PYSEC-2026-4111

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-10-01 16:38 - Updated: 2026-10-01 17:10
VLAI
Details

Impact

This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.

  1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the approve/deny actions on ApprovalWorkflowStage. The generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can POST approved responses directly and drive a stage past its min_approvers threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes user and state as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.

  2. Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through ApprovalWorkflow.save() to on_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.

Patches

Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8

Workarounds

Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Impacted products
Name purl
nautobot pkg:pypi/nautobot
Aliases
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nautobot",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/nautobot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.0.0",
        "3.0.1",
        "3.0.10",
        "3.0.11",
        "3.0.2",
        "3.0.3",
        "3.0.4",
        "3.0.5",
        "3.0.6",
        "3.0.7",
        "3.0.8",
        "3.0.9",
        "3.1.0",
        "3.1.0a1",
        "3.1.0a2",
        "3.1.0a3",
        "3.1.0a4",
        "3.1.0a5",
        "3.1.1",
        "3.1.2",
        "3.1.3",
        "3.1.4",
        "3.1.5",
        "3.1.6",
        "3.1.7"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83805",
    "GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
  ],
  "details": "### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-4111",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T17:10:32.792203Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T16:38:37.079884Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/nautobot"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83805"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs"
}



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