{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-push-notification"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45794"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T16:30:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Description**\n\nA Deserialization of Untrusted Data (CWE-502) issue exists in OpenAM\u0027s Push Notification SNS callback resource. The REST route that handles SNS push messages is mounted with anonymous access and, when a supplied message identifier has expired from the in-memory dispatcher, falls back to a CTS-stored predicate blob whose top-level keys are treated as Java class names and passed to Class.forName(...) before attacker-controlled JSON is deserialized via Jackson. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1.\n\nArbitrary attacker-controlled code execution was not confirmed on tested stock classpaths for the latest release, but the flaw yields a reliable class-loading and Jackson-construction primitive whose impacts include remotely triggerable process execution, file writes, and DoS, depending on the deployment\u0027s classpath and environment.\n\n## Impact\nOpenAM Community Edition deployments through version 16.0.6 that enable the Push Notification Service with SNS callbacks are potentially affected. While the callback route itself is anonymous, the planting step requires a low-privileged user who can start Push Registration and read their own QR-code payload. After that user obtains the server-issued messageId, shared secret, and challenge, they can wait for the in-memory dispatcher entry to expire and then send anonymous SNS callbacks that overwrite the persistent CTS blob with attacker-controlled JSON. A later anonymous callback for the same messageId causes OpenAM to load an attacker-named class and construct it with attacker-controlled values.\n\nThe planted blob is processed server-side with internal CTS privileges, giving a reliable class-loading and Jackson-construction primitive that can corrupt the push-token record and trigger classpath-dependent side effects in the OpenAM JVM. Arbitrary attacker-controlled command execution was not confirmed on the tested stock classpaths; practical severity depends on enabled Push Registration flows, JDK version, bundled or co-deployed classes, and whether any reachable class-loading or construction side effects are security-relevant in the deployment.\n\n## Patch\nThis has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.",
  "id": "GHSA-pp89-732f-3g8q",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T16:30:03Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T16:30:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-pp89-732f-3g8q"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenAM has Unsafe Java Deserialization via SNS"
}