GHSA-9RCH-GVF7-HRFC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:33Traefik is a HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. In versions >= v3.7.0 and <= v3.7.11, the Kubernetes ingress-nginx provider mishandles Ingresses that carry both an authentication annotation and the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/from-to-www-redirect annotation. For such Ingresses the provider creates an additional 'sibling' router that matches on the host alone, carries only the RedirectRegex middleware, and still points at the parent router's protected backend service. Because RedirectRegex is not a terminal handler, a request its pattern does not match is forwarded to the backend, and because the redirect pattern only accepts a numeric port while Traefik's host matcher canonicalizes the authority via net.SplitHostPort, a request with a non-numeric or empty port (for example 'Host: www.example.com:x') selects the sibling router, misses the redirect, and is proxied to the protected backend with none of the Ingress's annotation-derived middlewares applied. This discards not only authentication (e.g. BasicAuth) but every annotation-derived middleware, including source-IP allowlisting. Traefik v2 and v3 releases before v3.7.0 are not affected. The issue is fixed in v3.7.12.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-88877"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T14:17:16Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Traefik is a HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. In versions \u003e= v3.7.0 and \u003c= v3.7.11, the Kubernetes ingress-nginx provider mishandles Ingresses that carry both an authentication annotation and the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/from-to-www-redirect annotation. For such Ingresses the provider creates an additional \u0027sibling\u0027 router that matches on the host alone, carries only the RedirectRegex middleware, and still points at the parent router\u0027s protected backend service. Because RedirectRegex is not a terminal handler, a request its pattern does not match is forwarded to the backend, and because the redirect pattern only accepts a numeric port while Traefik\u0027s host matcher canonicalizes the authority via net.SplitHostPort, a request with a non-numeric or empty port (for example \u0027Host: www.example.com:x\u0027) selects the sibling router, misses the redirect, and is proxied to the protected backend with none of the Ingress\u0027s annotation-derived middlewares applied. This discards not only authentication (e.g. BasicAuth) but every annotation-derived middleware, including source-IP allowlisting. Traefik v2 and v3 releases before v3.7.0 are not affected. The issue is fixed in v3.7.12.",
"id": "GHSA-9rch-gvf7-hrfc",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:33:18Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T15:33:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cjr6-pf59-jq29"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-3.7.0-authentication-bypass-via-from-to-www-redirect"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.