GHSA-PFVC-3P5H-X7H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 16:16 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:16
VLAI
Summary
Wings exposes node configuration secrets through egg configuration-file templating
Details

Impact

Type: Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.

Wings exposes its entire daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any {{config.<path>}} placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be read.

Because the Panel substitutes user-controlled egg variable values into these replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a {{config.*}} placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it can be read via the file manager or SFTP.

This allows reading, among other values:

  • {{config.token}} - the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for   the Panel⇆Wings channel and the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node   issues;
  • {{config.token_id}};
  • {{config.docker.registries}} - configured container-registry credentials.

Who is impacted: Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the startup.update permission) and the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a configuration file via {{server.build.env.*}}. This pattern is common across stock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are affected.

Resulting impact: Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge authentication tokens and act against every server on that node, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged account.

Patches

Yes. Fixed in Wings v1.12.3 (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).

Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by {{config.*}} placeholders.

Users should upgrade Wings to v1.12.3 or later.

After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens, since a previously exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration → reset the token, then re-deploy config.yml to the node).

Workarounds

For operators who cannot upgrade immediately:

  • Audit your eggs and ensure no user-editable variable is rendered into a   configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.

These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the recommended action.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/pterodactyl/wings"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52855"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n**Type:** Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials\nleading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.\n\nWings exposes its **entire** daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file\ntemplating engine. When Wings renders a server\u0027s configuration files, any\n`{{config.\u003cpath\u003e}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the\nfull marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be\nread.\n\nBecause the Panel substitutes **user-controlled** egg variable values into these\nreplacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a\n`{{config.*}}` placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then\nresolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user\u0027s own server, where it\ncan be read via the file manager or SFTP.\n\nThis allows reading, among other values:\n\n- `{{config.token}}` - the node\u0027s daemon token, which is both the API bearer for\n\u00a0\u00a0the Panel\u21c6Wings channel **and** the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node\n\u00a0\u00a0issues;\n- `{{config.token_id}}`;\n- `{{config.docker.registries}}` - configured container-registry credentials.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set\nan egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the `startup.update`\npermission) **and** the server\u0027s egg renders a user-editable variable into a\nconfiguration file via `{{server.build.env.*}}`. This pattern is common across\nstock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are\naffected.\n\n**Resulting impact:** Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge\nauthentication tokens and act against **every server on that node**, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged\naccount.\n\n### Patches\n\nYes. Fixed in **Wings `v1.12.3`** (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only).\n\nWings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an\nexplicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by\n`{{config.*}}` placeholders.\n\nUsers should upgrade Wings to `v1.12.3` or later.\n\n**After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes\u0027 daemon tokens**, since a previously\nexfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin \u2192 Nodes \u2192 Configuration \u2192\nreset the token, then re-deploy `config.yml` to the node).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor operators who cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Audit your eggs and ensure no **user-editable** variable is rendered into a\n\u00a0\u00a0configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable.\n\nThese reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the\nrecommended action.",
  "id": "GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T16:16:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/security/advisories/GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/commit/eb65e27ae077a63e38518c490768486af1cd86a9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/wings/releases/tag/v1.12.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Wings exposes node configuration secrets through egg configuration-file templating"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…