FKIE_CVE-2026-67276
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-05 20:17 - Updated: 2026-09-25 14:57
Severity
Summary
RouterOS does not compare the complete RSA public key when matching an SSH authentication request to an authorized user key, checking the key type and modulus but omitting the exponent. Because signature verification uses the client-supplied key, an attacker knowing an authorized RSA modulus can supply a key with exponent one, forge a valid signature, and open an SSH command channel as the target user without the private key.This issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.4 (Long-term) and 7.24.2 (Stable)
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| cvd@cert.pl | https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve | Third Party Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/ | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-4-long-term-is-released/272801 | Release Notes | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-2-stable-is-released/272800 | Release Notes | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability/ | Vendor Advisory | |
| cvd@cert.pl | https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain/ | Exploit, Third Party Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "RouterOS",
"vendor": "Mikrotik",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7.24.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.24",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.23.4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.9",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:mikrotik:routeros:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7B88D531-98F2-41B2-AC4F-0170D7DB15C2",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.23.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.9",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:mikrotik:routeros:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A41D6B3C-D321-4C61-B3D5-00F8276CB4AC",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.24.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.24",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "RouterOS does not compare the complete RSA public key when matching an SSH authentication request to an authorized user key, checking the key type and modulus but omitting the exponent. Because signature verification uses the client-supplied key, an attacker knowing an authorized RSA modulus can supply a key with exponent one, forge a valid signature, and open an SSH command channel as the target user without the private key.This issue affects only 7.x branch was fixed in versions: 7.23.4 (Long-term)\u00a0and\u00a07.24.2 (Stable)"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-67276",
"lastModified": "2026-09-25T14:57:53.150",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.2,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-67276",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-08T00:00:00+00:00",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-05T20:17:17.977",
"references": [
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/mikrotik-routeros-cve"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Mitigation",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-23-4-long-term-is-released/272801"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://forum.mikrotik.com/t/7-24-2-stable-is-released/272800"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://mikrotik.com/supportsec/september-2026-vulnerability/"
},
{
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://npratley.net/reversing-mikrotiks-silent-patch-the-routeros-7-23-4-fix-they-wouldnt-explain/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cvd@cert.pl",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-347"
}
],
"source": "cvd@cert.pl",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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