Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-H9VW-JJGR-29WC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 18:31

Details

However, the application stripped only the top-level id and uuid fields and pinned org_id and default on the outer array before saving the data flat. A user with decaying-model permissions could supply a nested model key carrying its own primary key, organisation identifier, and default flag, which bypassed those guards during the save operation.

Impact:

A user with perm_decaying could overwrite an existing decaying model belonging to another organisation in place, altering its name, formula, parameters, or ownership.
A user could create or modify a model flagged as the organisation default, affecting scoring behaviour for other users.
A user could reassign a model's organisation to an arbitrary value.

Preconditions:

Authenticated user with decaying-model permission (perm_decaying).
Network access to the MISP instance.

Affected: <2.5.48.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-104908"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T16:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MISP contains an improper input validation vulnerability in the decaying model import functionality. The import endpoint was intended to create a new decaying model belonging exclusively to the importing user\u0027s organisation, with the default flag forced to off.\n\nHowever, the application stripped only the top-level id and uuid fields and pinned org_id and default on the outer array before saving the data flat. A user with decaying-model permissions could supply a nested model key carrying its own primary key, organisation identifier, and default flag, which bypassed those guards during the save operation.\n\nImpact:\n\n- A user with perm_decaying could overwrite an existing decaying model belonging to another organisation in place, altering its name, formula, parameters, or ownership.\n\n- A user could create or modify a model flagged as the organisation default, affecting scoring behaviour for other users.\n\n- A user could reassign a model\u0027s organisation to an arbitrary value.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- Authenticated user with decaying-model permission (perm_decaying).\n\n- Network access to the MISP instance.\n\nAffected: \u003c2.5.48.",
  "id": "GHSA-h9vw-jjgr-29wc",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T18:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T18:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104908"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-104908 (GCVE-0-2026-104908)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-02 15:56 – Updated: 2026-10-02 16:19

Title

MISP Decaying Model Import Mass Assignment Allows Cross-Organization Model Overwrite and Default Flagging

Summary

MISP contains an improper input validation vulnerability in the decaying model import functionality. The import endpoint was intended to create a new decaying model belonging exclusively to the importing user's organisation, with the default flag forced to off. However, the application stripped only the top-level id and uuid fields and pinned org_id and default on the outer array before saving the data flat. A user with decaying-model permissions could supply a nested model key carrying its own primary key, organisation identifier, and default flag, which bypassed those guards during the save operation. Impact: - A user with perm_decaying could overwrite an existing decaying model belonging to another organisation in place, altering its name, formula, parameters, or ownership. - A user could create or modify a model flagged as the organisation default, affecting scoring behaviour for other users. - A user could reassign a model's organisation to an arbitrary value. Preconditions: - Authenticated user with decaying-model permission (perm_decaying). - Network access to the MISP instance. Affected: <2.5.48.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-02 15:55 UTC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-02 16:18 UTC

CWE

CWE-915 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
CWE-285 - Improper Authorization

Assigner

CIRCL ENISA root Scorecard

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MISP	MISP	Affected: 0 , < 2.5.48 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp::::::::

Credits

Jeroen Pinoy iglocska Claude Opus 5

GCVE extensions

AI-generated Human-reviewed Confidence: high Model qwen3.8:27b 1 event advisory bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03

bcp-05-x-01

AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation

GCVE-BCP-05-X-01

Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification

Model	Source	Identifier
qwen3.8:27b	ollama	`qwen3.8:27b`

bcp-05-x-02

Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance

GCVE-BCP-05-X-02

Generator: patch2vuln.py on 2026-10-02 15:55
Model: qwen3.8:27b
Input: https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b.patch 2ea9ae3603b6…
Confidence: high

Commit	Subject	Patch SHA-256
`70e319e4b9db`	fix: [security] Imported decaying models belong to the	`2ea9ae3603b6…`

Fix summary

The import handler now builds the model record from an explicit allow-list of permitted fields (name, parameters, description, ref, formula, version, enabled, all_orgs) using array_intersect_key, discarding any unlisted keys including nested model objects. The organisation identifier and default flag are set unconditionally after filtering. The save operation is preceded by an explicit create() call and the data is wrapped in the proper model key, preventing the ORM from interpreting attacker-supplied nested keys as separate model attributes.

Patch summary

In DecayingModelController::import(), the previous logic of unsetting id/uuid and pinning org_id/default on the flat array was replaced with an allow-list approach: array_intersect_key against a fixed set of importable fields, followed by explicit assignment of org_id from the authenticated user and default=0. A DecayingModel::create() call was added before save, and the save payload is now wrapped as array('DecayingModel' => $model) to bind the data to the correct model context. A regression test (DecayingModelImportOwnership) was added that verifies a nested DecayingModel key with a foreign id, org_id, and default=1 cannot overwrite or reassign an existing model.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - the attack requires only crafting a JSON payload with a nested key; no race condition or complex timing is needed. AT:N - no in-transit tampering required. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with perm_decaying, a low-privilege role. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:N - no confidentiality impact; the attacker does not read data they cannot already access. VI:H - high integrity impact: an existing model belonging to another organisation can be overwritten in place, its ownership reassigned, or its default flag set, altering scoring for other users. VA:N - no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N - the impact is confined to the MISP instance itself (same component); no secondary component is affected. Scope is not changed because both the vulnerable and impacted components are the MISP application and its data store.

Weakness rationale

CWE-915 The import endpoint accepted user-supplied data and saved it without restricting which object attributes could be set. A nested model key allowed the attacker to modify the primary key, organisation, and default flag of a record, which are attributes that should be controlled exclusively by the application. This is a classic mass-assignment / improper dynamic attribute modification issue.
CWE-285 The application failed to enforce that the imported model belongs to the caller's organisation. A user with only perm_decaying could modify records owned by other organisations, indicating an authorization boundary was not enforced on the object being written.

Attack pattern rationale

CAPEC-13 The attacker tampers with the import request parameters by injecting a nested DecayingModel key containing unauthorized fields (id, org_id, default) that the application's top-level stripping did not filter. This is a direct form of parameter tampering where extra or modified parameters in the request bypass the intended input validation. The mapping is a close fit because the attack vector is manipulation of request parameters rather than a separate injection or protocol-level attack.

Assumptions to verify

The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (v2.5.48, 21 commits after fix); the patch metadata does not explicitly state a fixed version string, so '< 2.5.48' is an analyst inference.
The CAPEC-13 mapping is the closest available pattern; the attack is specifically a mass-assignment bypass via a nested model key rather than a generic parameter tampering, but no CAPEC entry precisely describes ORM-level mass assignment through nested keys.
CVSS PR:L assumes perm_decaying is a low-privilege role available to many users; if it requires elevated privileges the score would be lower.
The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5); it is recorded as a tool credit, not a human remediation developer.
No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch; SSVCE exploitation is set to 'none'.
The patch does not specify authentication requirements beyond perm_decaying; it is assumed this is a standard MISP role rather than an admin-level permission.

Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model	Score	Agreement	Confidence	Assumptions
`qwen3.8:27b`	7	11	high	6

bcp-05-x-03

Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline

GCVE-BCP-05-X-03

2026-09-25 12:22 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (70e319e4b9dbbeca173befce2340eedf9d86f1b0): fix: [security] Imported decaying models belong to the https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b.patch

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-915",
                    "rationale": "The import endpoint accepted user-supplied data and saved it without restricting which object attributes could be set. A nested model key allowed the attacker to modify the primary key, organisation, and default flag of a record, which are attributes that should be controlled exclusively by the application. This is a classic mass-assignment / improper dynamic attribute modification issue."
                  },
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-285",
                    "rationale": "The application failed to enforce that the imported model belongs to the caller\u0027s organisation. A user with only perm_decaying could modify records owned by other organisations, indicating an authorization boundary was not enforced on the object being written."
                  }
                ]
              }
            },
            "bcp-05-x-03": {
              "x_timeline": {
                "events": [
                  {
                    "description": "Corrective change authored (70e319e4b9dbbeca173befce2340eedf9d86f1b0): fix: [security] Imported decaying models belong to the",
                    "id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
                    "references": [
                      "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/70e319e4b.patch"
                    ],
                    "timestamp": "2026-09-25T12:22:03Z",
                    "type": "fix-developed"
                  }
                ]
              }
            }
          },
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20189"
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
    "assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-104908",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-02T15:56:13.969Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-02T15:56:12.330Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-02T16:19:17.687Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-H9VW-JJGR-29WC

CVE-2026-104908 (GCVE-0-2026-104908)

AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation

Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance

Fix summary

Patch summary

CVSS rationale

Weakness rationale

Attack pattern rationale

Assumptions to verify

Model comparison

Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour