GHSA-GH7R-589J-33X7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-21 15:32DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone's Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone's internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.
- An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone's network
- The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices.
- The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely
- The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed
- A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed
Affected models are DJI Neo until 01.00.0400, DJI Neo 2 until 01.00.0500, DJI Flip until 01.00.1200, DJI Air 3 until 01.00.1600, DJI Air 3S until 01.00.1400, DJI Avata 2 until 01.00.0400, DJI Avata 360 until 01.00.0300, DJI Mavic 3 until 01.00.1400, DJI Mavic 3 Classic until 01.00.0800, DJI Mavic 3 Pro until 01.01.0700, DJI Mavic 4 Pro until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 2 until 01.07.0200, DJI Mini 3 until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 3 Pro until 01.00.0900, DJI Mini 4 Pro until 01.00.1100, and DJI Mini 5 Pro until 01.00.0600.
Remediation requires a firmware update from the vendor. There is no user-side mitigation that fully addresses the vulnerability without upgrading.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77812"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-311"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T15:16:47Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone\u0027s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone\u0027s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.\n\n* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone\u0027s network \n* The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices.\n* The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely\n* The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed\n* A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed\n\nAffected models are DJI Neo until 01.00.0400, DJI Neo 2 until 01.00.0500, DJI Flip until 01.00.1200, DJI Air 3 until 01.00.1600, DJI Air 3S until 01.00.1400, DJI Avata 2 until 01.00.0400, DJI Avata 360 until 01.00.0300, DJI Mavic 3 until 01.00.1400, DJI Mavic 3 Classic until 01.00.0800, DJI Mavic 3 Pro until 01.01.0700, DJI Mavic 4 Pro until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 2 until 01.07.0200, DJI Mini 3 until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 3 Pro until 01.00.0900, DJI Mini 4 Pro until 01.00.1100, and DJI Mini 5 Pro until 01.00.0600.\n\nRemediation requires a firmware update from the vendor. There is no user-side mitigation that fully addresses the vulnerability without upgrading.",
"id": "GHSA-gh7r-589j-33x7",
"modified": "2026-08-21T15:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T15:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77812"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.dji.com/help/content?customId=en-us03400011149\u0026amp;spaceId=34\u0026amp;re=US\u0026amp;lang=en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.