Search

Find a vulnerability

Search criteria ⓘ Use this form to refine search results.
Full-text search supports keyword queries with ranking and filtering.
You can combine vendor, product, and sources to narrow results.
Enable “Apply ordering” to sort by date instead of relevance.

    2 vulnerabilities by RITOU

    CVE-2026-13089 (GCVE-0-2026-13089)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-07-22 20:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:21
    VLAI
    Title
    OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify
    Summary
    OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    CWE
    • CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
    Assigner
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    RITOU OIDC::Lite Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.12.1 (custom)
    		Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website
    To clipboard 

    {
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/17"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "OIDC-Lite",
          "product": "OIDC::Lite",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/OIDC/Lite/Model/IDToken.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite",
          "vendor": "RITOU",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.12.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.\n\nWhen the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-\u003ealg($self-\u003eheader-\u003e{alg}) from the token\u0027s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-\u003ealg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [\u0027none\u0027], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP\u0027s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).\n\nThe ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-\u003everify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-\u003ealg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.\n\nNote that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-347",
              "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
        "orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
        "shortName": "CPANSec"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#section-3.1"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite/0.10/CVE-2026-13089-r1.patch"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Apply the patch.\n\nOtherwise, pin the expected signature algorithm at the call site, for example OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken-\u003eload($token, $key, $alg) with an explicit non-none $alg, so verify uses the pinned algorithm instead of the value in the token header."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
    "assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-13089",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-23T18:53:35.254Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

    CVE-2026-13089 (GCVE-0-2026-13089)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-22 20:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:21
    VLAI
    Title
    OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify
    Summary
    OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify. When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self->alg($self->header->{alg}) from the token's own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self->alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields ['none'], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP's RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion). The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)->verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self->alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected. Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    CWE
    • CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
    Assigner
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    RITOU OIDC::Lite Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.12.1 (custom)
    		Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website
    To clipboard 

    {
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/17"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://cpan.org/modules",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "OIDC-Lite",
          "product": "OIDC::Lite",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/OIDC/Lite/Model/IDToken.pm"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite",
          "vendor": "RITOU",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.12.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.\n\nWhen the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-\u003ealg($self-\u003eheader-\u003e{alg}) from the token\u0027s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-\u003ealg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [\u0027none\u0027], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP\u0027s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).\n\nThe ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-\u003everify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-\u003ealg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.\n\nNote that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-347",
              "description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
        "orgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
        "shortName": "CPANSec"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725#section-3.1"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ritou/p5-oidc-lite/pull/31"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://security.metacpan.org/patches/O/OIDC-Lite/0.10/CVE-2026-13089-r1.patch"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Apply the patch.\n\nOtherwise, pin the expected signature algorithm at the call site, for example OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken-\u003eload($token, $key, $alg) with an explicit non-none $alg, so verify uses the pinned algorithm instead of the value in the token header."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e",
    "assignerShortName": "CPANSec",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-13089",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-22T20:31:23.693Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-23T18:53:35.254Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-22T22:21:41.686Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}