GHSA-3R8V-2XMJ-5C39

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 18:16 – Updated: 2026-06-30 18:16
VLAI
Summary
Fission: Cross-namespace Package read via unvalidated PackageRef in Function admission webhook
Details

Summary

A Fission Function spec carries three reference types — Secret, ConfigMap, and Package. The first two were namespace-validated by the admission webhook; PackageRef.Namespace was not.

Details

A tenant with functions.fission.io/create in their own namespace could set spec.package.packageref.namespace to any other namespace. When the function is invoked, the fetcher sidecar reads the victim Package using the fission-fetcher service account's namespace-wide get packages permission and writes its contents to /userfunc/deployarchive inside the attacker's pool pod, exposing the victim's source code and any embedded credentials.

The fission-fetcher SA holds get packages in every configured function namespace (granted by charts/fission-all/templates/_function-access-role.tpl), so the namespace check was the only barrier between the attacker and any in-cluster Fission Package.

Impact

A function author in one namespace could read the deployment archive — and therefore the source code and embedded secrets — of any Package in any other namespace.

Fix

Fixed in #3389 and released in v1.24.0.

The admission webhook (pkg/webhook/function.go::Validate) rejects Function.spec.package.packageref.namespace != metadata.namespace. An empty namespace remains accepted (controllers default it to the function's namespace). This shipped together with the EnvironmentRef cross-namespace check (GHSA-cvw6-gfvv-953q).

Behavioural change

Functions that explicitly set spec.package.packageref.namespace to a different namespace are now rejected at admission.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.23.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fission/fission"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49823"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T18:16:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Fission Function spec carries three reference types \u2014 Secret, ConfigMap, and Package. The first two were namespace-validated by the admission webhook; `PackageRef.Namespace` was not.\n\n### Details\n\nA tenant with `functions.fission.io/create` in their own namespace could set `spec.package.packageref.namespace` to any other namespace. When the function is invoked, the fetcher sidecar reads the victim Package using the\n`fission-fetcher` service account\u0027s namespace-wide `get packages` permission and writes its contents to `/userfunc/deployarchive` inside the attacker\u0027s pool pod, exposing the victim\u0027s source code and any embedded credentials.\n\nThe `fission-fetcher` SA holds `get packages` in every configured function namespace (granted by `charts/fission-all/templates/_function-access-role.tpl`), so the namespace check was the only barrier between the attacker and any\nin-cluster Fission Package.\n\n### Impact\n\nA function author in one namespace could read the deployment archive \u2014 and therefore the source code and embedded secrets \u2014 of any Package in any other namespace.\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in [#3389](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3389) and released in [v1.24.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0).\n\nThe admission webhook (`pkg/webhook/function.go::Validate`) rejects `Function.spec.package.packageref.namespace != metadata.namespace`. An empty namespace remains accepted (controllers default it to the function\u0027s namespace). This\nshipped together with the EnvironmentRef cross-namespace check (GHSA-cvw6-gfvv-953q).\n\n### Behavioural change\n\nFunctions that explicitly set `spec.package.packageref.namespace` to a different namespace are now rejected at admission.",
  "id": "GHSA-3r8v-2xmj-5c39",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T18:16:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T18:16:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-3r8v-2xmj-5c39"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49823"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/80e7ba55228e1ef426f51353e25d2682ec61de34"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.24.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fission: Cross-namespace Package read via unvalidated PackageRef in Function admission webhook"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…