FKIE_CVE-2026-10658
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-23 01:16 - Updated: 2026-07-14 19:16
Severity
Summary
bt_iso_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c pulled the ISO SDU header (4 bytes) or, when the timestamp flag is set, the timestamped SDU header (8 bytes) from the inbound HCI ISO Data buffer via net_buf_pull_mem() without first checking buf->len. The upstream hci_iso() handler enforces buf->len == the controller-declared ISO Data_Load length, so a malicious or buggy controller / adjacent BLE peer on an established CIS/BIS can present a first-fragment (BT_ISO_START) or single (BT_ISO_SINGLE) PDU shorter than the SDU header. Because net_buf_simple_pull_mem only guards length with __ASSERT_NO_MSG (compiled out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), the pull underflows buf->len (uint16_t, e.g. 0 - 8 = 0xFFF8) and advances buf->data past valid data: the subsequent reads of hdr->slen and hdr->sn are out-of-bounds reads of adjacent pool memory. For the multi-fragment (START) case the corrupted buffer is retained as iso->rx, and a following CONT/END fragment's net_buf_tailroom() guard underflows to a near-SIZE_MAX value, defeating the bounds check and causing net_buf_add_mem() to memcpy attacker-supplied fragment data far past the RX pool buffer (out-of-bounds write). The flaw affects ISO receive builds (CONFIG_BT_ISO_RX, selected by the default-off LE Audio options BT_ISO_PERIPHERAL/BT_ISO_CENTRAL/BT_ISO_SYNC_RECEIVER) and has existed since the ISO subsystem was introduced (v2.6.0) through v4.4.0. The fix adds explicit buf->len < sizeof(ts_hdr) and buf->len < sizeof(hdr) checks that drop the buffer before pulling.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "zephyr",
"product": "zephyr",
"programFiles": [
"subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c"
],
"vendor": "zephyrproject",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.5.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "9A947003-969D-455C-8C9D-6AF56EDB9330",
"versionEndIncluding": "4.4.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "bt_iso_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/iso.c pulled the ISO SDU header (4 bytes) or, when the timestamp flag is set, the timestamped SDU header (8 bytes) from the inbound HCI ISO Data buffer via net_buf_pull_mem() without first checking buf-\u003elen. The upstream hci_iso() handler enforces buf-\u003elen == the controller-declared ISO Data_Load length, so a malicious or buggy controller / adjacent BLE peer on an established CIS/BIS can present a first-fragment (BT_ISO_START) or single (BT_ISO_SINGLE) PDU shorter than the SDU header. Because net_buf_simple_pull_mem only guards length with __ASSERT_NO_MSG (compiled out when CONFIG_ASSERT is disabled, the production default), the pull underflows buf-\u003elen (uint16_t, e.g. 0 - 8 = 0xFFF8) and advances buf-\u003edata past valid data: the subsequent reads of hdr-\u003eslen and hdr-\u003esn are out-of-bounds reads of adjacent pool memory. For the multi-fragment (START) case the corrupted buffer is retained as iso-\u003erx, and a following CONT/END fragment\u0027s net_buf_tailroom() guard underflows to a near-SIZE_MAX value, defeating the bounds check and causing net_buf_add_mem() to memcpy attacker-supplied fragment data far past the RX pool buffer (out-of-bounds write). The flaw affects ISO receive builds (CONFIG_BT_ISO_RX, selected by the default-off LE Audio options BT_ISO_PERIPHERAL/BT_ISO_CENTRAL/BT_ISO_SYNC_RECEIVER) and has existed since the ISO subsystem was introduced (v2.6.0) through v4.4.0. The fix adds explicit buf-\u003elen \u003c sizeof(ts_hdr) and buf-\u003elen \u003c sizeof(hdr) checks that drop the buffer before pulling."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-10658",
"lastModified": "2026-07-14T19:16:49.380",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-10658",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-23T12:20:39.798180Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-23T01:16:26.867",
"references": [
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/756b16b64317defefad36fc994316cf96e418708"
},
{
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26g8-rmpf-j6cw"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-125"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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