GHSA-86FH-W43W-338C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 16:54 – Updated: 2026-07-13 16:54
VLAI
Summary
Decidim: Verification admins can access supplied IDs from other organizations
Details
Description
The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.
Technical description
The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.
Reproduction steps:
- An org2 participant uploads their ID:
- An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g
http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new
- The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)
- Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:
Impact
A tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.
Patches
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666
Workarounds
Disable the "Identity documents" verification
Reference
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
Credits
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
Severity
4.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.30.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0.rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.31.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.32.0.rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45330"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Description\n\nThe verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.\n\n## Technical description\n\nThe verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw `Authorization.find(...)` and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.\n\nReproduction steps:\n\n1. An org2 participant uploads their ID:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2184\" height=\"1288\" alt=\"decidim-verification-01\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6713454-c787-4795-b852-3c2c672358d6\" /\u003e\n\n2. An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g `http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1539\" height=\"1037\" alt=\"decidim-verification-02\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6ed646de-a501-4964-8467-013ada55ce2d\" /\u003e\n\n3. The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)\n \n\u003cimg width=\"1542\" height=\"652\" alt=\"decidim-verification-03\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7ee5bea-3fa2-43d9-8330-8d834f34a9af\" /\u003e\n\n4. Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2279\" height=\"720\" alt=\"decidim-verification-04\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55ee1bab-d396-4e0f-803f-21dc31a2c125\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nA tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant\u0027s `id_documents` requests.\n\n### Patches\n\nSee https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable the \"Identity documents\" verification \n\n### Reference\n\nOWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).",
"id": "GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Decidim: Veri\ufb01cation admins can access supplied IDs from other organizations"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
Loading…
Loading…