GHSA-JM7P-CC5G-QWXX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:21 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:22
VLAI
Summary
Electron: Parent process code-sign check is spoofable
Details

Impact

On macOS, the check Electron uses to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable the fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check; a local attacker could bypass it and run their own code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access.

Apps are only affected if they enable those macOS fuse-based restrictions. Apps that do not enable them are not affected.

Workarounds

There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

  • 42.0.0-beta.3
  • 41.2.1
  • 40.9.0
  • 39.8.8

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "39.8.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 40.9.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "40.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "40.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "41.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "41.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "42.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "42.0.0-beta.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70597"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T15:21:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nOn macOS, the check Electron uses to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable the fuse-based hardening restricting `ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE` and `NODE_OPTIONS` to same-signed parents rely on this check; a local attacker could bypass it and run their own code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access.\n\nApps are only affected if they enable those macOS fuse-based restrictions. Apps that do not enable them are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.3`\n* `41.2.1`\n* `40.9.0`\n* `39.8.8`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)",
  "id": "GHSA-jm7p-cc5g-qwxx",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T15:22:41Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T15:21:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-jm7p-cc5g-qwxx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/0a6291a97d210db3733689e70a51f5711e38ed35"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Electron: Parent process code-sign check is spoofable"
}



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Nomenclature

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