PYSEC-2026-3604

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36
VLAI
Details

Summary

POST /api/v1/images/edit performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the /api/v1/images/generations route, the built-in edit_image tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator's credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.

Impact

An authenticated, non-admin user can:

  • bypass the global ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False administrator control;
  • bypass a denied per-user/group features.image_generation permission;
  • cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY for the OpenAI engine).

No cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.

Affected Versions

>= 0.8.11, < 0.10.0 (the /api/v1/images/edit route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in v0.10.0.

Details

/api/v1/images/generations enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION (403 if globally disabled) and features.image_generation (403 for non-admins without the permission). The edit_image built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and features.image_generation. The direct POST /api/v1/images/edit route ran on Depends(get_verified_user) alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.

Proof of Concept

As a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False) or features.image_generation denied for the user:

POST /api/v1/images/edit
Authorization: Bearer <non_admin_user_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"image":"data:image/png;base64,<png>","prompt":"edit","model":"gpt-image-1"}

The request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.

Patch

The direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring generate_images/image_generations): a thin /edit route now enforces ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT and the per-user features.image_generation permission before delegating to the shared image_edits() implementation. The internal callers (the edit_image tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.

Impacted products
Name purl
open-webui pkg:pypi/open-webui

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.11"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.8.11",
        "0.8.12",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.2",
        "0.9.3",
        "0.9.4",
        "0.9.5",
        "0.9.6"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59227",
    "GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission \u2014 the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware \u2014 but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator\u0027s credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated, non-admin user can:\n\n- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;\n- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;\n- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).\n\nNo cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`\u003e= 0.8.11, \u003c 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/images/edit` route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in **v0.10.0**.\n\n## Details\n\n`/api/v1/images/generations` enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION` (403 if globally disabled) and `features.image_generation` (403 for non-admins without the permission). The `edit_image` built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and `features.image_generation`. The direct `POST /api/v1/images/edit` route ran on `Depends(get_verified_user)` alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAs a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or `features.image_generation` denied for the user:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/images/edit\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cnon_admin_user_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"image\":\"data:image/png;base64,\u003cpng\u003e\",\"prompt\":\"edit\",\"model\":\"gpt-image-1\"}\n```\n\nThe request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.\n\n## Patch\n\nThe direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring `generate_images`/`image_generations`): a thin `/edit` route now enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and the per-user `features.image_generation` permission before delegating to the shared `image_edits()` implementation. The internal callers (the `edit_image` tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3604",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:26.995054Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T11:34:42.578333Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/e038bab66dec8d17212eec35b5cb6d6b785a4200"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission"
}



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