GSD-2021-3681
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23Details
A flaw was found in Ansible Galaxy Collections. When collections are built manually, any files in the repository directory that are not explicitly excluded via the ``build_ignore`` list in "galaxy.yml" include files in the ``.tar.gz`` file. This contains sensitive info, such as the user's Ansible Galaxy API key and any secrets in ``ansible`` or ``ansible-playbook`` verbose output without the``no_log`` redaction. Currently, there is no way to deprecate a Collection Or delete a Collection Version. Once published, anyone who downloads or installs the collection can view the secrets.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2021-3681",
"description": "A flaw was found in Ansible Galaxy Collections. When collections are built manually, any files in the repository directory that are not explicitly excluded via the ``build_ignore`` list in \"galaxy.yml\" include files in the ``.tar.gz`` file. This contains sensitive info, such as the user\u0027s Ansible Galaxy API key and any secrets in ``ansible`` or ``ansible-playbook`` verbose output without the``no_log`` redaction. Currently, there is no way to deprecate a Collection Or delete a Collection Version. Once published, anyone who downloads or installs the collection can view the secrets.",
"id": "GSD-2021-3681",
"references": [
"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-3681.html",
"https://security.archlinux.org/CVE-2021-3681"
]
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
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"id": "GSD-2021-3681",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:35.015193Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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{
"product": {
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"product_name": "ansible",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_affected": "=",
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}
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"impact": {
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"cvssV2": {
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"accessVector": "LOCAL",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.1,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
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"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
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"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
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"severity": "LOW",
"userInteractionRequired": false
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"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2022-04-27T03:21Z",
"publishedDate": "2022-04-18T17:15Z"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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