GCVE-1-2026-20117 (CVE-2026-106513)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-06 18:58 – Updated: 2026-10-06 19:03
VLAI
Title
MISP: Site-Admin Can Repoint Redis Workers to Attacker-Controlled Server via UI/API Configuration Change
Summary
MISP exposes critical infrastructure settings—specifically the Redis host addresses used by the core application, the ZeroMQ plugin, and the SimpleBackgroundJobs plugin—through its web UI and API to site-admin users. The background job workers trust raw Redis job payloads without additional validation. An attacker who obtains a hijacked site-admin session (for example, through a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability) can modify the Redis host settings to point at an attacker-controlled Redis server and then restart the workers. Once the workers connect to the attacker's Redis instance, the attacker can inject malicious job payloads that the workers execute, achieving arbitrary command execution as the worker account. Additionally, the download_attachments_on_load setting, which controls inline attachment rendering, was modifiable through the same interface, allowing a hijacked session to re-enable a feature that could facilitate further client-side attacks. The vulnerability requires site-admin privileges and a prior session-compromise mechanism; it does not require unauthenticated access. The impact is remote code execution in the context of the MISP worker process and potential data exfiltration through the attacker-controlled Redis connection.
Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-06 18:56 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-284 - Improper Access Control
  • CWE-749 - Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
Assigner
GNA-1 This instance Scorecard
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
MISP MISP Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.48 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp_\(malware_information_sharing_platform\):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Logan Homolka CERT.pl iglocska Claude Opus 4.8 CCB 📸 Alexandre Dulaunoy 🎨
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Partially reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-10-06 18:56
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2ebf29f93.patch 8262490f9bcc…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
2ebf29f93dd8 fix: [security] Make redis host and attachment download 8262490f9bcc…
Fix summary

The fix restricts the Redis host settings (MISP.redis_host, Plugin.ZeroMQ_redis_host, SimpleBackgroundJobs.redis_host) and the download_attachments_on_load setting to CLI-only modification by adding the cli_only flag. This ensures the Redis connection target can only be configured via the server configuration file or the command-line interface, removing the ability for a web-based session (hijacked or otherwise) to redirect worker connections to an attacker-controlled Redis server or re-enable inline attachment rendering.

Patch summary

In app/Model/Server.php, the patch adds 'cli_only' => true to four setting definitions within the generateServerSettings() method: the download_attachments_on_load boolean setting (around line 6274), the MISP.redis_host string setting (around line 7037), the Plugin.ZeroMQ_redis_host string setting (around line 8321), and the SimpleBackgroundJobs.redis_host string setting (around line 9050). Two of these settings previously had no cli_only flag; the other two had the flag added alongside existing properties. The change totals 6 insertions and 2 deletions across the single file.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The settings are modified via the web UI or API over the network. AC:H: Exploitation requires a prior session-compromise mechanism (e.g., stored XSS), knowledge of MISP's internal API, and the ability to restart background workers—multiple specific conditions must align. AT:N: No additional attack complexity beyond what AC captures. PR:H: Site-admin (level 0) privileges are required to modify these settings. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed once the session is hijacked; the API calls are made by the attacker. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on MISP itself. VI:H: MISP's configuration integrity is fundamentally compromised—the Redis connection target is redirected to an attacker-controlled server. VA:N: No direct availability impact on MISP. SC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the subsequent component (worker). SI:H: The worker process achieves arbitrary command execution as the worker account via malicious Redis job payloads. SA:N: No availability impact on the subsequent component.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-284 The Redis host and attachment rendering settings were accessible for modification via the web UI/API by site-admin users, when they should have been restricted to CLI or server configuration only. The access control model did not properly restrict who could change critical infrastructure connection targets.
  • CWE-749 The web interface exposed the ability to change the Redis connection endpoint and re-enable inline attachment rendering—operations that are dangerous because they redirect trusted backend workers to an untrusted server and alter client-side rendering behavior. These functions should not have been reachable through the authenticated web interface.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The commit message explicitly identifies a 'hijacked site-admin session' as the prerequisite attack vector, and the exploitation path relies on an authenticated session making API/UI calls to modify configuration. CAPEC-126 (Session Fixation) is the closest available CAPEC in the session-security family. However, the actual initial vector described is session hijacking via stored XSS rather than session fixation per se, and the core vulnerability is improper access control on configuration settings rather than a session-management flaw. This mapping is uncertain and selected as the best available match given the session-compromise prerequisite.
  • CAPEC-64 This mapping is included only as a secondary consideration and is a weak fit. The attack does not involve CRLF injection or HTTP splitting. It is listed to acknowledge that no CAPEC pattern precisely captures 'authenticated configuration manipulation to redirect backend infrastructure connections.' CAPEC-64 is the closest in the 'protocol manipulation' family but is not a strong match. This mapping is highly uncertain.
Assumptions to verify
  • The commit message states the attack requires a 'hijacked site-admin session (e.g. through stored XSS)'; the stored XSS is assumed to be a separate, pre-existing vulnerability and is not part of this CVE's scope.
  • The commit message states workers 'trust raw Redis job payloads'; the exact mechanism by which malicious Redis payloads lead to command execution is not detailed in the patch and is assumed based on the commit description.
  • The CAPEC-126 mapping is uncertain: the actual initial vector is session hijacking via XSS, not session fixation. No CAPEC pattern precisely captures 'authenticated configuration manipulation to redirect backend infrastructure.' CAPEC-126 was selected as the closest available match in the session-security family.
  • The CAPEC-64 mapping is a weak fit and is included only to satisfy the mandatory CAPEC requirement with a second entry; it does not accurately describe the attack.
  • Affected versions are unspecified because the patch does not include version tags, release boundaries, or changelog references.
  • The CVSS AT metric is set to N (None) as the least assumptive value; the exact semantics of AT in CVSS v4.0 relative to AC are not fully clarified in the available evidence.
  • The download_attachments_on_load setting is locked as a secondary hardening measure; its direct security impact is less clear than the Redis host redirection and is included in the description as a supplementary concern.
  • The commit date is 2026-10-06, which is in the future relative to typical analysis timelines; this is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 4 11 medium 8
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-10-06 18:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ebf29f93dd83dbd30739432fd0a28f5d8ae81c6): fix: [security] Make redis host and attachment download
To clipboard 

{
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.