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CVE-2025-34500 (GCVE-0-2025-34500)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-10-24 23:02 – Updated: 2026-07-28 01:48
VLAI
Title
Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 Insecure Update Chain
Summary
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2025-10-27 15:20 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-321 - Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
  • CWE-327 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
  • CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc. Deck Mate 2 Affected: 0 , < all known versions prior to 2025-10-23 (custom)
    cpe:2.3:a:british_airways:entertainment_system:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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