Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-RHX6-VJ26-2FRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-25 00:30 – Updated: 2025-10-25 00:30

Details

Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.

Severity

7.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34500"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-24T23:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Deck Mate 2\u0027s firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit\u0027s USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device\u0027s integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.",
  "id": "GHSA-rhx6-vj26-2frq",
  "modified": "2025-10-25T00:30:39Z",
  "published": "2025-10-25T00:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34500"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2025-34500 (GCVE-0-2025-34500)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-10-24 23:02 – Updated: 2026-07-28 01:48

Title

Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 Insecure Update Chain

Summary

Severity

7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2025-10-27 15:20 UTC

CWE

CWE-321 - Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
CWE-327 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/…	technical-descriptionexploit
https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/	media-coverage
https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shuff…	media-coverage
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-mast…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc.	Deck Mate 2	Affected: 0 , < all known versions prior to 2025-10-23 (custom) cpe:2.3:a:british_airways:entertainment_system::::::::

Credits

Joseph Tartaro of IOActive Enrique Nissim of IOActive Ethan Shackelford of IOActive

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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        "metrics": [
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                  },
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-10-27T15:20:40.299784Z",
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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    ],
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            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
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            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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          "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/"
        },
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          ],
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            }
          ],
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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    "dateReserved": "2025-04-15T19:15:22.611Z",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

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