GHSA-V3PR-HXPR-MFM8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 12:30ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T11:16:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nWhen the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK\u2019s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class \u00e2\u20ac\u201d bypassing the accepted\n classes list .\n\n\nZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nFor ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class\u2019s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(\u201ccom.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes \u003cclinit\u003e of SomeClass \u00e2\u20ac\u201d and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers\n\n\nBoth issues have been fixed.",
"id": "GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8",
"modified": "2026-06-03T12:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.