GHSA-Q8J2-7WC6-Q8M4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-03 18:31MISP contains a session fixation vulnerability in the CustomAuth authentication (a custom configuration) flow. When a user was successfully authenticated through CustomAuth, MISP stored the authenticated user identity in the existing session without first rotating the session identifier.
As a result, if an attacker can cause a victim to use a session identifier known to the attacker before authentication, that same session identifier remains valid after the victim successfully authenticates. The attacker could subsequently reuse the fixed session identifier to access the victim's authenticated MISP session, potentially gaining the privileges associated with the victim's account.
The issue occurs because __customAuthentication() wrote the authenticated user into the existing CakePHP session while the call to Session->renew() had previously been disabled. The patch restores session identifier rotation when a new authentication occurs or when the authenticated user changes, while avoiding unnecessary session renewal on every request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85238"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T16:18:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MISP contains a session fixation vulnerability in the CustomAuth authentication (a custom configuration) flow. When a user was successfully authenticated through CustomAuth, MISP stored the authenticated user identity in the existing session without first rotating the session identifier.\n\n\nAs a result, if an attacker can cause a victim to use a session identifier known to the attacker before authentication, that same session identifier remains valid after the victim successfully authenticates. The attacker could subsequently reuse the fixed session identifier to access the victim\u0027s authenticated MISP session, potentially gaining the privileges associated with the victim\u0027s account.\n\n\nThe issue occurs because __customAuthentication() wrote the authenticated user into the existing CakePHP session while the call to Session-\u003erenew() had previously been disabled. The patch restores session identifier rotation when a new authentication occurs or when the authenticated user changes, while avoiding unnecessary session renewal on every request.",
"id": "GHSA-q8j2-7wc6-q8m4",
"modified": "2026-09-03T18:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T18:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e2eb2f058"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.