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GHSA-VQ4V-J7R6-JQ4M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:36 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:36
VLAI
Summary
pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
Details

Summary

When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.

Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.

Root cause

  • The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw path.join(modules, <resolved name>) in installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706, installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, and deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — without the safeJoinModulesDir guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location is node_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal <name> escapes.
  • The only resolve-time name gate (resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing /, so a scoped @x/../.. passes.

Steps to reproduce

Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):

npm i pnpm@11.9.0
# host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts

Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):

escape dir is outside the project        : true
new file implanted outside node_modules  : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***

Remediation

Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.34.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82393"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:36:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T22:17:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nWhen resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved **manifest `name`** as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose `package.json` `name` is a scoped path traversal (`@x/../../\u2026/\u003cabs path\u003e`) is therefore extracted **outside `node_modules`**, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can **overwrite existing files** there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents \u2192 arbitrary file write \u2192 **code execution** (e.g. `~/.zshrc`, `.git/hooks/pre-commit`, another package\u0027s code). Occurs during `pnpm install` **even with `--ignore-scripts`** (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.\n\nSame class as the just-patched **GHSA-hwx4** (transitive-dependency *alias* traversal) and **GHSA-v23m** (`stage download` manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved **name**.\n\n## Root cause\n- The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw `path.join(modules, \u003cresolved name\u003e)` in `installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706`, `installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614`, and `deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` \u2014 **without** the `safeJoinModulesDir` guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (`installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222`). The store location is `node_modules/.pnpm/\u003cid\u003e/node_modules/\u003cname\u003e`, so a traversal `\u003cname\u003e` escapes.\n- The only resolve-time name gate (`resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753`) rejects only *unscoped* names containing `/`, so a **scoped** `@x/../..` passes.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\nSelf-contained PoC (real `pnpm@11.9.0`; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):\n```\nnpm i pnpm@11.9.0\n# host a tarball whose package.json name = \"@x/\"+\"../\".repeat(25)+\"\u003cabs\u003e/OUTSIDE\"; victim depends on the http URL\npnpm install --ignore-scripts\n```\nConfirmed output (`repro/poc.mjs`, exit 0):\n```\nescape dir is outside the project        : true\nnew file implanted outside node_modules  : true\npre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true\n*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote \u0026 overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***\n```\n\n## Remediation\nRoute the isolated-linker import-target joins (`resolvePeers.ts:706`, `deps-resolver/index.ts:614`, `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`) through `safeJoinModulesDir` (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce `validate-npm-package-name` on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at `pickPackage.ts:753`) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T14:36:59Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T14:36:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm: A tarball dependency\u0027s manifest `name` escapes node_modules \u2192 arbitrary file write/overwrite on install"
}



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