GHSA-VHJM-W67Q-G75C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:38 – Updated: 2026-05-27 00:38Impact
When @hapi/wreck follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the Authorization and Cookie headers are stripped. The standard credential header Proxy-Authorization is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary.
Redirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... }).
Patches
@hapi/wreck 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include proxy-authorization. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible:
- Leave redirects at its default (false) — applications that never enable redirect following are not affected.
- If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request.
- Use the beforeRedirect hook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) when redirectOptions targets a different hostname than the original request.
Resources
- Related: CVE-2024-30260 / GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3 (undici)
- RFC 7235 §4.4 — Proxy-Authorization
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@hapi/wreck"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "18.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44979"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:38:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWhen `@hapi/wreck` follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the `Authorization` and `Cookie` headers are stripped. The standard credential header `Proxy-Authorization` is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary.\n\nRedirect following is opt-in. The redirects option defaults to false (no redirections followed), so applications are only affected if they have explicitly set redirects to a positive integer on the request or via `Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... })`.\n\n### Patches\n`@hapi/wreck` 18.1.1 extends the cross-hostname strip set to include `proxy-authorization`. Upgrade to 18.1.1 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n- Leave redirects at its default (`false`) \u2014 applications that never enable redirect following are not affected.\n- If redirects are required, set redirects: 0 when calling endpoints with sensitive headers, or strip Proxy-Authorization from the headers before issuing the request.\n- Use the `beforeRedirect` hook to manually strip proxy-authorization (and any other sensitive application headers) when `redirectOptions` targets a different hostname than the original request.\n\n### Resources\n- Related: [CVE-2024-30260 / GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3 ](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3)(undici)\n- [RFC 7235 \u00a74.4 \u2014 Proxy-Authorization](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.4)",
"id": "GHSA-vhjm-w67q-g75c",
"modified": "2026-05-27T00:38:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T00:38:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/security/advisories/GHSA-vhjm-w67q-g75c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-3787-6prv-h9w3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/commit/a5b6fac9c684621c1d5733d10a0257697cfea373"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@hapi/wreck leaks sensitive `Proxy-Authorization` header across cross-hostname redirects"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.