GHSA-M82C-83JF-3J4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 00:30 – Updated: 2026-08-26 00:30Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.
The helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.
The challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T22:17:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account\u0027s recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.\n\nThe helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code\u0027s digest alone, across every user\u0027s rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row\u0027s user_id with the challenged user\u0027s id through Perl\u0027s integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.\n\nThe challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim\u0027s password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim\u0027s second factor.",
"id": "GHSA-m82c-83jf-3j4v",
"modified": "2026-08-26T00:30:52Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T00:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/source/include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h#L801-827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/view/lib/Punk/Plugin/TOTP.pm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.