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GHSA-GV8P-48FR-4FXG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 19:23 – Updated: 2026-06-04 19:23
VLAI
Summary
Shopware: Privilege Escalation via Sync API Integration Admin Flag Bypass
Details

Summary

A non-admin API user with integration:create ACL privilege can escalate to full administrator by creating an integration with admin: true through the Sync API (POST /api/_action/sync). The regular integration endpoint (POST /api/integration) correctly blocks this, but the Sync API bypasses the controller-level check by writing directly through the DAL EntityWriter. The integration entity definition lacks WriteProtection, and the admin field has no field-level restriction flag.

OWASP: A01:2021 — Broken Access Control

Root Cause

IntegrationController::upsertIntegration() checks $source->isAdmin() before allowing the admin field to be set. However, SyncController::sync() routes writes through SyncService → EntityWriter, which only applies:

  1. AclWriteValidator — checks entity-level ACL (integration:create is sufficient)
  2. EntityProtectionValidator — checks WriteProtection on entity definitions, but IntegrationDefinition has none

The admin field in IntegrationDefinition is a plain BoolField with no WriteProtection or special flag. The Sync API writes it without restriction.

Vulnerable code path: - src/Core/Framework/Api/Controller/SyncController.php → SyncService → EntityWriter::upsert() - Missing protection: src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php — admin field has no WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)

Working protection (bypassed): - src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationController.php:46-56 — isAdmin() check only applies to the dedicated controller endpoint

Impact

  • Complete admin API access — the escalated integration has full read/write on every entity: users, customers, orders, system configuration, integrations, plugins
  • PII exfiltration — read all customer records (names, emails, addresses, order history)
  • Persistent backdoor — the admin integration survives password changes and user deactivation

Remediation

Add WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE) to IntegrationDefinition, matching how UserDefinition and AclRoleDefinition are already protected:

// src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php
(new BoolField('admin', 'admin'))
    ->addFlags(new WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)),
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.10.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.10.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48008"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA non-admin API user with `integration:create` ACL privilege can escalate to full administrator by creating an integration with `admin: true` through the Sync API (`POST /api/_action/sync`). The regular integration endpoint (`POST /api/integration`) correctly blocks this, but the Sync API bypasses the controller-level check by writing directly through the DAL EntityWriter. The `integration` entity definition lacks `WriteProtection`, and the `admin` field has no field-level restriction flag.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 \u2014 Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`IntegrationController::upsertIntegration()` checks `$source-\u003eisAdmin()` before allowing the `admin` field to be set. However, `SyncController::sync()` routes writes through `SyncService \u2192 EntityWriter`, which only applies:\n\n1. `AclWriteValidator` \u2014 checks entity-level ACL (`integration:create` is sufficient)\n2. `EntityProtectionValidator` \u2014 checks `WriteProtection` on entity definitions, but `IntegrationDefinition` has none\n\nThe `admin` field in `IntegrationDefinition` is a plain `BoolField` with no `WriteProtection` or special flag. The Sync API writes it without restriction.\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n- `src/Core/Framework/Api/Controller/SyncController.php` \u2192 `SyncService` \u2192 `EntityWriter::upsert()`\n- **Missing protection:** `src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php` \u2014 `admin` field has no `WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)`\n\n**Working protection (bypassed):**\n- `src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationController.php:46-56` \u2014 `isAdmin()` check only applies to the dedicated controller endpoint\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete admin API access** \u2014 the escalated integration has full read/write on every entity: users, customers, orders, system configuration, integrations, plugins\n- **PII exfiltration** \u2014 read all customer records (names, emails, addresses, order history)\n- **Persistent backdoor** \u2014 the admin integration survives password changes and user deactivation\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd `WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)` to `IntegrationDefinition`, matching how `UserDefinition` and `AclRoleDefinition` are already protected:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php\n(new BoolField(\u0027admin\u0027, \u0027admin\u0027))\n    -\u003eaddFlags(new WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)),\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-gv8p-48fr-4fxg",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/security/advisories/GHSA-gv8p-48fr-4fxg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.6.10.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.7.10.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Shopware: Privilege Escalation via Sync API Integration Admin Flag Bypass"
}



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