CVE-2026-82441 (GCVE-0-2026-82441)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 13:58 – Updated: 2026-09-14 19:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Apache Storm Nimbus: Cross-Tenant Blob Deletion and Cluster Denial of Service via Unvalidated Topology Dependency Keys
Summary
Description
A submitted topology carries two lists of blobstore keys, `dependency_jars` and `dependency_artifacts`,
which the client fills in after uploading the corresponding blobs. Nimbus performed no validation of their
contents on the submission path, yet acts on them in two places.
During cleanup of a finished topology, Nimbus deletes the keys named in those lists, and the deletion is
performed as the Nimbus subject, for which the blobstore short-circuits its ACL check. A submitter who
listed a key belonging to another topology, such as its `-stormjar.jar`, could therefore cause
that blob to be deleted when their own topology was cleaned up.
Separately, on acquiring leadership a Nimbus compares the dependency keys of all active topologies against
the blobstore contents and surrenders leadership if any is missing. A single key that does not exist, on a
single active topology, therefore causes every Nimbus to acquire leadership, surrender it and requeue
indefinitely, leaving the cluster without a leader and unable to schedule, clean up or accept submissions.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where a submission is refused unless every entry in both lists is a dependency blob key
and exists in the blobstore.
Note that this validates new submissions only; a topology stored by an affected version with an invalid list
is unaffected by the upgrade. An operator whose cluster is failing to retain a leader should inspect the
Nimbus log for the dependency keys reported as missing and remove or resubmit the topology naming them.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals.
Credit
This issue was discovered by rzo1 while investigating an unrelated blobstore defect.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-14 19:44 UTC
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/qzh245bczoxw4mfny… | vendor-advisory |
| http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/0… |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Storm Nimbus |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 3.1.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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