GHSA-CHQV-VRJ7-QFFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:35 – Updated: 2026-05-21 20:35
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members
Details

Summary

Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.

Details

Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.

The end-to-end chain:

  • GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users returned the member list to shared-base callers (@Acl('baseUserList')).
  • POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users accepted an invite from shared-base callers (@Acl('userInvite')); base-users.service.ts inserted a real nc_users_v2 row with invite_token and a nc_base_users_v2 row for the target base, with invited_by = null.
  • The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (users.service.ts), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.
  • Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.

Impact

  • Confidentiality: shared-base link exposes member email addresses.
  • Integrity: shared-base link can mutate base ACL state by creating new members.
  • Persistence: link-based access converts into durable authenticated access that survives revocation of the share.

Credit

This issue was reported by @0xmrma.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.301.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46552"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nShared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (`xc-shared-base-id`), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.\n\n### Details\n\nShared-base sessions were mapped to `ProjectRoles.VIEWER` in `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts`, and `packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts` granted `baseUserList` and `userInvite` to that role. The shared frontend (`packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts`) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.\n\nThe end-to-end chain:\n\n- `GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` returned the member list to shared-base callers (`@Acl(\u0027baseUserList\u0027)`).\n- `POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` accepted an invite from shared-base callers (`@Acl(\u0027userInvite\u0027)`); `base-users.service.ts` inserted a real `nc_users_v2` row with `invite_token` and a `nc_base_users_v2` row for the target base, with `invited_by = null`.\n- The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (`users.service.ts`), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.\n- Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Confidentiality: shared-base link exposes member email addresses.\n- Integrity: shared-base link can mutate base ACL state by creating new members.\n- Persistence: link-based access converts into durable authenticated access that survives revocation of the share.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@0xmrma](https://github.com/0xmrma).",
  "id": "GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members"
}


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