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GHSA-JC6X-RJ79-W4MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:46 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:46
VLAI
Summary
CoreWCF: WS-Security signature substitution via document-wide Signature lookup
Details

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before wsse:Security can embed a ds:Signature of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header.

Preconditions

Exploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a ds:Signature whose KeyInfo resolves through the receive-side token resolver to a key under the attacker’s control. Both are conditions outside the attacker’s direct control on a generic deployment.

Patches

Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1

Workarounds

Use a security token resolver that only accepts references to issuer-pinned X.509 chains (the default when expecting a static set of signing certificates).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54773"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:46:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before `wsse:Security` can embed a `ds:Signature` of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header.\n\n#### Preconditions\nExploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a `ds:Signature` whose `KeyInfo` resolves through the receive-side token resolver to a key under the attacker\u2019s control. Both are conditions outside the attacker\u2019s direct control on a generic deployment.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1\n\n### Workarounds\nUse a security token resolver that only accepts references to issuer-pinned X.509 chains (the default when expecting a static set of signing certificates).",
  "id": "GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:46:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:46:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreWCF: WS-Security signature substitution via document-wide Signature lookup"
}



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