GHSA-RV89-WCH8-C574

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 20:29 – Updated: 2026-06-22 20:29
VLAI
Summary
Paymenter doesn't reset email verification status after email change
Details

Summary

The email update functionality fails to invalidate the existing verification state when a user changes their email address, allowing a verified account to retain its verified status after switching to an unverified or unowned email address.

Technical Details

When a user updated their email address, the system did not reset or revalidate the associated email verification status. As a result, the verification column remained set to “true” even after the email address was changed.

This allowed an attacker to:

  • Verify an account using a legitimate email address
  • Change the account email to an arbitrary or unowned address
  • Retain the verified status without re-confirmation of the new email

No verification challenge or confirmation was required for the newly assigned email address.

Impact

This vulnerability allows a user to associate a verified account with an email address they do not control, this may result in:

  • Misrepresentation of email ownership
  • Bypass of verification-based trust assumptions
  • Potential abuse of features gated behind verified status

No direct unauthorized access to other users accounts or data is possible through this issue alone.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "paymenter/paymenter"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44584"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe email update functionality fails to invalidate the existing verification state when a user changes their email address, allowing a verified account to retain its verified status after switching to an unverified or unowned email address.\n\n### Technical Details\nWhen a user updated their email address, the system did not reset or revalidate the associated email verification status. As a result, the verification column remained set to \u201ctrue\u201d even after the email address was changed.\n\nThis allowed an attacker to:\n\n- Verify an account using a legitimate email address\n- Change the account email to an arbitrary or unowned address\n- Retain the verified status without re-confirmation of the new email\n\nNo verification challenge or confirmation was required for the newly assigned email address.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows a user to associate a verified account with an email address they do not control, this may result in:\n\n- Misrepresentation of email ownership\n- Bypass of verification-based trust assumptions\n- Potential abuse of features gated behind verified status\n\nNo direct unauthorized access to other users accounts or data is possible through this issue alone.",
  "id": "GHSA-rv89-wch8-c574",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T20:29:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter/security/advisories/GHSA-rv89-wch8-c574"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Paymenter/Paymenter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Paymenter doesn\u0027t reset email verification status after email change"
}



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