GHSA-JM7P-CC5G-QWXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 15:21 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:22Impact
On macOS, the check Electron uses to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable the fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check; a local attacker could bypass it and run their own code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access.
Apps are only affected if they enable those macOS fuse-based restrictions. Apps that do not enable them are not affected.
Workarounds
There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.
Fixed Versions
42.0.0-beta.341.2.140.9.039.8.8
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "electron"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "39.8.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 40.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "electron"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "40.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "40.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "electron"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "41.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "41.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "electron"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "42.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "42.0.0-beta.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-70597"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T15:21:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nOn macOS, the check Electron uses to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable the fuse-based hardening restricting `ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE` and `NODE_OPTIONS` to same-signed parents rely on this check; a local attacker could bypass it and run their own code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access.\n\nApps are only affected if they enable those macOS fuse-based restrictions. Apps that do not enable them are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `42.0.0-beta.3`\n* `41.2.1`\n* `40.9.0`\n* `39.8.8`\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)",
"id": "GHSA-jm7p-cc5g-qwxx",
"modified": "2026-08-05T15:22:41Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T15:21:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-jm7p-cc5g-qwxx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/0a6291a97d210db3733689e70a51f5711e38ed35"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Electron: Parent process code-sign check is spoofable"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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