GHSA-C96P-56GH-3PVW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-05 09:30 – Updated: 2026-07-05 09:30
VLAI
Details

A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default).

The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default).

The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider.

Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database.

Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows.

Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-14781"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-05T07:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token.\nThe root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token\u0027s email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email.\nExploitation Conditions:\nThe OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default).\n\nThe userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default).\n\nThe attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider.\n\n\nConcrete Impact:\nMark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database.\n\nBypass email-based security controls or verification workflows.\n\nPotential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.",
  "id": "GHSA-c96p-56gh-3pvw",
  "modified": "2026-07-05T09:30:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-05T09:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14781"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-14781"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2497118"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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