GHSA-CHQV-VRJ7-QFFP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:35 – Updated: 2026-05-21 20:35Summary
Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.
Details
Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.
The end-to-end chain:
GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/usersreturned the member list to shared-base callers (@Acl('baseUserList')).POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/usersaccepted an invite from shared-base callers (@Acl('userInvite'));base-users.service.tsinserted a realnc_users_v2row withinvite_tokenand anc_base_users_v2row for the target base, withinvited_by = null.- The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (
users.service.ts), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base. - Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.
Impact
- Confidentiality: shared-base link exposes member email addresses.
- Integrity: shared-base link can mutate base ACL state by creating new members.
- Persistence: link-based access converts into durable authenticated access that survives revocation of the share.
Credit
This issue was reported by @0xmrma.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.301.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46552"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nShared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (`xc-shared-base-id`), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.\n\n### Details\n\nShared-base sessions were mapped to `ProjectRoles.VIEWER` in `packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts`, and `packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts` granted `baseUserList` and `userInvite` to that role. The shared frontend (`packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts`) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.\n\nThe end-to-end chain:\n\n- `GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` returned the member list to shared-base callers (`@Acl(\u0027baseUserList\u0027)`).\n- `POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users` accepted an invite from shared-base callers (`@Acl(\u0027userInvite\u0027)`); `base-users.service.ts` inserted a real `nc_users_v2` row with `invite_token` and a `nc_base_users_v2` row for the target base, with `invited_by = null`.\n- The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (`users.service.ts`), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.\n- Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Confidentiality: shared-base link exposes member email addresses.\n- Integrity: shared-base link can mutate base ACL state by creating new members.\n- Persistence: link-based access converts into durable authenticated access that survives revocation of the share.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@0xmrma](https://github.com/0xmrma).",
"id": "GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp",
"modified": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:35:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.