ubuntu-cve-2025-62603
Vulnerability from osv_ubuntu
Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on going security-control traffic after the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the message_data (i .e., the DataHolderSeq) via the readParticipantGenericMessage → readDataHolderSeq path. The DataHolderSeq is parsed sequentially: a sequence count (uint32), and for each DataHolder the class_id string (e.g. DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req), string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not "peek" only at a minimal header and instead parses the entire DataHolderSeq. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi ng behavior can trigger an out-of-memory condition and remotely terminate the process. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 p atch the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "fastdds-tools",
"binary_version": "2.5.0+ds-3ubuntu0.1~esm1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libfastrtps2.5",
"binary_version": "2.5.0+ds-3ubuntu0.1~esm1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS",
"name": "fastdds",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/fastdds@2.5.0+ds-3ubuntu0.1~esm1?arch=source\u0026distro=esm-apps/jammy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.1.0+ds-9",
"2.4.1+ds-1",
"2.5.0+ds-3",
"2.5.0+ds-3ubuntu0.1~esm1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "fastdds-tools",
"binary_version": "2.11.2+ds-6.1build3"
},
{
"binary_name": "libfastrtps2.11t64",
"binary_version": "2.11.2+ds-6.1build3"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:24.04:LTS",
"name": "fastdds",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/fastdds@2.11.2+ds-6.1build3?arch=source\u0026distro=noble"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.10.1+ds-3",
"2.11.2+ds-6",
"2.11.2+ds-6ubuntu1",
"2.11.2+ds-6.1build2",
"2.11.2+ds-6.1build3"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "fastdds-tools",
"binary_version": "3.1.2+ds-1build1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libfastdds3.1",
"binary_version": "3.1.2+ds-1build1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:25.10",
"name": "fastdds",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/fastdds@3.1.2+ds-1build1?arch=source\u0026distro=questing"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.1.2+ds-1",
"3.1.2+ds-1build1"
]
},
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"binaries": [
{
"binary_name": "fastdds-tools",
"binary_version": "3.3.0+ds-3ubuntu1"
},
{
"binary_name": "libfastdds3.3",
"binary_version": "3.3.0+ds-3ubuntu1"
}
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Ubuntu:26.04:LTS",
"name": "fastdds",
"purl": "pkg:deb/ubuntu/fastdds@3.3.0+ds-3ubuntu1?arch=source\u0026distro=resolute"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.1.2+ds-1build1",
"3.3.0+ds-3ubuntu1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"details": "Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on going security-control traffic after the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the `message_data` (i .e., the `DataHolderSeq`) via the `readParticipantGenericMessage \u2192 readDataHolderSeq` path. The `DataHolderSeq` is parsed sequentially: a sequence count (`uint32`), and for each DataHolder the `class_id` string (e.g. `DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req`), string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not \"peek\" only at a minimal header and instead parses the entire `DataHolderSeq`. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi ng behavior can trigger an out-of-memory condition and remotely terminate the process. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 p atch the issue.",
"id": "UBUNTU-CVE-2025-62603",
"modified": "2026-05-20T15:22:57Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T20:15:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-62603"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62603"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/eProsima/Fast-DDS/commit/354218514d32beac963ff5c306f1cf159ee37c5f"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "medium",
"type": "Ubuntu"
}
],
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-62603"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.