WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in the query parameter name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({...}) runs -- at MODULE IMPORT (export const OpQueryParams = zod.object({...}) executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The query parameter name is a pure data field. Verified on orval 8.19.0 / Node.
Details
export const OpQueryParams = zod.object({ "a":zod.string(),[require("fs").writeFileSync("PWNED","")]:zod.string(),"b": ... })
Also affects the hono client (reuses zod generation). orval escapes values in zod arrays but not keys in zod.object. Sibling fields: schema property name, header parameter name (CVE-97) (separate reports). Distinct from orval's $ref / route-path / server-url / zod-default findings.
PoC
reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: a query parameter name that breaks the zod.object key and injects a computed key; evaluating it (= importing the module) writes the marker. Verified on 8.19.0.
Impact
JavaScript / OS command execution at import time for anyone who generates an orval zod client from an attacker-controlled spec and imports it.
Suggested fix
Escape the query parameter name for the JS string key (JSON.stringify) in the zod.object key generation; never interpolate a raw name adjacent to [ ] in object-literal position. maintainer-report.txt make_spec.py reproduce.sh
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "orval"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94",
"CWE-95",
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T18:18:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:17:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\norval\u0027s zod client emits each query parameter name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({...}) request-validation schema WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A \" in the query parameter name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({...}) runs -- at MODULE IMPORT (export const OpQueryParams = zod.object({...}) executes on load) -\u003e import-time RCE. The query parameter name is a pure data field. Verified on orval 8.19.0 / Node.\n\n### Details\n\nexport const OpQueryParams = zod.object({ \"a\":zod.string(),[require(\"fs\").writeFileSync(\"PWNED\",\"\")]:zod.string(),\"b\": ... })\n\nAlso affects the hono client (reuses zod generation). orval escapes values in zod arrays but not keys in zod.object. Sibling fields: schema property name, header parameter name (CVE-97) (separate reports). Distinct from orval\u0027s $ref / route-path / server-url / zod-default findings.\n\n### PoC\n\nreproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: a query parameter name that breaks the zod.object key and injects a computed key; evaluating it (= importing the module) writes the marker. Verified on 8.19.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nJavaScript / OS command execution at import time for anyone who generates an orval zod client from an attacker-controlled spec and imports it.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nEscape the query parameter name for the JS string key (JSON.stringify) in the zod.object key generation; never interpolate a raw name adjacent to [ ] in object-literal position. [maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426090/maintainer-report.txt) [make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426091/make_spec.py) [reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426092/reproduce.sh)",
"id": "GHSA-653q-5476-x79g",
"modified": "2026-09-03T18:18:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T18:18:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/security/advisories/GHSA-653q-5476-x79g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/pull/3692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/commit/8ef1bfdf3f9bcaf9dabfbe2e42887f1c0e159ab6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orval-labs/orval/releases/tag/v8.21.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Orval: Import-time RCE via query parameter name -\u003e computed-property-key injection in the zod cli"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.