Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-FR32-WCM4-P6HF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-23 00:31

Details

OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.

When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).

The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.

Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13089"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T21:17:12Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.\n\nWhen the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-\u003ealg($self-\u003eheader-\u003e{alg}) from the token\u0027s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-\u003ealg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [\u0027none\u0027], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP\u0027s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).\n\nThe ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-\u003everify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-\u003ealg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.\n\nNote that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.",
  "id": "GHSA-fr32-wcm4-p6hf",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T00:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T21:32:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#section-3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite/0.10/CVE-2026-13089-r1.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/17"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2026-13089 (GCVE-0-2026-13089)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-22 20:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:21

Title

OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify

Summary

OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Assigner

CPANSec

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#sec…	technical-description
https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31	issue-tracking
https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite…	patch
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
RITOU	OIDC::Lite	Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.12.1 (custom)

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/17"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "OIDC-Lite",
          "product": "OIDC::Lite",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/OIDC/Lite/Model/IDToken.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite",
          "vendor": "RITOU",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.12.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.\n\nWhen the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-\u003ealg($self-\u003eheader-\u003e{alg}) from the token\u0027s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-\u003ealg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [\u0027none\u0027], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP\u0027s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).\n\nThe ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-\u003everify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-\u003ealg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.\n\nNote that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-347",
              "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
        "orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
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          "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#section-3.1"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite/0.10/CVE-2026-13089-r1.patch"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Apply the patch.\n\nOtherwise, pin the expected signature algorithm at the call site, for example OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken-\u003eload($token, $key, $alg) with an explicit non-none $alg, so verify uses the pinned algorithm instead of the value in the token header."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
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    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
    "assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-13089",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-23T18:53:35.254Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

GHSA-FR32-WCM4-P6HF

CVE-2026-13089 (GCVE-0-2026-13089)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature