GHSA-XV7Q-FVMC-JX96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:49 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:49
VLAI
Summary
Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover
Details

Summary

With the per-provider OIDC emailfallback option enabled, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing local (username+password) account using only the email claim — no email_verified (or Microsoft xms_edov) check and no password check, on the unauthenticated callback. An attacker who can make the configured issuer emit a token bearing a victim's email logs in as that victim with a full session and no victim interaction (the nOAuth / Grafana CVE-2023-3128 class). The 2.3.0 fix for GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg added a TOTP gate, not an email_verified gate, so users without TOTP remain exposed.

Details

References are pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go at HEAD. Identity is first resolved on the immutable (issuer, subject) pair (openid.go:428). On a subject miss with emailfallback on, fallbackSearchUsers adds an email-only lookup against local accounts:

// openid.go:413
searches = append(searches, &user.User{Issuer: user.IssuerLocal, Email: cl.Email})

getUser resolves this via s.Get(), which ANDs non-zero fields -> WHERE issuer='local' AND email=?. Local users always have Issuer="local" (user_create.go:38), so the lookup matches any local account by email alone; getOrCreateUser returns it and the caller mints a session — the password is never read. The claims struct has no email_verified field (openid.go:80) and getClaims never consults one; a repo-wide grep for email_verified/xms_edov returns nothing. The code already warns about this at openid.go:388 ("Discouraged for untrusted providers where someone can set email without verification") — but enforces nothing.

Impact

Unauthenticated takeover of any existing local account (read/write/delete its projects, tasks, attachments, shares), bypassing the password. Scope notes: only issuer='local' accounts are matched (not pure-SSO users); the attacker's sub is not bound to the victim record, but the attack is repeatable; TOTP users are protected by the 2.3.0 enforceTOTPIfRequired gate (openid.go:250), non-TOTP users are not.

Preconditions

  1. Admin enabled emailfallback: true (defaults false — a default install is unaffected).
  2. The configured issuer lets the attacker assert the victim's unverified email: a self-service IdP (Keycloak/Authentik/Auth0/Dex with editable email), a mixed federation, or a multi-tenant Entra /common app. iss/aud are pinned, but the attacker controls email, not the issuer.
  3. The victim has a local account.

Not reachable against a single-tenant IdP that verifies email and disallows self-set addresses.

Recommended Fix

Add email_verified to the claims struct and require it true on the email-fallback branch before linking to a local account; reject when absent/false. For Entra also require xms_edov and pin multi-tenant configs to an allowed-tenant list. Fail closed on an email collision not backed by a verified email from a trusted single-tenant issuer rather than silently logging the caller in.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:49:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWith the per-provider OIDC `emailfallback` option enabled, Vikunja links an SSO login to a pre-existing **local** (username+password) account using only the `email` claim \u2014 no `email_verified` (or Microsoft `xms_edov`) check and no password check, on the unauthenticated callback. An attacker who can make the configured issuer emit a token bearing a victim\u0027s email logs in as that victim with a full session and no victim interaction (the nOAuth / Grafana CVE-2023-3128 class). The 2.3.0 fix for GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg added a TOTP gate, not an `email_verified` gate, so users without TOTP remain exposed.\n\n## Details\n\nReferences are `pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go` at HEAD. Identity is first resolved on the immutable `(issuer, subject)` pair (`openid.go:428`). On a subject miss with `emailfallback` on, `fallbackSearchUsers` adds an email-only lookup against local accounts:\n\n```go\n// openid.go:413\nsearches = append(searches, \u0026user.User{Issuer: user.IssuerLocal, Email: cl.Email})\n```\n\n`getUser` resolves this via `s.Get()`, which ANDs non-zero fields -\u003e `WHERE issuer=\u0027local\u0027 AND email=?`. Local users always have `Issuer=\"local\"` (`user_create.go:38`), so the lookup matches any local account by email alone; `getOrCreateUser` returns it and the caller mints a session \u2014 the password is never read. The `claims` struct has no `email_verified` field (`openid.go:80`) and `getClaims` never consults one; a repo-wide grep for `email_verified`/`xms_edov` returns nothing. The code already warns about this at `openid.go:388` (\"Discouraged for untrusted providers where someone can set email without verification\") \u2014 but enforces nothing.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated takeover of any existing **local** account (read/write/delete its projects, tasks, attachments, shares), bypassing the password. Scope notes: only `issuer=\u0027local\u0027` accounts are matched (not pure-SSO users); the attacker\u0027s `sub` is not bound to the victim record, but the attack is repeatable; TOTP users are protected by the 2.3.0 `enforceTOTPIfRequired` gate (`openid.go:250`), non-TOTP users are not.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n1. Admin enabled `emailfallback: true` (defaults false \u2014 a default install is unaffected).\n2. The configured issuer lets the attacker assert the victim\u0027s unverified email: a self-service IdP (Keycloak/Authentik/Auth0/Dex with editable email), a mixed federation, or a multi-tenant Entra `/common` app. `iss`/`aud` are pinned, but the attacker controls `email`, not the issuer.\n3. The victim has a local account.\n\nNot reachable against a single-tenant IdP that verifies email and disallows self-set addresses.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `email_verified` to the `claims` struct and require it `true` on the email-fallback branch before linking to a local account; reject when absent/false. For Entra also require `xms_edov` and pin multi-tenant configs to an allowed-tenant list. Fail closed on an email collision not backed by a verified email from a trusted single-tenant issuer rather than silently logging the caller in.",
  "id": "GHSA-xv7q-fvmc-jx96",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T20:49:06Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T20:49:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-xv7q-fvmc-jx96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/7854f2729ab72000210b61c25929678fd6901630"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja: OIDC email-fallback account linking ignores email_verified, enabling local-account takeover"
}



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