{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.25.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "twig/twig"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47732"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T21:47:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`SandboxNodeVisitor` enforces `SecurityPolicy::checkMethodAllowed()` for implicit `__toString()` calls by wrapping selected AST nodes in `CheckToStringNode`. The set of wrapped nodes is incomplete, and several Twig language constructs still trigger PHP string coercion on a `Stringable` operand without first consulting the policy. A sandboxed template author can therefore invoke `__toString()` on any object reachable in the render context, even when `__toString` on its class is not allowlisted.\n\nConfirmed bypass vectors:\n\n- Conditional expressions (`a ? b : c`, `a ?: b`, `a ?? b`) used as the input of a string-coercing filter or as a filter/function argument.\n- The `matches` operator and the loose comparison operators (`==`, `!=`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\u003c=`, `\u003e=`, `\u003c=\u003e`), which coerce a `Stringable` operand to string and can be used as an oracle to recover the value byte by byte (no tag, filter or function needs to be allowlisted).\n- Twig tests in general (which were never policy-gated), in particular `is empty` which casts a `Stringable` value via `(string) $value` in `CoreExtension::testEmpty()`.\n- Null-coalesce expressions nested in concatenation, and the direct output of allowed functions or filters that return a `Stringable` object.\n- Arguments passed to allowed object methods, template-name expressions of template-loading tags (`include`, `extends`, `use`, ...), dynamic attribute/property names, and spread arguments from `Traversable` objects.\n- The `do` tag and the `..` range operator.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe sandbox now wraps every child node that the parent will string-coerce at runtime, instead of relying on a hardcoded list of node types in `SandboxNodeVisitor`. A new `Twig\\Node\\CoercesChildrenToStringInterface` lets nodes declare which of their children must be guarded; core nodes (concatenation, comparison and range binaries, filter/function/test expressions, `do`, `include`, `extends`, `use`, ...) implement it. Spread arguments are materialised and policy-checked via the new `SandboxExtension::ensureSpreadAllowed()`, and dynamic attribute names are checked at runtime inside `CoreExtension::getAttribute()`.\n\n### Credits\n\nTwig would like to thank Anthropic Glasswing and El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issues, and Fabien Potencier for providing the fixes.",
  "id": "GHSA-pr2w-4gpj-cpq4",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T21:47:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T21:47:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/security/advisories/GHSA-pr2w-4gpj-cpq4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/twig/twig/CVE-2026-47732.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/releases/tag/v3.26.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-47732"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Twig: Sandbox: multiple `__toString()` policy bypasses via unguarded string coercion points"
}