GHSA-CMHJ-WH2F-9CGX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 18:12 – Updated: 2026-09-23 18:12
VLAI
Summary
9router: Image prefetch DNS rebinding allows SSRF to internal services
Details

Summary

9router validates image URLs by resolving the host before fetching, but the later server-side fetch performs a separate DNS resolution. An attacker-controlled DNS name can resolve to a public IP during validation and then rebind to an internal Docker/private IP during the fetch. This allows the server-side image prefetch to reach internal-only HTTP services (SSRF).

Details

  • Affected version / commit: 9router v0.4.80 @ b282f05.
  • Reachable through /v1/chat/completions with a vision-capable model and an image_url content part. A vision-capable model name is required so the image survives modality stripping and the server-side prefetch is armed.
  • The provider used in this reproduction is the bundled mock providerno real API key and no real provider call.
  • internal-admin (the SSRF target) is not exposed to the host network; it is reachable only from inside the Docker network.
  • rebind-dns behaviour for rebind.9r.test:
  • first A response → 1.1.1.1 (public) to pass the public-host guard,
  • second A response → 172.29.0.10 (internal-admin) during the fetch.
  • internal-admin logs GET /ssrf-marker with peer=172.29.0.30 (the proxied-router container), proving the server-side fetch landed on the internal service.
  • mock-provider receives POST /api/chat and the flow completes with HTTP 200.
  • Root cause: DNS TOCTOU — the IP is not pinned between the validation resolution (the public-host guard) and the fetch resolution. The guard and the fetch each resolve the hostname independently, so a TTL-0 rebinding authority can return a public IP to the guard and an internal IP to the fetch.

Proof of Concept

This repository is a self-contained Docker Compose reproduction. No real provider is called and no real API key is required.

  1. Build and start the stack: bash docker compose up --build
  2. Confirm internal-admin is unreachable from the host: bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18083/ssrf-marker # connection refused / fail docker compose ps # internal-admin has NO host port mapping
  3. Send the request named POST image-prefetch DNS rebinding trigger from requests.http, or with curl: bash curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18082/v1/chat/completions \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "model": "ollama-local/gemma3", "messages": [{"role":"user","content":[ {"type":"text","text":"reproduction image-prefetch trigger"}, {"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"http://rebind.9r.test:8080/ssrf-marker?case=rebind-trigger"}} ]}], "stream": false }'

Impact

  • SSRF to internal HTTP services reachable from the 9router host/container.
  • Depending on the environment, this can reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin panels, or be used for internal service discovery.
  • Blind / semi-blind SSRF when the fetched response is not returned to the attacker; an exfil variant (pointing the image at an internal endpoint that returns valid image bytes) can return internal content base64-encoded to the upstream.
  • Requires a code path that prefetches/normalizes remote images for vision-capable providers.
  • No real credential is needed for the reproduction.

Suggested Fix

  • Pin the resolved IP after validation and connect to that IP (resolve once, then reuse the address for the fetch).
  • Block private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and cloud-metadata ranges at connect time, not only at validation time.
  • Perform DNS resolution and IP checks immediately before the request and against the address actually used to connect.
  • Disable redirects, or re-validate every redirect target with the same checks.
  • Enforce an allowlist for image-fetch domains where feasible.
  • Add a timeout, a response size limit, and a content-type check.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.80"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "9router"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T18:12:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T16:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n9router validates image URLs by resolving the host before fetching, but the later\nserver-side fetch performs a separate DNS resolution. An attacker-controlled DNS name can\nresolve to a public IP during validation and then rebind to an internal Docker/private IP\nduring the fetch. This allows the server-side image prefetch to reach internal-only HTTP\nservices (SSRF).\n\n## Details\n\n- **Affected version / commit:** 9router `v0.4.80` @ `b282f05`.\n- **Reachable through** `/v1/chat/completions` with a **vision-capable model** and an\n  `image_url` content part. A vision-capable model name is required so the image survives\n  modality stripping and the server-side prefetch is armed.\n- The provider used in this reproduction is the bundled **mock provider** \u2014 **no real API\n  key and no real provider call**.\n- **internal-admin** (the SSRF target) is **not exposed to the host network**; it is\n  reachable only from inside the Docker network.\n- **rebind-dns** behaviour for `rebind.9r.test`:\n  - first A response \u2192 `1.1.1.1` (public) to pass the public-host guard,\n  - second A response \u2192 `172.29.0.10` (internal-admin) during the fetch.\n- **internal-admin** logs `GET /ssrf-marker` with `peer=172.29.0.30` (the `proxied-router`\n  container), proving the server-side fetch landed on the internal service.\n- **mock-provider** receives `POST /api/chat` and the flow completes with `HTTP 200`.\n- **Root cause:** DNS TOCTOU \u2014 the IP is **not pinned** between the validation resolution\n  (the public-host guard) and the fetch resolution. The guard and the fetch each resolve the\n  hostname independently, so a TTL-0 rebinding authority can return a public IP to the guard\n  and an internal IP to the fetch.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThis repository is a self-contained Docker Compose reproduction. No real provider is called\nand no real API key is required.\n\n1. Build and start the stack:\n   ```bash\n   docker compose up --build\n   ```\n2. Confirm `internal-admin` is unreachable from the host:\n   ```bash\n   curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18083/ssrf-marker   # connection refused / fail\n   docker compose ps                            # internal-admin has NO host port mapping\n   ```\n3. Send the request named **`POST image-prefetch DNS rebinding trigger`** from\n   [`requests.http`](./requests.http), or with curl:\n   ```bash\n   curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18082/v1/chat/completions \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n     -d \u0027{\n       \"model\": \"ollama-local/gemma3\",\n       \"messages\": [{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":[\n         {\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"reproduction image-prefetch trigger\"},\n         {\"type\":\"image_url\",\"image_url\":{\"url\":\"http://rebind.9r.test:8080/ssrf-marker?case=rebind-trigger\"}}\n       ]}],\n       \"stream\": false\n     }\u0027\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\n- SSRF to internal HTTP services reachable from the 9router host/container.\n- Depending on the environment, this can reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin\n  panels, or be used for internal service discovery.\n- Blind / semi-blind SSRF when the fetched response is not returned to the attacker; an\n  exfil variant (pointing the image at an internal endpoint that returns valid image bytes)\n  can return internal content base64-encoded to the upstream.\n- Requires a code path that prefetches/normalizes remote images for vision-capable\n  providers.\n- No real credential is needed for the reproduction.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n- **Pin the resolved IP** after validation and connect to **that** IP (resolve once, then\n  reuse the address for the fetch).\n- Block private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and cloud-metadata ranges **at connect\n  time**, not only at validation time.\n- Perform DNS resolution and IP checks immediately before the request and against the\n  address actually used to connect.\n- Disable redirects, or re-validate every redirect target with the same checks.\n- Enforce an allowlist for image-fetch domains where feasible.\n- Add a timeout, a response size limit, and a content-type check.",
  "id": "GHSA-cmhj-wh2f-9cgx",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T18:12:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-23T18:12:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-cmhj-wh2f-9cgx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/c7d07448c58bec1200741de0b73305b860416b82"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "9router: Image prefetch DNS rebinding allows SSRF to internal services"
}



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