Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-PRFF-6VWQ-GF23

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-29 15:31

Details

The reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.

The same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.

Fix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.

This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.

Severity

3.5 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

4.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12047"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T00:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "HTML injection in pgAdmin 4\u0027s cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text \u2014 and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text \u2014 into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard\u0027s DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard\u0027s FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe\u0027s src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim\u0027s pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin\u0027s own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim\u0027s browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints \u2014 Azure\u0027s check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit \u2014 all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-prff-6vwq-gf23",
  "modified": "2026-06-29T15:31:59Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60d149864b5fdd99675754c7996637737a24fce3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-12047 (GCVE-0-2026-12047)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-18 23:37 – Updated: 2026-06-22 19:14

Title

pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text

Summary

HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM. The reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an <iframe/src=...> payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context. The same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered. Fix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.

Severity

3.5 (Low)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

4.8 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-22 19:13 UTC

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
CWE-116 - Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Assigner

PostgreSQL redhat root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069	issue-tracking
https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60…	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
pgadmin.org	pgAdmin 4	Affected: 6.6 , < 9.16 (custom)

Credits

Fernando Bortotti <fernando.bortotti@bsd.com.br> Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                "id": "CVE-2026-12047",
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                "timestamp": "2026-06-22T19:13:58.685569Z",
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            "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/misc/cloud/google/__init__.py",
            "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/misc/cloud/static/js/CloudWizard.jsx"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
          "vendor": "pgadmin.org",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "9.16",
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              "version": "6.6",
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      "credits": [
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Fernando Bortotti \u003cfernando.bortotti@bsd.com.br\u003e"
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        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "HTML injection in pgAdmin 4\u0027s cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text \u2014 and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text \u2014 into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard\u0027s DOM.\n\nThe reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an \u003ciframe/src=...\u003e payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard\u0027s FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe\u0027s src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim\u0027s pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin\u0027s own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim\u0027s browser context.\n\nThe same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints \u2014 Azure\u0027s check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit \u2014 all of which are now covered.\n\nFix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16."
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      "metrics": [
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          "cvssV3_1": {
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            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
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          },
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          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Self-XSS only. The same authenticated pgAdmin user that submits the crafted cloud credential is the one whose browser renders the echoed error -- there is no third-party attacker driving a distinct victim, so the confused-deputy elements (S:C / C:H confidentiality uplift) do not apply. The frontend DOMPurify layer added by #10068 already neutralises the in-browser exploit; this fix is defence in depth that ensures non-browser JSON consumers (audit logs, scripted API clients) never see the raw markup either. Scored as I:L for that residual escape only; S:U because no authority is crossed.\n\nCross-user escalation would require an independent CSRF primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim\u0027s browser context. That is not part of this defect."
            }
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            }
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        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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        }
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      },
      "title": "pgAdmin 4: HTML injection in cloud verify_credentials / deploy endpoints via unsanitised SDK exception text"
    }
  },
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    "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:07.824Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.